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ADMISSIBILITY COMPARED: THE RECEPTION OF
INCRIMINATING EXPERT EVIDENCE (I.E., FORENSIC SCIENCE)
IN FOUR ADVERSARIAL JURISDICTIONS
Gary Edmond,* Simon Cole,† Emma Cunliffe,‡ and Andrew Roberts§

INTRODUCTION
The single most important observation about judicial [gate-keeping] of
forensic science is that most judges under most circumstances admit
most forensic science. There is almost no expert testimony so threadbare
that it will not be admitted if it comes to a criminal proceeding under the
banner of forensic science. . . . The applicable legal test offers little
assurance. The maverick who is a field unto him- or herself has
repeatedly been readily admitted under Frye, and the complete absence
of foundational research has not prevented such admission in Daubert
jurisdictions.1
There is an epistemic crisis in many areas of forensic science. This crisis
emerged largely in response both to the mobilization of a range of academic commentators
and critics and the rise and influence of DNA typing. It gained popular and authoritative
support through the influence of the National Academy of Science (NAS) and a
surprisingly critical report produced under its auspices by a committee of the National
Research Council (NRC). Interestingly, as this article endeavors to explain, the courts
themselves seem to have played a rather indirect, inconsistent and ultimately ineffective
role in the supervision and evaluation of forensic science evidence. Indeed, in the
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Jane Campbell Moriarty & Michael J. Saks, Forensic Science: Grand Goals, Tragic Flaws, and Judicial
Gatekeeping, 44 JUDGES J. 16, 29 (2005).
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aftermath of recent criticism of the forensic sciences, this essay considers the effect of the
dominant admissibility standards that operate in four common law jurisdictions. The
revealing result seems to be that although admissibility standards vary across these
jurisdictions, actual admissibility practices are remarkably consistent. In this article we
will question the extent to which courts (and legal personnel) are able to meaningfully
invigilate the use of forensic science evidence in criminal proceedings and consider some
of the ideological commitments and institutional pressures that might lead judges in all
jurisdictions to prefer inclusive approaches to incriminating expert opinions.
In the first part of the article, we compare rules, jurisprudence and practices,
across four jurisdictions: the United States, England and Wales, Canada, and Australia.2
All profoundly shaped by the English common law, these jurisdictions (and their subjurisdictions) tend to use a mixture of common law (e.g. England and Wales and Canada),
judge-made rules (e.g. the U.S. Federal Rules of Evidence) and statutory schemes (e.g. the
Australian Evidence Act 1995 Cth and many states in the United States) to regulate the
admission of evidence, including expert opinion.3 These jurisdictions tend to maintain
criminal trial processes that remain reasonably similar and facilitate broad brush
comparisons.4
Forensic science and medical techniques are used routinely in criminal
proceedings. We have selected techniques (and technologies) that are not necessarily
standardized, but are regularly used in each of the four jurisdictions.5 Legal recognition
and treatment as distinctive types of evidence enables us to consider what these advanced
jurisdictions, with different, though evolving, admissibility standards have done (and are
doing) in response to the various techniques and opinions. Our findings suggest that
admissibility standards, including the first generation of reliability-based standards, seem
to make little, if any, difference to (traditional) admissibility decision-making and
practice. Allowing for some variation, the same sorts of forensic science evidence are
admitted across all jurisdictions, even where the techniques are not demonstrably reliable
and the jurisdiction in question has explicit reliability standards and other rules regulating
the admission of expert opinion evidence. Moreover, it is our contention that the legal
accommodation of the techniques considered in this article exemplifies a more general
response to admissibility and the regulation of forensic science and medicine evidence. In
the second part of the article we will consider possible explanations and some of the
implications of our findings.

2
Our study surveys and summarizes the leading decisions rather than a detailed empirical study of actual case
practices across jurisdictions. Both would be interesting and informative, but this offers a first attempt to survey
leading decisions against formal rules and overarching criminal justice objectives and values.
3

See generally FED. R. EVID.; FED. R. EVID. 702 (Federal Rule of Evidence concerning expert testimony);
Australian Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (a statutory scheme covering everything from cross examination to
admission of evidence).

4
It should be noted, however, that there are many differences, not all of which should be considered trivial. Canada,
for example, has fewer trials before juries than the other jurisdictions. Many prosecutors and judges in the United
States are elected, and the United States retains civil juries, making the admissibility of expert opinion evidence an
important, and frequently controversial, issue in civil proceedings (e.g. tort and product liability litigation). There are
no capital cases or capital juries in England, Canada, and Australia. Australia and England tend to provide relatively
well-resourced defense lawyers and are more likely to expend state resources on defense experts than most U.S. states.
Undoubtedly, these and a myriad of other differences in practice, traditions, and resourcing (of courts, police and
forensic sciences, as well as parties) influence the ways in which forensic science and medicine evidence is developed,
contested, and admitted.
5

While there can be quite significant differences in actual practices, many of the techniques feature remarkably
similar ingredients across our sample. Many of these similarities flow from information and technology sharing
or the use of proprietary systems.
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Rules of Evidence and Procedure

A fundamental condition of admissibility is that evidence must be relevant.6 That
means it must be capable of rationally influencing the assessment of facts in issue (i.e., the
contested or material facts).7 Ordinarily, opinion evidence is not admissible. Witnesses are
normally required to testify about facts.8 There are exceptions for some kinds of opinion
evidence. Lay witnesses are frequently allowed to express opinions, especially those
necessary to make sense of the witness’ perceptions or impressions.9 It is, for example, not
uncommon for a witness to be allowed to express an opinion on events within their
experience: such as a person’s emotional state; whether someone was intoxicated; and
even whether a car was being driven fast or dangerously.10 Most of the forensic science
evidence considered in this article is opinion evidence and subject to exclusionary rules
operating in all of our jurisdictions. Because of its great potential to assist the tribunal of
fact, all jurisdictions maintain an exception for the opinions of “experts” or for opinions
based on “specialized knowledge.”11 Though not all require evidence about the reliability
of the method or technique, or the expert’s ability, for admissibility purposes. In most
common law jurisdictions (with a jury), where the admissibility of expert opinion
evidence is contested, the trial judge will conduct a hearing (a voir dire or Daubert
hearing) into the admissibility of the evidence. Such hearings are normally held in the
absence of the jury.
Once expert opinion evidence is deemed admissible, the expert witness is subject
to direct (i.e., examination-in-chief) and limited re-direct (i.e., re-examination) by the
party calling the witness and cross-examination by the other parties. It is not uncommon
for an expert’s report (or part thereof) to be tendered as his or her evidence-in-chief. In
most adversarial jurisdictions the trial judge maintains a discretion to exclude otherwise
admissible evidence if its reception would result in unfairness, or the value of the evidence
is outweighed by any unfair prejudice it might engender.12 In practice, where expert
opinion evidence satisfies the exception to the opinion rule, trial and appellate judges
rarely resort to discretionary powers to exclude incriminating evidence. In some
jurisdictions (such as England), depending on the kind of evidence, the judge may offer
some guidance or cautionary instructions to the tribunal of fact, in others (parts of
Australia, under the uniform statutes, for example), there may be a duty to do so.13 In
recent years, in response to challenges and increasing sensitivity to reliability discourses,
some judges have been prepared (or obliged), often in consultation with the lawyers, to
prescribe the precise wording of parts of an expert’s testimony. On some occasions,
reading down the confidence or strength of opinions and conclusions operates as an
admissibility compromise.
6

See JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 485 (1898).

7

See id. at 267; see also FED. R. EVID. 401 (establishing the Federal Rules of Evidence test for what evidence is
relevant).
8

In practice, courts in all jurisdictions acknowledge the blurred boundary between fact and opinion.

9

See FED. R. EVID. 701.

10

See, e.g., id. §§ 701 & 803(3).

11

See, e.g., id. §§ 702-703; Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79 (Austl.); Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (Can.);
Criminal Procedure Rules, (2012), c. 33 §§ 1-2 (Eng.). We use ‘tribunal of fact’ interchangeably with ‘trier of
fact’ and ‘fact-finder.’ A jury is the proto-typical tribunal of fact, but increasingly judges (and appellate courts)
are involved in fact-finding. Joan Steinman, Appellate Courts as First Responders: The Constitutionality and
Propriety of Appellate Courts’ Resolving Issues in the First Instance, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1521, 1521, 1525
(2012) (discussing the role of appellate courts as fact-finders).
12

See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403; Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 130 (Austl.) (codifying the common law Christie
Discretion first established in R. v. Christie AC [1914] 545 (Austl.)); Evidence Act 2008 (Cth) s 137 (Austl.).

13

Civil Procedure Rules, (2012), c. 32 § 1 (Eng.); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 116 (Austl.).

34

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

Once expert opinion evidence is deemed admissible, the “weight” attached is a
matter for the tribunal of fact based on what transpires at trial (e.g. cross-examination and
rebuttal experts), along with any other evidence and instructions.
All of the jurisdictions considered in this article offer some kind of judicial
review or appeal mechanism.14 Trial and appellate courts appear to hold great confidence
in the effectiveness of trial safeguards, and the abilities of tribunals of fact (whether judges
or juries) and appellate courts to understand and evaluate incriminating expert opinion
evidence.
B.

The Epistemological Status of the Forensic Identification Sciences

Before moving to review admissibility rules, jurisprudence and practice in the
U.S., England and Wales, Canada and Australia, it is helpful to provide a backdrop to the
epistemic status of the forensic comparison techniques that form the primary focus of our
study.
In what follows, we draw upon studies that have cast doubt on the adequacy of
empirical support for the forensic science techniques that are routinely admitted in all of
our jurisdictions. Our reason for doing so is that the results of these studies will tend to
amplify the implications of our findings. In this respect, an important backdrop to our
discussion and understanding of the value of the techniques is a recent report by the
National Research Council of the United States National Academy of Science (NAS)
published in 2009 (hereafter the NRC report).15
The NRC report is authoritative, particularly in relation to understanding the
value of forensic science and medical evidence and the effectiveness of admissibility
standards. The report is particularly illuminating of a range of “identification” sciences;
because the multidisciplinary committee responsible for its drafting was surprisingly
critical of the research base, or lack thereof, underpinning many techniques that are
routinely relied upon in criminal investigations and prosecutions.16 According to the NRC
report:
The degree of science in a forensic science method may have an
important bearing on the reliability of forensic evidence in criminal
cases. There are two very important questions that should underlie the
law’s admission of and reliance upon forensic evidence in criminal
trials: (1) the extent to which a particular forensic discipline is founded
on a reliable scientific methodology that gives it the capacity to
accurately analyze evidence and report findings and (2) the extent to
which practitioners in a particular forensic discipline rely on human
interpretation that could be tainted by error, the threat of bias, or the
absence of sound operational procedures and robust performance
standards. These questions are significant: The goal of law enforcement
actions is to identify those who have committed crimes and to prevent
the criminal justice system from erroneously convicting the innocent. So
it matters a great deal whether an expert is qualified to testify about
14

England and Wales also have a free-standing Criminal Cases Review Commission. Peter Duff, Straddling Two
Worlds: Reflections of a Retired Criminal Cases Review Commissioner, 72 MOD. L. REV. 693, 695-96 (2009);
See generally LAURIE ELKS, RIGHTING MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE?: TEN YEARS OF THE CRIMINAL CASES
REVIEW COMMISSION (2008).
15
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD
(2009).
16
Harry T. Edwards & Constantine Gatsonis, Preface to NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD, at xix-xx (2009).
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forensic evidence and whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable to
merit a fact finder’s reliance on the truth that it purports to support. . . .
Unfortunately, these important questions do not always produce
satisfactory answers in judicial decisions pertaining to the admissibility
of forensic science evidence proffered in criminal trials.17
And, directly relevant to this article:
With the exception of nuclear DNA analysis . . . no forensic method has
been rigorously shown to have the capacity to consistently, and with a
high degree of certainty, demonstrate a connection between evidence
and a specific individual or source. . . . The law’s greatest dilemma in its
heavy reliance on forensic evidence, however, concerns the question of
whether—and to what extent—there is science in any given forensic
science discipline.18
While image evidence, and several other techniques and methods in widespread use were
not included within the scope of its purview, many of the Committee’s concerns appear
readily applicable to these areas of practice.19
The NRC report is salient because the inability to support forensic science
techniques and derivative opinion evidence with empirical evidence—and this applies to
techniques that have been routinely admitted and relied upon for more than a century—
seems to be a common feature of practice in all of our jurisdictions. In other words, the
NRC report authoritatively exposes the lack of underlying research support for many
forensic science and medical techniques in the United States and elsewhere.20
The NRC report recommends establishing a National Institute of Forensic
Sciences to undertake research, standard setting and accreditation, in response to
expressed doubts about the ability of lawyers and judges to credibly respond to what is
characterized as the parlous state of affairs.21
The report finds that the existing legal regime—including the rules
governing the admissibility of forensic evidence, the applicable
standards governing appellate review of trial court decisions, the
limitations of the adversary process, and judges and lawyers who often
lack the scientific expertise necessary to comprehend and evaluate
forensic evidence—is inadequate to the task of curing the documented
ills of the forensic science disciplines.22
It is also important to indicate that the authors have reservations about the value
of many types of forensic science and several of those discussed in this article. In
17

NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 9, 87.

18

Id. at 7, 9.

19

See STEPHEN GOUDGE, INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY IN ONTARIO 80 (2008) (discussing
forensic pathology).

20

Scholarly criticisms were frequently dismissed or ignored, but it is much more difficult to challenge the NRC
report. See Gary Edmond & Kent Roach, A Contextual Approach to the Admissibility of the State’s Forensic
Science and Medical Evidence, 61 UNIV. TORONTO L.J. 343, 367-68 (2011). In Australia, forensic sciences are
often defended on the basis of standards and accreditation, but the research underlying these standards is far from
always obvious. Edmond is a member of the Standards Australia committee tasked with drafting standards for
the forensic sciences in Australia. See also Gary Edmond, What lawyers should know about the forensic
‘sciences’, 36 Adelaide L. Rev. (2014) (forthcoming).
21

See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 19.

22

Id. at 85.
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particular, we are concerned that fingerprint, bite mark, image and voice comparison
evidence is often relied upon or expressed in ways that are not consistent with existing
empirical evidence.23 Each of us has written about problems with expert evidence, and
particularly forensic science and forensic medicine, and the manner in which admissibility
standards and practice do not seem to prevent problematic forms of expert opinion
evidence being adduced and admitted in criminal proceedings.24 By way of summary, we
share the general outlook expressed by the NRC. Our research and observations affirm
that techniques routinely relied upon by investigators, prosecutors, jurors and judges are
either unreliable or of unknown reliability.25 This article represents an attempt to
consolidate these experiences in a manner that facilitates a systematic comparison capable
of illuminating the limits of current standards, practice and personnel when assessed
against the overarching objectives of the accusatorial criminal trial.
The NRC report suggests that DNA evidence generally stands on a stronger
scientific foundation than these other techniques;26 though it should not be seen as
infallible. There are continuing problems with DNA evidence that extend beyond chain of
custody issues, to interpretations (especially of mixed samples and the random match
probabilities for sub-populations), how to respond to increasingly sensitive analyses (such
as those associated with low copy number techniques), the transportability of microscopic
biological traces, and finally, whether the real-world risk of error (laboratory or otherwise)
should be imposed on the fantastically large probabilities (and likelihood ratios) routinely

23
We are also engaged in debates about the expression of results in reports and testimony as well as the adequacy
of the adversarial trial (and the effectiveness of its various processes and safeguards). See Gary Edmond, Kristy
Martier & Mehere San Roque, Unsound Law: Issues With (‘Expert’) Voice Comparison Evidence, 35 MELB. U.
L. REV. 52, 53-54 (2011) (contending that voice comparison evidence is readily admitted when the probative
value is unknown and traditional features of the adversarial trial are inadequate to correct the associated
problems).
24
THE LAW COMM’N, EXPERT EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN ENGLAND AND WALES 14 (2011)
(stating that an expert’s opinion evidence must satisfy a threshold of acceptable reliability); SIMON A. COLE,
SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION, 4-5 (2001) (reflecting on
methods of criminal identification that have been suspect, such as fingerprint identification); Simon A. Cole,
More Than Zero: Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 985,
988-91 (2005) (arguing that fingerprint identification is not error free); Simon A. Cole, Is Fingerprint
Identification Valid? Rhetorics of Reliability in Fingerprint Proponents’ Discourse, 28 L. & POL’Y 109, 109-10
(2006) (considering whether or not latent print identification is valid); EMMA CUNLIFFE, MURDER, MEDICINE
AND MOTHERHOOD 2-4 (2011) (arguing that behavioral and scientific evidence cannot provide independent proof
of guilt); Gary Edmond et al., ‘Mere guesswork’: Cross-Lingual Voice Comparisons and the Jury, 33 SYDNEY L.
REV. 395, 396 (2011) (outlining the dangers associated with the allowance of jurors to engage in voice
identification and comparison); Gary Edmond at al., Unsound Law: Issues With (‘Expert’) Voice Comparison
Evidence, 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 52, 53-54 (2011) (contending that voice comparison evidence is readily admitted
when the probative value is unknown and traditional features of the adversarial trial are inadequate to correct the
associated problems); Gary Edmond et al., Law’s Looking Glass: Expert Identification Evidence Derived from
Photographic and Video Images, 20 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 337, 337-38 (2009) (illustrating limitations
with approaches to the use of images as evidence); Gary Edmond et al., Atkins v. The Emperor: The ‘Cautious’
Use of Unreliable ‘Expert’ Evidence, 14 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 146, 146 (2010) (concerning
jurisprudential weakness and problems with photo comparison and facial mapping evidence); Andrew Roberts,
Rejecting General Acceptance, Confounding the Gatekeeper: The Law Commission on Expert Evidence CRIM. L.
REV. 551 (2009).
25

Professor Edmond is engaged in ongoing observational research. Professor Cole participates as an expert
witness and advisor. Professor Cunliffe has undertaken empirical research into the relationship between expert
testimony and scientific research. Professor Roberts is primarily a scholarly commentator. See, e.g., Michael
Lynch & Simon Cole, Science and Technology Studies on Trial: Dilemmas of Expertise 35 SOC. STUD. SCI. 269,
272-73 (2005). See generally Simon Cole, A Cautionary Tale About Cautionary Tales About Intervention, 16
ORG. 121 (2009).

26

Although, there would appear to be more chance of accidental (though potentially incriminating)
contamination with DNA than with most images and voice recordings, for example. See BRANDON L. GARRETT,
CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 100-02 (2011).
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generated.27 There are also problems with the manner in which DNA matches should be
expressed that seem to raise profound challenges for a system of trials based on lay
assessment of technical and other forms of evidence.28 Moreover, it is unlikely that the
possibility of full genetic sequencing will eliminate all of these risks, even if it changes
what is meant by ‘matching’ DNA profiles.29 Many of the original problems with DNA
evidence are known (or “visible”) today because of the existence and involvement of
scientists (e.g. biologists, geneticists and statisticians) from beyond the institutionalized
forensic sciences (and commercial providers). Nevertheless, the inclusion of DNA
evidence, as a stabilized and research-based technology, enables us to compare practices
associated with less stabilized or more controversial techniques, including some that are
not supported by empirical evidence and openly questioned by the NRC and/or most
attentive academic commentators.
Those allowed to give evidence, as some kind of expert, routinely use apparent or
alleged similarities as the basis for opinions pertaining to the identification of a person of
interest (POI). In some cases, as with photo-interpretation and bite marks, there is no
established technique for explaining how traces—say images or bruising, respectively—
relate to the objects that features in them or produced them. Even where the similarities or
artifacts are real (or, as is more often the case, not contested) in most circumstances we
have little idea of how common a particular feature is, or its relationship to (or
independence from) other features. Notwithstanding such deficiencies, techniques based
on comparisons are routinely used for the purposes of identification or to assist with
identification at trial (and during pre-trial processes).30 There is little, if any, evidence to
support the value of opinions derived from these techniques, and furthermore, many of
these forms of evidence are obtained in ways that are likely to create or exacerbate errors.
Taking just one example, it is very common for those using comparison
techniques where the identity of an offender or source is at stake—and this even applies to
latent fingerprint examiners and the interpretation of DNA profiles (especially in mixed
samples)—to have access to information that is strictly irrelevant to their analysis but
implicates a particular person, or persons, or source. Consequently, we have a range of
individuals of varying levels of training and experience, offering opinions about evidence
in conditions where there may be few, if any, empirically established methods or
standards, and in circumstances where gratuitous information may influence the
interpretation.31 Moreover, attempts to ascertain proficiency or substantially mitigate
many of the problems identified by scholarly commentators (and other critics) and the
NRC report are highly variable. Rather, as this article illustrates, admissibility decisions
are often relied upon by witnesses and investigative institutions to support techniques, and
displace the need for scientific validation and proficiency testing.
One caveat. It may well turn out that some of the techniques and opinions we are
discussing have considerable probative value. If evidence emerges that supports the
27

Id. at 101-02.

28

Aytugrul v. The Queen [2012] HCA 15 (Unreported, 18 April 2012) (Austl.) (an example of a case in which
the method of expressing DNA evidence was contested); see also Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks,
Communicating Opinion Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact, 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 1159, 1180 (2008) (citing research that indicates the method of expressing DNA match evidence can affect
jurors).
29

Ironically, this might be closer to what the latent fingerprint examiners had historically assumed.

30

Problems with forensic science and medicine apply to pre-trial negotiations, especially plea-bargaining, where
the limits of expert opinion evidence might not be recognized.
31

See Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making Erroneous
Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 74 (2006). See generally, GARRETT, supra note 26.
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accuracy of these techniques, that could hardly be seen as a vindication of past legal
practice and a liberal approach, particularly in those jurisdictions with formal reliability
standards. Moreover, future empirical vindication will not overcome the ways in which a
range of biases and procedural problems, that may contaminate forensic science practice
and conclusions, were and are routinely trivialized. Nor will it address persistent and
unanswered questions about the ability of adversarial criminal proceedings and the various
participants (i.e., lawyers, forensic scientists, judges and jurors) to credibly manage even
highly reliable techniques. It is our contention that unreliable and speculative
incriminating expert opinion evidence always threatens important institutional values such
as rectitude of decision and the fairness of accusatorial proceedings.32

I.

COMPARISON

Our comparative review begins with the U.S. because of its influence in the wake
of the rise of DNA evidence and the institution of reliability standards and admissibility
jurisprudence following the seminal Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
decision in 1993.33
A.

The United States: Admissibility Standards, Jurisprudence, and
Practice

The United States is a federal system encompassing 50 state courts as well as
federal courts. In recent decades an expectation has emerged that judges will assume a
“gate-keeping” role in controlling the admission of expert opinion evidence. Most, but not
all, jurisdictions adhere to one of two principal approaches which are generally known by
their leading cases: Frye v. United States (1923) and Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals (1993).34 Today, 29 states and the federal courts adhere to Daubert or a
Daubert-like model.35 Daubert has been described as a ‘reliability-validity’ model.36 The
principal attribute of Daubert, as opposed to Frye, is that it mandates that the trial court
undertake an independent assessment of the evidence to determine its admissibility.37 This
aspect of Daubert has been often criticized, most conspicuously in Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s dissent, for its assumption that judges without scientific training are
competent to evaluate scientific evidence.38 Though commonly described as a four or fivepart test, Daubert is really a two-part test derived from Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE).39 The two criteria for admissibility under Daubert are relevance and

32

See Gary Edmond & Andrew Roberts, Procedural Fairness, the Criminal Trial and Forensic Science and
Medicine 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 359 (2011).

33

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).

34

Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579.

35

David E. Bernstein & Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Daubert Trilogy in the States, 44 JURIMETRICS J. 351, 355-56
(2004).

36

DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE 288 n.22 (2d ed. 2010).

37

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585-93.

38

Id. at 600-01.

39

Id. at 588-89. Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence was designed to govern the admissibility of expert
opinion evidence in United States Federal Courts (as an exception to the general prohibition on opinion evidence
provided by the exclusionary Rule 701). The original version of Rule 702 read, “If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise”; See FED. R. EVID. 702 (1975) (amended 2011).
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reliability.40 It was by way of explicating the idea of “reliability,” that the Court
articulated four (or five) criteria: (1) testing, (2) peer review and publication, (3) error rate
and standards,41 and (4) general acceptance in the relevant scientific community.42 Not
intended as a checklist, the criteria were to be applied flexibly to assist with admissibility
decision-making.
Daubert was explicated in two further appeals to the Supreme Court, often
described as its ‘progeny’: General Electric v. Joiner and Kumho Tire v. Carmichael.43
Reiterating the importance of flexibility, in Kumho the Court explained that the Daubert
criteria may be applied to admissibility determinations for non-scientific forms of expert
evidence—i.e., “‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge.”44 Joiner, importantly,
states that the standard of review for admissibility decisions by trial courts is “abuse of
discretion.”45 In consequence, admissibility decisions are not subject to stringent review
and similar types of expert evidence may be treated disparately across jurisdictions,
courtrooms and cases, as well as over time.
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, on which Daubert and Kumho were
based, was revised in 2000 to make the need for ‘reliability’ explicit.46 It now reads:
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or
data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the
facts of the case.47
The revised version of Rule 702 seems to have made little discernible difference to
practice and is largely conceived as a statutory explication of the Daubert and Kumho
decisions.
Sixteen U.S. states, including some of the most populous, continue to adhere to
the ‘general acceptance’ approach embodied in the earlier Frye decision.48 Frye has been
40

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95; see FED. R. EVID. 401, (stating that ‘relevant evidence’ means evidence having
any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence).

41

It is these two items which are sometimes—quite logically since they have little obvious relation—
disaggregated to purportedly render Daubert a five-, rather than a four-, part test. See, e.g., Bond v. State, 925
N.E.2d 773, 779 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
42

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. Sometimes the existence and use of standards is included as a fifth criterion.
Perhaps the most notorious addition occurred when, on remand, Judge Kozinski added anxiety about ‘science for
litigation’ into the mix. See Gary Edmond, Supersizing Daubert: Science for Litigation and its Implications for
Legal Practice and Scientific Research, 52 VILL. L. REV. 857, 864-65 (2007).

43

Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); General Electric v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). Some legal
scholars find Kumho to be the most coherent of the three opinions (Kumho, Joiner, and Daubert) and argue that
evidence scholars should speak of a ‘Kumho approach’ to evidence, rather than a ‘Daubert approach.’ E.g., D.
Michael Risinger, Goodbye to All That, or A Fool's Errand, by One of the Fools: How I Stopped Worrying About
Court Responses to Handwriting Identification (and "Forensic Science" in General) and Learned to Love
Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 TULSA L. REV. 447, 462, 467 (2007).

44

Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147-48.

45

Joiner, 522 U.S. at 141.

46

FED. R. EVID. 702(c) (2000) (amended 2012).

47

Id. We use the terms ‘trier of fact’ and ‘tribunal of fact’ interchangeably.

48

Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific and Other Expert Evidence
in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453 (2011).
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called a ‘deference’ approach in that, rather than asking the trial judge to evaluate the
reliability and validity of proffered evidence, Frye suggests that the judge try to ascertain
how those scientists best positioned to undertake such an evaluation—‘the relevant
scientific community’—evaluate the evidence.49
Though deference and independent assessment of validity-reliability are quite
different philosophically, in practice the two approaches have tended to produce
remarkably similar outcomes. Indeed, empirical studies have observed little difference in
outcomes between Frye and Daubert jurisdictions.50 While the Daubert approach retains
“general acceptance” as one of its “factors,” this does not provide a very persuasive
explanation for the apparent convergence.51 Interestingly, studies suggest that U.S. judges
struggle with several of the Daubert criteria, and are not in a position to make an
assessment of the relevant community or the extent of acceptance.52 Instead, they tend to
use heuristics, such as credentials and experience, when making admissibility decisions in
criminal trials and appeals.53
In addition, six U.S. states have been characterized as “hybrids” because their
admissibility standards combine features from Frye and Daubert.54 Three U.S. states have
their own independent admissibility regimes.55 Once again, these alternative admissibility
standards have not produced practices or outcomes that diverge significantly from those
associated with Frye and Daubert.
Among evidence scholars (and other observers), the U.S. courts’ handling of
forensic evidence in admissibility hearings and trials has been soundly and nearly
universally excoriated.56 This critical view was recently endorsed by the NRC Report,
which characterized U.S. courts as “utterly ineffective” in using the law of expert evidence
to encourage “forensic science professionals . . . to establish either the validity of [their]
approach or the accuracy of [their] conclusions.”57

49

See Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century
Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1205 (1980). Frye was decided in 1923 but it was not widely used until much
later.
50

E.g., Edward K. Cheng & Albert H. Yoon, Does Frye or Daubert Matter? A Study of Scientific Admissibility
Standards, 91 VA. L. REV. 471, 511 (2005); Veronica B. Dahir et al., Judicial Application of Daubert to
Psychological Syndrome and Profile Evidence, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 62, 62, 64, 78 (2005); Lloyd
Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards for Admitting Expert Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the
Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 251, 252, 285-86 (2002); Henry F. Fradella et al., The Impact of
Daubert on the Admissibility of Behavioral Science Testimony, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 403, 443-44 (2003); Jennifer
Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal Criminal
Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 339, 339 (2002).
51

Cheng & Yoon, supra note 50, at 478.

52

Groscup et al., supra note 50, at 341, 367.

53

Id. at 357.

54

Lustre, supra note 48.

55

Id.

56

E.g., DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: FORENSICS (Student ed. 2008); KELLY M.
PYREK, FORENSIC SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE: THE CHALLENGES OF FORENSIC LABORATORIES AND THE MEDICOLEGAL DEATH INVESTIGATION SYSTEM (2007); Margaret A. Berger, What Has a Decade of Daubert Wrought?,
95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH S59 (2005); Paul C. Giannelli, The Supreme Court's "Criminal" Daubert Cases, 33
SETON HALL L. REV. 1071 (2003); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprints: Not a Gold Standard, 20 ISSUES IN SCI. &
TECH. 47 (2003); Risinger, supra note 43; Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift
in Forensic Identification Science, 309 SCI. 892 (2005). E.g., André Moenssens, Fingerprint Identification: A
Valid Reliable "Forensic Science"?, 18 CRIM. JUST. 31 (2003); André Moenssens, Palmprint and Handwriting
I.D. Satisfy Daubert Rule, THE CRIMINALIST (Spring 2004), available at http://njiai.org/Criminalist0604.pdf.
57

NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15, at 53.
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Other potential methods of controlling the reception of expert opinion in U.S. law
include the probative value/prejudice discretion and jury instructions. Rule 403,
embodying the federal version of the discretion, states that evidence may be excluded “if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice,
confusi[on of] the issues, [or] misleading the jury, [or by considerations of] undue delay,
[waste of] time, or needless[ presentation of] cumulative evidence.”58 Techniques deemed
admissible under Rule 702 might, in theory, run afoul of Rule 403. Courts reluctant to
tangle with complex reliability debates might go directly to Rule 403 to make a
determination on the admissibility of evidence. Such reasoning appears most common in
cases involving lie detection techniques, such as the polygraph. Some courts have evaded
technical debate over the accuracy of the polygraph by finding that, whatever its accuracy,
its potential for prejudice is greater.59 Because many jurisdictions maintain an explicit
reliability standard, once expert opinion evidence is deemed admissible, and therefore
implicitly reliable, there is limited scope for subsequently finding that the evidence will
create unfair prejudice.60 Admissibility standards (such as Rule 702), in effect, almost
always trump exclusionary discretions (such as rule 403).61
Courts might also seek to counter expert testimony that is exaggerated or of
questionable validity through jury instructions, similar to those that have been delivered
by some courts regarding the accuracy of eyewitness identification or extensions of the
standard instructions for expert witnesses. Thus far, the use of jury instructions for
forensic science in the U.S. has been quite limited, and much more limited than in the
other jurisdictions considered in this article.62
Across the many U.S. jurisdictions, there is considerable variation in the
selection and quality of judges, prosecutors and defenders, as well as the resources
available to public defenders. It is often difficult to obtain public funding for a defense
expert, especially in state-based prosecutions.63 There is, in addition, tremendous variation
in the provision and quality of forensic science and medicine evidence by the state. Some
facilities employ personnel with academic-level scientific credentials and state of the art
equipment and facilities. Others are tiny, poorly equipped laboratories operated by a
handful of employees with modest scientific credentials, at best. Some forensic disciplines
are situated within police departments, rather than crime laboratories. Some states still rely
on coroners, rather than medical examiners. Virtually all U.S. public forensic science
providers suffer from serious resource constraints.

58

FED. R. EVID. 403.

59

DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: STANDARDS, STATISTICS AND RESEARCH ISSUES 60 (2002).

60

See, e.g., Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 595 (1993); United States v. Dorsey, 45 F.3d
809, 815-16 (4th Cir. 1995). The example of the lie detector probably encapsulates older attempts to manage
polygraphs that pre-date the Federal Rules of Evidence and Daubert. We might expect that rule 702, Daubert,
and rule 403 will be applied to manage new techniques of lie detection associated with scanning technologies
such as fMRI. Although, several appellate courts have suggests that rule 403 might have more purchase in
relation to expert evidence than other kinds of evidence.
61

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595.

62

United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Perhaps the best known instruction was
delivered by the court which analyzed forensic document examination to harbor piloting. State v. Quintana, 103
P.3d 168 (Ct. App. Utah 2004) (Thorne, J., concurring); United States v. Zajac, 2010 WL 4363637 (D. Utah
2010). Disclosure: One of the authors was a consultant to the defendant in this case. Jury instructions have been
proposed by attorneys, but not delivered by judges, in cases involving latent prints, and perhaps other areas as
well.

63
Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83 (1985); see Paul C. Giannelli, The Right to Expert Assistance in a PostDaubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305 (2004).
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Latent Fingerprint Evidence

Latent print evidence was first deemed admissible in the United States in People
v. Jennings in 1911.64 In that case, the primary defense argument was oriented toward
treating the evidence as “ostensive” evidence—that is, evidence that did not require expert
interpretation—rather than exclusion.65 In finding the testimony of the latent print expert
admissible, the decision relied primarily on two propositions which formed the backbone
of many subsequent decisions: first, the fact that numerous authorities stated that latent
print evidence was reliable; and, second, the reasoning that the reliability of latent print
evidence may be inferred from the supposed “uniqueness” of the human friction ridge skin
that produces the impressions we call “fingerprints.”66 For good reason, the second
proposition has been characterized as the “fingerprint examiner’s fallacy.”67
Subsequent cases generally followed this pattern, culminating perhaps in Grice v.
State, where the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals suggested “that instead of the state
being called upon . . . to offer proof that no two finger prints are alike, it may now be
considered in order for those taking the opposite view to assume the burden of proving
their position.”68 With this ruling the admissibility of latent print evidence no longer
seemed susceptible to challenge until the Daubert decision in 1993.
Beginning with United States v. Mitchell, there have been numerous admissibility
challenges to latent print evidence in the U.S in the aftermath of Daubert.69 Many of these
cases have generated reported decisions. In almost all cases, latent print evidence was
deemed admissible.70 Page et al. found that 93 per cent of admissibility challenges to
64

96 N.E. 1077, 1083 (Ill. 1911).

65

Id. at 1082. This approach has been adopted by some courts in India. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Images of Truth:
Evidence, Expertise, and Technologies of Knowledge in the American Courtroom (1999) (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with author).

66

Id. at 1082.

67

Simon A. Cole, Grandfathering Evidence: Fingerprint Admissibility Ruling from Jennings to Llera Plaza and
Back Again, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1189, 1197 (2004); see Simon A. Cole, Forensics Without Uniqueness,
Conclusions Without Individualization: The New Epistemology of Forensic Identification, 8 L. PROBABILITY &
RISK 233, 233-255 (2009).
68

Grice v. State, 151 S.W.2d 211, 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 1941).

69

United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004). Although Mitchell was the earliest post-Daubert
admissibility challenge to latent print evidence, heard in 1999, the trial court did not issue a written ruling (after a
five-day admissibility hearing), and the appellate decision was not issued until 2004. By that time, cases whose
admissibility hearings (or refusals to hold admissibility hearings) has been held later, such as Havvard, had
already become law, including at least one case, Llera Plaza, which had relied upon the admissibility hearing
record generated by Mitchell. When it finally appeared, however, the 2004 opinion by a respected justice on the
Third Circuit of Appeals was quite comprehensive. The decision is perhaps most notable for its very weak
interpretation of Daubert, in which evidence that relies on ‘testable’ propositions is deemed admissible, even if,
even after nearly a century of courtroom use, those propositions have never been formally ‘tested’, but only
subjected to what the court termed—apparently without irony—‘implicit testing.’ See Simon A. Cole, 'Implicit
Testing': Can Casework Validate Forensic Techniques?, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 117 (2006).

70

Mara L. Merlino et al., Meeting the Challenges of the Daubert Trilogy: Refining and Redefining the Reliability
of Forensic Evidence, 43 TULSA L. REV. 417 (2007). One group of commentators developed a useful taxonomy
summarizing the reasoning used by the federal courts to continue to admit latent fingerprint evidence in this
substantial body of cases. For them, the taxonomy amounts to “little more than a catalog of evasions.” FAIGMAN
ET AL., supra note 56, at 187. Reasons include: refusing to hold an admissibility hearing (e.g., United States v.
Reaux, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11883 (E.D. La. 2001)); reversing of the burden of persuasion (e.g., United States
v. Rogers, 26 Fed. App’x 171 (4th Cir. 2001)); misinterpreting Daubert and Kumho (e.g., United States v.
Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848 (S.D. Ind. 2000); United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001));
deferring to the pro-admissibility decisions produced by other courts (e.g., Havvard); emphasizing the
‘flexibility’ language in Daubert (e.g., Rogers); “bringing the standards down to meet the expertise” (e.g., United
States v. Cline, 188 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Kan. 2002)); and relegating the issues to weight rather than
admissibility (e.g., Cline). Faigman and his colleagues found the reasoning in state cases much the same,
regardless of whether the jurisdiction adhered to Frye or Daubert. “Whatever route is taken,” they note dryly,
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latent print evidence resulted in unrestricted admission, and that figure is probably
conservative given that many of the cases coded as “exclusions” were either only partial
exclusions, concerned case specific issues peripheral to reliability, or were reversed on
appeal.71
The leading case in the post-Daubert era is United States v. Havvard.72 The trial
court described latent print evidence as “the very archetype of reliable expert testimony.”73
Undoubtedly, the most notorious appeal was United States v. Llera Plaza.74 It represented
the first time in nearly a century that latent print evidence was substantially restricted or
impugned in any way.75 Based on the stipulated admissibility hearing record from
Mitchell, the court found latent print evidence wanting when judged against the Daubert
“factors,’ with the exception of ‘general acceptance.”76 The court did not, however,
exclude the latent print evidence, preferring to opt for what has subsequently been labeled
“split testimony.”77 That is, the examiners were permitted to describe similarities between
the two prints but prevented from expressing an opinion about the significance of those
findings of similarity.78 Following a motion for reconsideration and a live hearing, the
court reversed itself.79 Perhaps the most significant move was shifting the burden of
persuasion to the defendant and requiring him to show that latent print evidence is
unreliable.80
U.S. courts almost always rule that latent print evidence satisfies whatever
admissibility threshold is in place.81 The few exceptions to this overall trend are: Virgin
Islands v. Jacobs, in which the government put on no case whatsoever in response to the
defendant’s motion to exclude the evidence; Commonwealth v. Patterson, in which
“the destination is admission.” FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 212; Simon A. Cole, Out of the Daubert Fire
and into the Fryeing Pan? The Admissibility of Latent Print Evidence in Frye Jurisdictions, 9 MINN. J. L. SCI. &
TECH. 453 (2008). It is possible, however, that Frye jurisdictions, somewhat counter intuitively, offer a more
hospitable forum for admissibility challenges to latent print evidence than do Daubert jurisdictions. The State v.
Rose decision provides some anecdotal support for this notion, but it is, of course, difficult to conclude much
from a single case.
71
Mark Page et al., Forensic Identification Science Evidence Since Daubert: Part I—A Quantitative Analysis of
the Exclusion of Forensic Identification Science Evidence, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1180 (2011).
72

United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597 (7th Cir. 2001).

73

United States v. Havvard, 117 F. Supp. 2d 848, 855 (S.D. Ind. 2000).

74

United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa. 2002) vacated, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa.
2002).

75

Id. at 494. A second reason for its prominence was probably the eminence of the trial judge.

76

Id. at 515.

77

Laura Tierney, Forensic Science Disciplines and Daubert: A Trend Toward "Split Testimony," Impression &
Pattern Evidence Symposium (2010).

78

Id.

79

United States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 570 (E.D. Pa. 2002).

80

But see, e.g., FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 56; Cole, supra note 67, passim; David H. Kaye, The Nonscience
of Fingerprinting: United States v. Llera Plaza, 21 QLR 1073 (2003); Tara Marie La Morte, Sleeping
Gatekeepers: United States v. Llera Plaza and the Unreliability of Forensic Fingerprinting Evidence under
Daubert, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 171 (2003). Among the most perplexing aspects of the opinion was the way
in which the discovery, in the live hearing, that the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation imposed extremely easy
proficiency tests on its examiners somehow increased the court’s confidence in the reliability of latent print
identification. Another curious aspect of the opinion, quite relevant to the cross-national focus of this article, was
the court’s reliance on events in the U.K.—specifically its recent abandonment of its historic ‘16-point standard’
for declaring a latent print ‘identification’ in favor of the North American practice of having no standard at all—
as somehow vouching for the reliability of latent print evidence in the U.S., based on the logically and
historically dubious reasoning that the British had ‘invented’ latent print identification. See Cole, supra note 67.
81

Cole, supra note 70, at 516; Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Validity of Latent Fingerprint Identification:
Confessions of a Fingerprinting Moderate, 7 L. PROBABILITY & RISK 127 (2008).
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Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts deemed latent print evidence in general
admissible, but excluded evidence based on “simultaneous” or “cluster” impressions; and,
United States v. Llera Plaza I (discussed previously).82 In addition, Judge Michael of the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a strong dissent to the upholding of the trial court’s
admission of latent print and handwriting evidence in United States v. Crisp.83 Another
glimmer of dissent may be found in a concurring opinion in State v. Quintana, where
Judge Thorne, though agreeing that latent print evidence should be admissible, argued that
the defendant should be entitled to a jury instruction on the fallibility and limitations of
latent print evidence.84
The most significant exception, however, was State v. Rose, in which a Maryland
trial judge excluded latent print evidence in a capital murder trial.85 The government’s
motion for reconsideration was unsuccessful, and, because Maryland does not allow
interlocutory appeals, this decision effectively ended the case.86 Interestingly, the case was
re-filed in federal court, shifting the case from a Frye to a Daubert jurisdiction, where the
evidence was subsequently deemed admissible.87 Rose is one of a handful of admissibility
decisions written after the publication of the landmark NRC report.88 These decisions are
significant because it seems plausible that the NRC Committee’s findings might have
altered the courts’ overwhelming tendency toward admission. Specifically, the Report
concluded that “ACE-V,” the “methodology”89 that U.S. latent print examiners purport to
use, is not validated, and that “individualization,” the only inculpatory testimonial
conclusion that U.S. latent print examiners are permitted to offer, is not empirically
sustainable.90 The Committee’s ability to find only “limited” information on the accuracy
and reliability of latent print identification would seem to have some bearing on the
admissibility of the evidence.91 Although the Report never explicitly takes a position on
the aforementioned cases, its discussion of cases admitting latent print evidence assumes a
critical tone.92

82
John P. Black, Pilot Study: The Application of ACE-V. to Simultaneous (Cluster) Impressions, 56 J. FORENSIC
IDENTIFICATION 933 (2006) (discussing a description of ‘simultaneous’ impressions)
83

United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d. 261, 272 (4th Cir. 2003).

84

State v. Quintana, 2004 UT App 103 P.3d 168, 170 (Thorne, J., concurring).

85

State v. Rose, No. K06-0545 (Cir. Ct. Baltimore Cty. Md. 2008).

86

Id.

87

United States v. Rose, 672 F. Supp. 2d 723, 726 (D. Md. 2009).

88

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15.

89

Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 143, 178 (2005). It is almost certainly not correct to
call ACE-V. a methodology. Courts generally do so, however, and the dispute is probably of minor importance.
Id. at 177-78.
90

NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 15.

91

Id. at 142. See also Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent Print Analysis, Latent Print
Examination and Human Factors: Improving the Practice through a Systems Approach (U.S. Department of
Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2012). Commissioned by the National Institute of
Science and Technology (NIST) and the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) and focused exclusively on latent
fingerprints, this multi-authored, multidisciplinary report endorses and develops the concerns expressed in by the
NRC committee.
92

Id. at 103-05. It calls evidence scholars’ critiques of Crisp ‘telling’ and notes that the Crisp Court’s assertion of
the ‘reliability’ of latent print evidence rested solely upon legal precedents but “pointed to no studies supporting
the reliability of fingerprint evidence.” The Report accuses the Havvard Court of ‘overstat[ing]’ the expert’s
testimony and “giv[ing] fuel to the misconception that the forensic discipline of fingerprinting is infallible.” The
Report is conspicuously not commensurately critical of the State v. Rose decision excluding latent print evidence,
which the Report commends for going “into considerable detail.”
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Nevertheless, the NRC Report has not exerted the effect that one might have
anticipated.93 There have been no cases excluding latent print evidence since its release.
Anecdotally, where the evidence is challenged, courts appear to be eschewing blanket
admission or exclusion in favor of the ”split testimony” approach.94 Some courts have
precluded very strong conclusions couched in words like “individualized”, “identification
to the exclusion of all others”, and “absolute” by restricting witnesses to describing
similarities between two prints but not offering an opinion as to the meaning of those
findings. Given the position adopted in the NRC Report, split testimony is likely to remain
an attractive option for trial courts.
2.

DNA Evidence

During the earliest years in which DNA evidence was introduced, its
admissibility was extensively litigated in the U.S. in a series of contests, sometimes
labeled as the “DNA wars.”95 In the earliest cases, DNA evidence was either not
challenged or not challenged competently, and it was routinely admitted.96 In later cases,
defense attorneys enlisted well-credentialed molecular biologists who were able to
gradually expose sloppy practices, failure to adhere to protocols, and unprincipled (and
biased) interpretations of data.97 These interventions and criticisms produced a number of
cases in which state courts excluded DNA results, perhaps most famously in People v.
Castro.98 Not insignificantly, these exclusions were quickly followed by federal courts
deeming similar evidence admissible; in United States v. Jakobetz and United States v.
Yee.99
Successful challenges to the admissibility of DNA evidence drew on population
genetics to challenge the calculation of the “random match probability” (RMP) which is
generally a vital component in the interpretation of DNA evidence. Drawing on debates
among geneticists about human mating patterns, defendants argued that the state’s RMP
calculations were not accepted in the scientific community. These cases helped to trigger
the intervention of the National Academy of Sciences—through its National Research
Council committees. The NRC issued two reports, in 1992 and 1996, each of which
endorsed two different ways of estimating the RMP, the “ceiling principle” and the
“product rule” respectively.100 Following the first report, some courts excluded RMPs

93

See Harry Edwards, Solving the Problems That Plague the Forensic Science Community, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 5
(2010).

94

Tierney, supra note 77. Simon A. Cole, Splitting Hairs? Evaluating ‘Split Testimony’ as an Approach to the
Problem of Forensic Expert Evidence, 34 SYDNEY L. REV. 459 (2011) (discussing 'split testimony').

95

See JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND CONTROVERSY IN THE MAKING OF DNA
PROFILING (2007); DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2010). See also MICHAEL
LYNCH ET AL., TRUTH MACHINE: THE CONTENTIOUS HISTORY OF DNA FINGERPRINTING (2008); Sheila
Jasanoff, The Eye of Everyman: Witnessing DNA in the Simpson Trial, 28 SOC. STUDIES OF SCI. 713 (1998); Eric
Lander, DNA Fingerprinting: Science, Law, and the Ultimate Identifier, in THE CODE OF CODES: SCIENTIFIC
AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 191 (Daniel J. Kevles & Leroy Hood eds., 1992); Michael
Lynch, The Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ Simpson 'Dream Team' and the Sociology of
Knowledge Machine, 28 SOC. STUDIES OF SCI. 829 (1998); Jennifer L. Mnookin, People v. Castro: Challenging
the Forensic Use of DNA Evidence, in EVIDENCE STORIES 207 (Richard Lempert ed., 2006); William C.
Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons from the 'DNA War', 84 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1993).
96

ARONSON, supra note 95, at 41; KAYE, supra note 95, at 65.

97

ARONSON, supra note 95, at 42.

98

545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 980 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989). See also State v. Schwartz, 447 N.W.2d 422, 428 (Minn. 1989);
ARONSON, supra note 95, at 57; KAYE, supra note 95, at 74; Thompson, supra note 95, at 42-43.

99

ARONSON, supra note 95, at 118, 120; KAYE, supra note 95, at 75, 94.

100

ARONSON, supra note 95, at 153; KAYE, supra note 95, at 98.
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proffered by the government: Commonwealth v. Lanigan, State v. Bible, State v.
Cauthron, and State v. Anderson.101 The second report, however, practically eliminated
admissibility challenges based on population genetics. to the extent that the government
asserted that it was adhering to the NRC recommendation, admissibility challenges were
unlikely to succeed, and subsequent cases upheld admissibility.102 Since the mid-1990’s
DNA evidence in general has been universally admissible.103
Targeted admissibility challenges are still made. In People v. Venegas, the
California Supreme Court reversed a conviction because of an improper “binning”
procedure in calculating the RMP.104 Another avenue of challenge concerns how a “cold”
database search affects the calculation of the RMP. Since statisticians disagreed about how
the fact that a DNA association was generated through a database search should be
handled (though all agreed that it mattered), defendants argued that the government’s
method of calculating the RMP was not “generally accepted.”105 DNA evidence was
excluded on this basis in United States v. Jenkins,106 though, this ruling was overruled by
the D.C. Court of Appeals in an interlocutory appeal.107 The appeals court reasoned that
the disagreement over which statistic was appropriate to present to the jury fell into the
“legal” rather than the “scientific” domain and thus a decision that could be made by the
trial court without deferring to the “relevant scientific community.”108 The California
Supreme Court, on the other hand, denied a similar appeal by simply rejecting what to
statisticians would be an indisputable point—that the manner in which the search is
conducted affects the probability that one can assign to the result of that search.109 The
Court concluded that the fact that database search was conducted “simply does not
matter.”110 Two years later, however, the California Supreme Court reached the same
result but switched its rationale to one more like that employed in Jenkins.111
There has been some litigation about the conclusions that DNA analysts should
be permitted to state in their testimony and that prosecutors should be permitted to state in
their summations. In several cases, defendants challenged the use of likelihood ratios to
present the probative value of DNA mixtures. These challenges were all unsuccessful.112
In Commonwealth v. Girouard, the defendant sought to exclude what he characterized as
101

KAYE, supra note 95, at 107.

102

Id. at 158.

103

ARONSON, supra note 95, at 173; DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: FORENSICS 62
(Student ed. 2008); NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A PATH FORWARD 99 (2009). Perhaps the most famous motion to exclude DNA evidence was one that
was never filed. Although the defendant’s “Dream Team” prepared an extensive motion to exclude DNA
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weight of the evidence at trial by showing sloppy procedures, inadvertent contamination, and possible planting of
evidence. See ARONSON, supra note 95, at 173; KAYE, supra note 95, at 152-53; Michael Lynch, The
Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ Simpson 'Dream Team' and the Sociology of Knowledge Machine,
28 SOC. STUDIES OF SCI. 829, 830 (1998); William C. Thompson, Proving the Case: The Science of DNA: DNA
Evidence in the O.J. Simpson Trial, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 827, 831-40 (1996).
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Id. at 1016.
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People v. Johnson, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 590 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
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People v. Nelson, 185 P.3d 49, 66 (Cal. 2008).
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FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 103, at 90.
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an overstated conclusion by the state’s DNA expert: that “no one other than [the
defendant] is the donor of the DNA.”113 The trial court admitted the testimony, and the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts upheld this decision, reasoning that any
problems with such testimony could be rectified through cross-examination or rebuttal
expert testimony.114 In McDaniel v. Brown, the Supreme Court accepted that the state’s
witness had made erroneous calculations and committed the “prosecutor’s fallacy.”115 The
court adverted to the impropriety of the prosecutor’s fallacy, but concluded that the
defendant had legally forfeited the claim.116
There has thus far been only a small amount of litigation over DNA profiling
techniques more exotic than the STR testing that has become standard. An admissibility
challenge to Y-STR haplotyping failed in Curtis v. State, and this result was upheld by the
appellate court.117 Similarly, a trial court admitted mitochondrial DNA profiling in State v.
Pappas, and this result was upheld by the Supreme Court of Connecticut.118 The Court
found the procedures for mitochondrial DNA testing to be “generally accepted in the
scientific community” and “that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the
statistical methods used to derive that mtDNA type frequency in this case were
scientifically valid,” even though a defense expert demonstrated that the particular
calculations advanced by the government’s expert were flawed.119 In marked contrast to
England, Wales and Australia (more below), there have been no published U.S. cases
concerning low copy number (LCN) DNA profiling, though the use of LCN has been
litigated.120 Notably, some of the principal defenders of the use of DNA profiling during
the “DNA wars,” such as Bruce Budowle, formerly of the FBI, have emerged as critics of
LCN.121
3.

Bite marks

Bite mark evidence has almost always been found admissible by U.S. courts.122
The earliest reported case seems to be Doyle v. State from 1954.123 Typically, for the time,
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Commonwealth v. Girouard, 766 N.E.2d 873, 882 (Mass. 2002).
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Id. at 882.
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McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 120 (2010); KAYE, supra note 95, at 173. Erin Murphy & William C.
Thompson, Common Errors and Fallacies in Forensic DNA Statistics: An Amicus Brief in McDaniel v. Brown,
46 CRIM. L. BULL. 709 (2010); William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical
Evidence in Criminal Trials, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1987) (explaining fallacies in the interpretation of
statistical evidence to which lay people are susceptible).

116

McDaniel, 558 U.S. at 120.
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KAYE, supra note 95, at 211.
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Id. at 232; State v. Pappas, 776 A.2d 1091, 1095 (Conn. 2001).
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Pappas, 776 A.2d at 1104-05, 1111; KAYE, supra note 95, at 236.
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United States v. Davis, 602 F. Supp. 2d 658 (D. Md. 2009).
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Bruce Budowle et al., Validity of Low Copy Number Typing and Applications to Forensic Science, 50 CROAT.
MED. J. 207 (2009), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2702736/.
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Marjorie A. Shields, Admissibility and Sufficiency of Bite Mark Evidence as Basis for
Identification of Accused, 1 A.L.R. 6th 657, 657 (2005); Erica Beecher-Monas, Reality Bites: The
Illusion of Science in Bite-Mark Evidence, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1369, 1369 (2009); FAIGMAN ET AL.,
supra note 103, at 446. Page et al. found that it was admitted without restriction in 83 percent of cases
in which it was challenged. Mark Page et al., Forensic Identification Science Evidence Since
Daubert: Part I—A Quantitative Analysis of the Exclusion of Forensic Identification Science
Evidence, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1180, 1183 (2011). This figure is probably an underestimate because
several cases, such as Ege v. Yukins discussed below, were coded as ‘exclusions’ notwithstanding
their case-specific holdings.
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Doyle v. State, 263 S.W.2d 779, 779 (Tex. Crim. App 1954); FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 103, at
447.
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the defendant raised only procedural objections that did not extend to the empirical
foundations of the technique.124 The leading case is People v. Marx, in which a California
appellate court upheld the admission of bite mark evidence.125 It is important to note that
the expert in Marx cautioned that the bite mark was particularly distinctive and expressed
doubt about the value of less distinctive marks.126 This cautionary caveat was overlooked
by later courts drawing upon Marx as authority for the admissibility of bite mark
evidence.127 California is a Frye (or Kelly) jurisdiction.128 Nevertheless, the court upheld
the admission of the bite mark evidence not because bite mark identification was
“generally accepted in the relevant scientific community” (the central requirement of the
Frye rule), but because of two loopholes in the interpretation of Frye.129 First, bite mark
evidence, in contrast to polygraph evidence (about which Frye was concerned), was
determined to be evidence that the jury could observe and interpret for itself, at least
sufficiently so that it would not be compelled to adopt the expert’s opinion entirely on
faith.130 Secondly, bite mark evidence was determined to be non-novel and therefore not
subject to Frye—a decision concerned with a novel lie-detection technique.131
In a thorough review of the case law, Beecher-Monas categorized the courts’
reasoning in admitting bite mark evidence as follows: some courts admit bite mark
evidence because other courts have (for half a century);132 some courts employ the same
non-novelty loophole employed in Marx;133 some courts have reasoned that bite mark
evidence is not science and that Daubert does not apply to non-scientific evidence;134 and
some courts have employed this reasoning even after the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Kumho Tire (and subsequent revision of the FRE in 2000) made clear that “reliability”
applies to all expert opinion evidence and the Daubert factors may be applied where
appropriate.135
Bite mark identification evidence has been excluded in only a handful of cases.
Ege v. Yukins is an interesting example.136 The trial judge admitted the bite mark
evidence.137 Ege filed and won a federal habeas corpus claim based in part on the federal
court’s conclusion that the bite mark evidence “was unreliable and not worthy of
consideration by a jury.”138 As it turns out, the court’s judgment was case specific and did
124

Id.
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People v. Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975); FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 103, at
448.
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Marx, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 350.
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FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 103, at 448.

128

People v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24, 30 (Cal. 1976).
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The strangeness of this reasoning has been often discussed. FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 103, at
449. The same reasoning was recently applied to fingerprint evidence as well in an unpublished
decision. People v. Greenwood, No. BA351185 (Super. Ct. Cal. Cty. of Los Angeles 2010), available
at http://www.swgfast.org/Resources/100210_CA-v-Greenwood_Schnegg_Order.pdf. Frye was based
on a blood pressure test claimed to assist with lie detection.
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Cole, Out of the Daubert Fire, supra note 70, at 526.
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Beecher-Monas, supra note 122, at 1372.
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Id.
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Id. at 1373.
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Ege v. Yukins, 485 F.3d 364, 374-75 (6th Cir. 2007).
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Id. at 374.
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Ege v. Yukins, 380 F. Supp. 2d 852, 871 (E.D. Mich. 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part 485 F.3d 364 (6th Cir.
2007).
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not apply to bite mark evidence more generally.139 The court felt that the particular expert
used at trial had “been cast into disrepute as an expert witness.”140 Of particular concern
was the expert’s attempt to attach something akin to an RMP to his testimony.141 The
expert testified that only 1 of 3.5 million people (the population of the city in which the
crime occurred) would have dentition consistent with the bite mark.142 There was, as the
court accepted, no basis for this statement.143
At least two Oklahoma trial courts have excluded bite mark testimony, one in an
unpublished decision.144 In the reported case of Garrison v. State, the court excluded
testimony attributing the bite mark to the defendant, but permitted testimony that the mark
was a “probable bite-mark.”145 The defendant appealed the admissibility of this testimony
and the failure of the trial court to conduct an admissibility hearing, but this appeal was
rejected.146 In Howard v. State, the Mississippi Supreme Court expressed some critical
remarks about bite mark evidence while reversing Howard’s conviction on other
grounds.147 After Howard was subsequently re-convicted and his conviction was again
appealed, the court held, ”without explanation,” that the admission of the bite mark
evidence was not an abuse of discretion.148 In another case, one Mississippi Supreme
Court justice dissented from an opinion upholding the admissibility of bite mark
evidence.149 In State v. Adams, a court precluded a physician who claimed no expertise in
forensic dentistry from testifying as to whether a mark was consistent with being a bite
mark.150 In State v. Fortin, the court excluded experience based testimony concerning the
rarity of a combination of bite marks on different parts of the body without a database
upon which to base such an estimate,151 a holding that presaged R. v. T.
Based on this record, the NRC report concluded, “[t]here is nothing to indicate
that courts review bite mark evidence pursuant to Daubert’s standard of reliability.”152
4.

Incriminating Images and Voice Recordings
a.

Opinions about Images

Images have been admitted as evidence into U.S. courts for more than a hundred
years.153 In recent decades, in criminal proceedings, images have been used for purposes
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probability calculations behind vague verbal formulations like “no one else in the world could be found
consistent with this mark”).

144

FAIGMAN ET AL, supra note 56, at 15.

145

Id.

146

BEECHER-MONAS, supra note 122, at 1398; FAIGMAN ET AL, supra note 56, at 15.

147

701 So. 2d 274, 288 (Miss. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Hearn v. State, 3 So. 3d 722 (Miss. 2008).

148

FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 17-18.

149

Id. at 18.

150
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Mark Page et al., Forensic Identification Science Evidence Since Daubert: Part II—Judicial Reasoning in
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related to identification primarily in relation to robberies of banks, convenience and liquor
stores with video surveillance facilities.154
American juries are permitted, and often required, to interpret surveillance
images and make identifications, but in several cases both the state and/or defendants have
sought to adduce expert opinion to assist with the interpretation of images.155 In contrast to
England, Canada and Australia, anthropometry—particularly the use of (reverse
projection) photogrammetry—is pronounced in the United States.156 Courts in the United
States have been inconsistent in their responses to identification evidence as opposed to
descriptions of similarities between a person of interest (POI) and the accused.157
Generally, positive identification (or individualization) is allowed and on some occasions
the inability of a defense expert to positively identify a POI or to exclude the accused, as
opposed to criticizing assumptions and techniques, has led to the exclusion of their
rebuttal evidence.158
United States v. Alexander is an early, though not entirely representative,
example of the uses of images for identification purposes.159 Alexander, a medical doctor,
was accused of committing a bank robbery.160 Three bank employees selected a
photograph of Alexander when shown a photo array in the aftermath of the robbery. The
state also called four acquaintances who supported the identification.161 In response,
Alexander called five witnesses “who stated that he was not the person photographed by
the bank surveillance cameras.”162 Alexander also sought to adduce two expert
witnesses—one specializing in cephalometrics and the other a former FBI agent with
photographic comparison expertise—both opining that “it was impossible for Dr.
Alexander to be the person depicted in the photographs.”163 Prior to Daubert, the trial
judge excluded the expert witnesses called by the defense.164 The Court of Appeals
concluded that the trial court had abused its (considerable) discretion, explaining:
“[b]ecause of the specific nature of the proffered testimony in this case, together with the
complete lack of any evidence other than the eyewitness identification connecting Dr.
Alexander to the robbery, we find that the district court’s exclusion of Dr. Alexander’s
153
See NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW ON DISPLAY: THE DIGITAL TRANSFORMATION OF LEGAL
PERSUASION AND JUDGMENT 107 (2009); JONATHAN FINN, CAPTURING THE CRIMINAL IMAGE: FROM MUG SHOT
TO SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY xii (2009); TAL GOLAN, LAWS OF MEN AND LAWS OF NATURE: THE HISTORY OF
SCIENTIFIC EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 176 (2004) [herinafter LAWS OF MEN]; Tal Golan,
The Emergence of the Silent Witness: The Legal and Medical Reception of X-rays in the USA, 34 SOC. STUD. OF
SCI. 469, 476 (2004); Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of
Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 13 (1998).
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See United States v. McGinnis, 201 F. App’x 246, 249-51 (5th Cir. 2006) (discussing expert qualification and
the reliability of photogrammetry); see also United States v. Welch, 368 F.3d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 2004) (excluding
expert testimony in favor of eyewitness identification).
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expert witnesses was clearly erroneous.”165 The fact that the “entire case … turned on the
photographic identification” rendered the exclusion erroneous.166 The Court did not hold
“that such evidence will always be admissible in every case.”167
A more representative example of the willingness to exclude defense evidence
emerged in United States v. Dorsey.168 Dorsey adduced the opinions of two forensic
anthropologists—that he was “not the individual depicted in the Bank … surveillance
photographs”—at very short notice during his trial.169 The trial judge excluded the
evidence, questioning whether “this is a recognized science” and noting that all “we are
doing here is … comparing some photographs.”170 The Court of Appeals concluded that
the evidence was inadmissible under Daubert: not amounting to ‘scientific knowledge’
and not “helpful to a trier of fact.”171 Applying the Daubert criteria, the Court of Appeals
noted that “Dorsey never contended anywhere in his brief, or during trial, that the forensic
anthropologists’ method of analysis had been tested.”172 Affirming, they explained: “there
is no indication that the expert testimony was at all necessary in the instant case; … the
comparison of photographs is something that can sufficiently be done by the jury without
help from an expert.”173 The Court of Appeals was reassured in their exclusionary stance
by the other evidence suggesting Dorsey’s guilt.174 In United States v. Crotteau, the
defendant’s attempt to call a friend as an expert witness who used crude measurements to
compare two videos, one of Crotteau at a bank and the other of a bank robbery, was
deemed inadmissible under the FRE.175 Other friends of Crotteau were allowed to express
their opinions about the identity of the bank robber as the state’s lay “familiarity”
witnesses.176
Many appeals against conviction involving the interpretation of images are based
on grounds such as exclusion of the defendant’s expert(s) was improper or, more
commonly, that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call (or apply for funding
for) an expert in photographic interpretation (usually photogrammetry) to counter the
state’s expert or to explore problems and limitations. In the main, these appeals have been
unsuccessful, largely because of the very onerous standards governing the review of
decisions made by counsel and admissibility determinations (after Joiner).177
Generally the state has been allowed to call expert witnesses to testify about
height, and similarities in features, and possessions (such as clothing), and sometimes
even to positively identify the accused.178 Figure 2 illustrates the comparison of clothing
165
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photographed during a bank robbery (Figure 1). The Court in United States v. Sellers
explained that expert testimony to assist the jury with identification would allow an
“opinion as to whether the defendant is the person in the picture.”179 In United States v.
McKreith, the FBI analyst’s interpretation of video and still images, led him to testify that
a shirt recovered from McKreith “matched the class characteristics of the shirt worn by the
bank robber” and a black bag was “‘indistinguishable’ from the bag seen in the photos.”180
According to the Court of Appeals, Bruegge’s opinions were properly admitted, able to be
cross-examined and, given the strength of the case, if they were inadmissible his testimony
was “harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence.”181 In United States v. Cairns, an
FBI agent was allowed to testify about similarities in “the nose and mouth area, chin line,
hair lines, ear contours and inner folds of the ears, among other things” and then
proceeded to positively identify the defendant “or another individual having all of these
characteristics.”182 In United States v. Brown the state’s expert was allowed to take new
photographs of the defendant at the bank and compare them with the surveillance images
of the actual robbery to assist with identification.183 Experts called by the state have been
allowed to make positive identifications (i.e., to individualize) but have also been
restricted, on occasion, to describing similarities between the accused and the person of
interest—so-called “splitting.”184 Comparisons, and positive identifications, may be based
upon clothing and accessories, weapons, and even mannerisms (such as handedness).185
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180

United States v. McKreith, 140 F.App’x 112, 114 (11th Cir. 2005) (involving Vorder Bruegge, perhaps the
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434 F.2d 643, 644 (9th Cir. 1970); see also Brown, 511 F.2d at 924 (describing ear lobes as “being like a
fingerprint”).
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511 F.2d at 924; see also Sellers, 566 F.2d at 886. The trial court’s refusal to support a similar defense request
in United States v. Armstrong was not considered reversible error. 621 F.2d 951, 954-55 (9th Cir. 1980).
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United States v. Alexander, 816 F.2d 164, 168 (5th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Demjanjuk, 367 F.3d
623, 631 (6th Cir. 2004) (where a great deal of time, such as 60 years, has passed); Cole, supra note 94, at 462.
185
United States v. McGinnis, 201 F.App’x 246, 251 (5th Cir. 2006) (jeans); United States v. Johnson, 114 F.3d
808, 811-13 (8th Cir. 1997) (height, shoe size, and logo on baseball cap) aff’d, 278 F.3d 839 8th Cir. 2002);
United States v. Quinn, 18 F.3d 1461, 1465 (9th Cir. 1994) (guns); People v. Smith, No. D035500, 2004 WL
406991, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. May 29, 2004) (clothing, masks, and weapons). In United States v. D’Ambrosio, the
analyst asserted that on the basis of similarities, a pair of the defendant’s jeans “were the same” as those in the
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Figure 1: Security images taken during a bank robbery.

Figure 2: Detail of image of bank robbery (‘Questioned’ from left-hand image of
Figure 1) and jeans belonging to the accused (‘Known’). The condition of the seam
was used to positively identify the jeans.186

Early challenges to the admissibility of the state’s reverse projection
photogrammetry were unsuccessful and consequently were transformed into grounds of
appeal based on the failure of counsel to adequately cross-examine such witnesses or
obtain similar expert assistance.187 After Daubert, challenges to photogrammetry, in
186
Images reproduced from Vorder Bruegge, Photographic Identification of Denim Trousers From Bank
Surveillance Film, 44 J. FORENSIC SCI. 613-22 (1999); see also Kitty Hauser, A Garment in the Dock; Or, How
the FBI Illuminated the Prehistory of a Pair of Denim Jeans, 9 J. MATERIAL CULTURE 293, 295-305 (2004).
187
Claritt v. Kemp 336 F.App’x 869, 871 (11th Cir. 2009); Webster. v. Sec’y, DOC, 291 F. App’x 964, 966-67
(11th Cir. 2008); Chappel v. Garcia, No. CIV. S-03-0132, 2006 WL 1748424, at *39-40 (E.D. Cal. June 26,
2006) (noting that Superior Court opined that the decision not to consult his own photogrammetry expert was a
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particular, have been unsuccessful188 or seen as irrelevant.189 Photogrammetry evidence
often passes without comment or challenge.190 An earlier defense challenge to the
reliability of photogrammetry was rejected in United States v. Everett, where the
perceived inability of the jurors to make an accurate assessment of heights from images
was, along with the impartiality of the FBI witness, accepted.191 More recently,
photogrammetrists have tended to testify in terms of a range,192 rather than a specific
height193 and increasingly tend to place emphasis on their ignorance of the height of the
suspect prior to analysis of the images.194
In addition, and sometimes without objection or appeal, investigators and
analysts are allowed to interpret and narrate images. In The People v. Apodaca, a detective
was allowed to express his opinion about a video that was said to corroborate the account
of the central prosecution witness.195 Issues about enhancement have not been particularly
controversial and even some minor losses from a recording might not render the remaining
images inadmissible.196
A second strand of image evidence concerns attempts to determine whether an
image is “real” or computer generated, an area of expertise that has become important in a
sub-set of child pornography prosecutions. Some individuals so accused have offered as a
defense the argument that the government cannot rule out the possibility that the image is
computer generated, in which case it would not violate the law.197 In United States v.
Frabizio, the government initially proffered a computer scientist to testify as to whether
child pornographic images depicted real children or were computer generated.198
Apparently after defense counsel demonstrated that this expert’s methods produced a high
rate of errors, the government withdrew this expert and proffered an FBI photography
expert, who made subjective experience based judgments to render conclusions on the

reasonable tactical decision); see also Dixon v. Admin. Appeal Dep’t Office of Info. & Privacy, No. 06 Civ.
6069, 2008 WL 216304, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2008) aff'd, 336 F. App'x 98 (2d Cir. 2009); cf. Hutchinson v.
Hamlet, 243 F. App’x 238, 240 (9th Cir. 2007) (challenging ineffective counsel for not obtaining expert
assistance to challenge height evidence).
188
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denying in part plaintiffs’ and defendants’ motions to exclude expert opinion testimony interpreting photographs
in suit alleging violation of federal and state deceptive trade practices acts).
196

Wisconsin v. Avery, 807 N.W.2d 638 (Wis. Ct. App. 2011) (digital video enhancement), cert. granted, 810
N.W.2d 221 (2012); United States v. Codrington, No. 07 MJ 118, 2008 WL 1927372 (E.D.N.Y. May 1, 2008)
(upholding use of surveillance video where portions of the video were lost due to human error), aff’d, No. 08MC-0291, 2009 WL 1766001 (2009).
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Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 263-64 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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same question.199 The government’s apparent belief that the testimony based on a
subjective judgment and experience was “more admissible” than testimony based on
quantifiable, computer science methods has important implications for the subject of this
article.200 Judge Gertner excluded the testimony, based on extensive Daubert analysis.
Judge Gertner concluded that the government had offered no evidence measuring the
ability of the expert to correctly determine whether images were “real” or computer
generated.201 This ruling was later extended to a second proffered witness who used
similar techniques.202
Interestingly, the government appears to have secured a legal fix for this issue
with a subsequent ruling in United States v. Rodriguez-Pacheco, holding that expert
testimony was not necessary for a court to conclude that an image depicted a real child.203
Curiously, the expert witness in that case testified to his methodology for analyzing
images, but not conclusions.204 Neither the expert’s methodology nor the nature of his
expertise is clear from the opinion. The opinion holds that the court was competent to
render the conclusion that the images depicted real children based solely on the conclusion
of a pediatrician that the depicted individuals, if real, would be younger than 18 years old
and the testimony of the photographic expert describing his methodology, but not his
conclusion.205
b.

Opinions about Voices (and Sounds)

In contrast to the other techniques discussed in this article, U.S. courts have been
equivocal about the admissibility of speaker or voice “identification” evidence offered by
professional experts (as opposed to “earwitnesses”), using techniques such as voice
spectrography in recent decades. It also seems that the admissibility standard used by the
court may influence the outcome of the admissibility ruling.206 Historically, courts have
tended to divide fairly evenly on whether to admit the evidence, with around 60 percent of
cases resulting in admission, a pattern that appears to be consistent across time.207 In a
telling analysis, Faigman et al. show that the ultimate result has tended to hinge on
whether the courts interpreted the “relevant scientific community”—referred to in Frye—
narrowly as consisting of individuals who perform voice spectrography (thus resulting in
admission) or broadly as consisting of a broader group of experts with knowledge relevant
to claims of voice spectrographers such as audiologists, acousticians, electrical engineers,
linguists, phoneticians, physicists, physiologists, psychologists, and statisticians (thus
resulting in exclusion).208 They also note that the 1979 publication of a National Academy
of Science sponsored NRC report on voice identification, which might be conceived as
similar to (if somewhat narrower in scope than) the more recent NRC response to the
pattern recognition disciplines, had limited impact on court admissibility
199

Id.

200

Id.

201

Id. at 159 n.9.
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United States v. Frabizio, 463 F. Supp. 2d 111, 112-13 (D. Mass. 2006). Contra United States v. Christie, No.
07-332, 2009 WL 742722, at *1 (D. N.J. 2009) (expert evidence was admissible under Daubert in response to
multiple images and video).
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United States v. Rodriguez-Pacheco, 475 F.3d 434, 438 (1st Cir. 2007).
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Id.
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Id.
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Michelle Meyer McCarthy, Annotation, Admissibility and Weight of Voice Spectrographic Analysis Evidence,
95 A.L.R. 5th 471 (2009).
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FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 519.
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determinations.209 Revealingly, only one third of subsequent opinions even cite it, and
only one opinion suggests substantial engagement.210
Several courts have considered the admissibility of voice identification evidence
after Daubert. The Alaska Supreme Court ruled that a trial court’s admission of voice
spectrography was not an abuse of discretion.211 This was based on “a limited and
superficial review of the research . . . doing little more than quoting the trial court’s
conclusory assertions”.212 Voice identification evidence has also been excluded after
Daubert. A trial court excluded voice spectrography in United States v. Bahena (2000) as
unreliable, and the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the decision.213 In United States
v. Angleton (2003), the trial court was quite critical of the evidence of reliability put
forward.214 In United States v. Ramos (2003) the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
‘summarily’ rejected the claim that exclusion was erroneous. 215 Voice identification
evidence was also excluded under Frye in People v. Persaud (1996).216 Voice
identification evidence was excluded in United States v. Ricketts (2005) for lacking
probative value.217 Expert evidence as to whether the defendant had uttered an “intelligible
vocalization[]” was also excluded on relevance grounds in United States v. Naegele
(2007).218 Not insignificantly, all of these cases concerned voice identification evidence
proffered by defendants.219
In State v. Cooke, the trial court excluded what has been called “negative
evidence” testimony proffered by the government—that is, testimony showing that efforts
were made to perform voice identification, but that those efforts were unsuccessful.220 Socalled negative evidence is often used in order to correct for the imputed “CSI effect”, in
which it is claimed that jurors will assume that the absence of testimony about forensic
techniques that the jurors believe are available to the government based on their
experience viewing television dramas will lead them to infer either that tests excluded the
defendant or that the government was negligent in not performing them.221

209
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNSEL, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION 60 (Richard H. Bolt
et al. eds., 1979) (explaining that the degree of accuracy and error rates vary from case to case due to the
properties of the voices compared, the recording conditions used to obtain voice samples, the skill of the
examiner, and the examiner’s knowledge about the case. Estimates of error rates are available only for a few
situations, and they “[d]o not constitute a generally adequate basis for a judicial or legislative body to use in
making judgments concerning the reliability and acceptability of aural-visual voice identification in forensic
applications.”). See also Julie C. Reyonlds & Julius W. Weber, The Admissibility of Spectrographic Voice
Identification in the State Courts, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 349, 354 (1973).
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FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 522.
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State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 402 (Alaska 1999).
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FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 56, at 524.
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United States v. Bahena, 233 F.3d 797, 810 (8th Cir. 2000); McCarthy, supra note 207.
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United States v. Angleton, 269 F. Supp. 2d 892, 898-99 (S.D. Tex. 2003); McCarthy, supra note 207.
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United States v. Ramos, 71 F. App’x 332, 336 (5th Cir. 2003).
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People v. Persaud, 406 N.Y.S. 2d 261 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
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United States v. Ricketts, 141 F. App’x 93, 95 (4th Cir. 2005).
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United States v. Naegele, 471 F. Supp. 2d 152, 159 (D.C. Cir. 2007). This issue assumed significance in a
very high profile mass-murder exoneration in New Zealand. See Bain v. Queen [2009] NZSC 16 (SC) [2], [5][8], [68] (N.Z.).
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Ricketts, 141 F. App’x at 95; United States v. Ramos, 71 F. App’x 334, 335 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Bahena, 223 F.3d 797, 802 (8th Cir. 2000); Naegele, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 159; United States v. Angleton, 269 F.
Supp. 2d 892, 893 (S.D. Tex. 2003); People v. Persaud, 640 N.Y.S.2d 261, 403 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
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State v. Cook, 914 A.2d 1078, 1096 (Del. Super. Ct. 2007).

Simon A. Cole & Rachel Dioso-Villa, Investigating the 'CSI Effect' Effect: Media and Litigation Crisis in
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England and Wales: Admissibility Standards, Jurisprudence, and
Practice

An attempt to state the principles that govern the reception of expert evidence in
England and Wales is, in some respects, a relatively simple undertaking. Admissibility is
governed for the most part by common law principles.222 English courts have adopted a
characteristically pragmatic approach to determining whether a witness’s skills and
experience are such that he or she is qualified to provide expert testimony. The essential
question is whether the witness can satisfy the court that he or she has “sufficient
familiarity with and knowledge of the expertise in question to render his opinion
potentially of value.”223
Perhaps the most significant obstacle to the reception of a suitably qualified
expert’s testimony is the principle identified by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Turner:224
An expert’s opinion is admissible to furnish the court with scientific
information which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge
of a judge or jury. If on the proven facts a judge or jury can form their
own conclusions without help, then the opinion of an expert is
unnecessary[.]225
This principle is considered by many commentators to be an expression of the common
knowledge rule. The Law Commission interpreted it to require expert evidence to have
sufficient probative value to be of assistance to the fact-finder in resolving the issues in the
case.226 In concentrating attention on the assistance that might be derived from
developments in science and technology, the courts have elided the significance of
reliability.227 In R. v. Dallagher,228 the Court of Appeal suggested that the English
approach was analogous with that established by rule 702 of the U.S. Federal Rules of
Evidence.229 However, the analogy is tenuous. Daubert and the text of rule 702 indicate
that expert testimony will only assist the tribunal of fact if it is the product of reliable
theories and techniques. While Daubert provides criteria for the evaluation of scientific
and other forms of expert testimony, English courts have taken the view that reliability is
primarily an issue for the tribunal of fact in determining the weight to be attached to such
evidence, and have declined to identify any specific criteria relating to reliability as a
condition of admissibility.
In recent judgments, rather worryingly, the Court of Appeal has cast doubt on the
credentials of witnesses called to give expert opinion (almost exclusively for the defense)
who have no clinical or investigative experience with the methods or techniques to which

222

See PAUL ROBERTS & ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (2nd ed. 2010); MIKE REDMAYNE, EXPERT
EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2001); TRISTRAM HODGKINSON & MARK JAMES, EXPERT EVIDENCE: LAW
AND PRACTICE (2010).
223
Barings v. Coopers & Lybrand (No. 2) [2001] Lloyd’s Rep. Bank. 85 (Eng.); see also R. v. Robb, [1991] 93
Cr. App. R. 161, 164-65 (Eng.); R. v. Stockwell [1993] 97 Cr. App. R. 260, 264-66 (Eng.).
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R. v. Turner, [1974] QB 834 (Eng.).
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Id. at 841.
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Law Commission of England and Wales, Report on Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings in England and
Wales (London: The Stationery Office, 2011) 2.17. Roberts and Zuckerman have taken it to be the articulation of
a broader ‘helpfulness’ principle.
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Ian Dennis, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 895 (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 4th ed. 2010).
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their opinions relate.230 This trend appears to be predicated on the misguided assumption
that those who have considerable knowledge and understanding of scientific and
methodological principles generally can say nothing of value about the application of
those principles in particular forensic contexts. In R. v. Weller,231 the Court went so far as
to issue an admonishment to parties (in practice, the defense):
[W]e do hope that the courts will not be troubled in future by attempts to
rely on published work by people who have no practical experience in
the field and therefore cannot contradict or bring any useful evidence to
bear on issues that are not always contained in scientific journals.232
A peculiar feature of English appellate decisions is the frequency with which the
South Australian Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Bonython is cited as a statement of the
rules that govern the reception of expert evidence in England and Wales. One of those
rules is that the subject matter of an expert’s testimony must form “a body of knowledge
or experience which is sufficiently organized or recognized to be accepted as a reliable
body of knowledge or experience.”233 The prevailing view in several Australian states
seems to be that this principle embodies an approach that is similar to that established by
U.S. v. Frye.234 This is not to say that a Frye-like test forms any part of the common law in
England and Wales (or Australia), for although the Court of Appeal has cited the relevant
passage in Bonython with some regularity, there has been no pause to consider its meaning
or to focus attention on the acceptance (or reliability) of techniques and opinions.235
Interestingly, the Law Commission of England and Wales suggested that recent
appellate decisions confirm the existence of a common law reliability threshold.236 In Reed
& Reed237 the Court of Appeal held that "a court must consider whether “the subject
matter of the evidence [is] part of ‘a body of knowledge or experience which is
sufficiently organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or
experience.’”238 Despite the obvious allusion to Bonython, the Court explained that this
did not constitute an enhanced test of admissibility for expert (scientific) evidence:
[E]xpert evidence of a scientific nature is not admissible where the
scientific basis on which it is advanced is insufficiently reliable for it to
be put before the jury. There is, however, no enhanced test of
230
See, for example, the Court of Appeal’s observations regarding the experience of the expert called by the
defense to provide opinions relating to the reliability of LCN DNA analysis in R. v. Reed & Reed [2009] EWCA
Crim 2698, at [106-110]: “He bases much of his knowledge of DNA and the analysis of Low Template DNA on
papers and discussion with other scientists; he does not conduct laboratory research . . . his expertise on the
interpretation of DNA profiles is limited, without any relevant first hand laboratory research experience. He is
not qualified to make a scene of crime investigation.”
231

[2010] EWCA Crim 1085.

232

Id. at [38].
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R. v. Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45.
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In Kastelein v. Newmont Australia Ltd, [2006] N.T.M.C. 081, for example, the Northern Territory Work
Health Court suggested that in Runjanjic, King C.J. had applied the test set out in Frye. In Mallard v. The Queen
[2003] W.A.S.C.A. 296 (December 3, 2003), the Supreme Court of Western Australia cited Runjanjic and the
South Australian Supreme Court’s decision in Karger, S.A.S.C. 64 (March 29, 2001), in support of its
observation that ‘the Frye test has been adopted in a number of Australian jurisdictions’; [2003] W.A.S.C.A. 296
at [285]. In the latter case, the South Australian Supreme Court, after close analysis of the judgment of King C.J.
in Bonython, concluded: ‘It is clear from his judgment that King CJ was accepting the [Frye] general acceptance
test’; at [178].
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Roberts, ‘Rejecting General Acceptance’; Law Commission, Expert Evidence, 2.12.
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LAW COMM’N, supra note 24, at 14.
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[2010] 1 Crim. App. 23 (Eng.).
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admissibility for such evidence. If the reliability of the scientific basis
for the evidence is challenged, the court will consider whether there is a
sufficiently reliable scientific basis for that evidence to be admitted, but,
if satisfied that there is a sufficiently reliable scientific basis for the
evidence to be admitted, then it will leave the opposing views to be
tested in the trial.239
It seems, then, that Bonython’s acceptance-orientation has been assimilated into the
common law in England and Wales in a way that leaves it devoid of any real meaning. In
practice, the common law test of admissibility does not appear to establish anything more
substantial than the general position expressed in various appellate court judgments that
expert evidence is subject to the “‘ordinary tests of relevance and reliability.’”240
In view of this, it might be no surprise that trial judges’ decisions to admit
incriminating expert opinion of questionable reliability have, with a few exceptions, been
generally endorsed by the Court of Appeal. A striking example of this tendency is the
decision in Dallagher, in which the Court rejected a challenge to the admissibility of
expert opinion concerning latent ear print impressions.241 The witness allowed to express
an opinion at trial was a Dutch police officer who had developed an interest in ear
prints.242 His evidence was, having compared an ear print found on a window at the crime
scene with a print taken from the appellant, he was able to conclude that the print found at
the crime scene had been left by the appellant.243 The foundation for this conclusion was a
portfolio of 600 photographs and 300 ear prints compiled by the officer in which he had
not found two ear prints that were alike in every detail.244 Although the police officer and
a second expert witness conceded that the assumption that ear prints taken from any two
persons are distinguishable was based on limited experience and had little empirical
support, the Court of Appeal took the view that the trial judge could not possibly have
concluded that the evidence was so unreliable that it ought to be excluded.245 In other
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E.g., R. v. Dallagher, [2003] 1 Crim. App. 12 at [29] (Eng.). The source of this principle is one of the most
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cases, even where the error rate of a technique has been found to be significant (as great as
50 per cent), courts have been willing to admit the opinion.246 The general view is that
reliability is primarily an issue for the tribunal of fact rather than a factor regulating
admissibility.
Trial judges in England and Wales also have discretion, under section 78 of the
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, to exclude evidence the reception of which would
have an adverse effect on the fairness of proceedings.247 Though there is little guidance on
the exercise of this discretion, it seems that expert evidence might be excluded where it is
presented in a form that would not enable it to be adequately tested through crossexamination. In R. v. Otway,248 for example, the question of whether the methods used by
an expert were “sufficiently explained to be tested in cross-examination and so to be
verifiable or falsifiable”249 was considered to be a matter that was the province of a trial
judge in determining exclusion under section 78.250 Similarly, the Court observed in R. v.
Ahmed,251 that an expert’s refusal to disclose the material that formed the basis of his or
her testimony, thus rendering it unchallengeable, “would be likely to be a reason for
refusing to admit it.”252 Notwithstanding these instances, the exclusionary discretion is
typically applied with a very light touch.253
The prevailing laissez faire approach to the admissibility of expert evidence in
England and Wales presumes that juries possess the capacity to distinguish reliable from
unreliable expert testimony and attach appropriate weight.254 However, a series of recent
appellate court decisions seem to belie this presumption.255 These have established that
where there is uncontradicted and unequivocal expert evidence, the jury must be directed
that it is to accept the expert evidence, it cannot substitute the expert’s views with its
own.256 More recently, in R. v. Henderson, the Court of Appeal acknowledged the

difference between the “banal” observation that skin surfaces are unique and a measurable scale of detection that
relates to uniqueness.
246
In R. v. Luttrell, [2004] 2 Crim. App. 31 (Eng.), for example, a lip-reading expert was permitted to give
incriminating evidence of the words allegedly spoken by the appellants in a surveillance video. This was so
notwithstanding that tests previously conducted in order to ascertain her accuracy revealed that in video
recording of conversation—containing 890 known words—revealed her accuracy to be about 50 percent. Id. at
[13]. She also reported over 224 words that were not spoken. Id. The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial
judge in Luttrell had been entitled to admit the expert’s evidence. Id. at [38]. It was accepted that lip-reading
evidence may fall “significantly short of perfection,” and that this required the jury to be warned of the
limitations of this kind of evidence. Id. at [42], [44].Though, there is no general requirement to issue a warning to
a jury regarding the reliability of expert evidence. See id. at [42] (explaining that a warning is necessary when
there is particular evidence about which the jury should be cautioned).
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difficulties that juries will inevitably encounter in evaluating some forms of expert
testimony, particularly conflicting medical opinion.257 The Court acknowledged that in
such cases there is a real risk of juries reaching verdicts that do not have a logical basis,
and ventured that:
[T]o suggest, in cases where the expert evidence is fundamental to the
case, that the jury should approach [the] expert opinion in the same way
as they do in every other criminal case, is inadequate … Juries, we
suggest, should not be left in cases requiring [proof beyond reasonable
doubt] to flounder in the formation of a general impression. A
conclusion cannot be left merely to impression … a jury needs to be
directed as to the pointers to reliable evidence and the basis for
distinguishing that which may be relied upon and that which should be
rejected.258
Rather than reflect on whether more rigorous scrutiny of expert evidence was required at
the admissibility stage, the response to this concern over the ability of the jury to
undertake this task satisfactorily was resort to jury directions and cautionary warnings.
The jury should be asked to consider, among other things, whether the witness has strayed
beyond the area of his or her expertise, if the witness is able to point to a recognized peer
reviewed source for his or her opinions, and whether the expert has recent or
contemporary clinical (practical) experience of the matters on which he or she is
testifying.
Overall, English jurisprudence and practice is impoverished. There are few
obstacles to the reception of incriminating expert opinion evidence. Although there appear
to be significant reservations about the ability of advocates to expose the flaws in expert
evidence, and the capacity of juries to undertake satisfactory evaluation of it, the general
approach to admissibility appears to be grounded on contrary assumptions.
In March 2011, the Law Commission released a report on Expert Evidence in
Criminal Proceedings in England and Wales.259 The report recommends the codification
of the common law rules supplemented by an explicit reliability standard which would
replace the “rudimentary” version associated with the common law, Bonython, and
Reed.260 Patently influenced by Daubert and the revised FRE, a draft bill sets out several
factors that might assist a trial judge to determine whether expert opinion evidence is
“sufficiently reliable” to admit.261 The Commission, in addition, recommended greater

remind a jury about evidence to the contrary of expert testimony). But c.f. Walton v. R., [1978] A.C. 788 (P.C.) at
793 (Eng.) (holding that a jury is not required to accept expert testimony as conclusive).
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Id. at 3, 18 (discussing the influence of the United States’ Federal Rules of Evidence); Id. at 83 (discussing
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)); Id. at 148 (clause 4 of the draft bill); Id. at 157 (schedule,
part 1 of the draft bill); Roberts, supra note 24 (explaining the three factors proposed by the Commission to help
judges determine admissibility of scientific evidence); see Gary Edmond & Andrew Roberts, The Law
Commission’s Report on Expert Evidence in Criminal Proceedings, 11 CRIM. L.R. 844, 844-848 (2011)
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scope for judicial review of admissibility decisions, increased use of court-appointed
experts at the admissibility stage, and further education for lawyers and judges.262
1.

Latent Fingerprint Evidence

As in other jurisdictions, there is long-standing acceptance of fingerprint examiners’
claims that fingerprints are uniquely distinctive. For many years identification (i.e.,
individualization) on the basis of fingerprints was predicated on an expert finding 16
points of similarity. The formal adoption of a non-numeric approach was precipitated by
the decision in R. v. Buckley, in which the Court of Appeal held that where there were
eight or more points of similarity, a trial judge “may or may not exercise his or her
discretion in favour of admitting the evidence.”263 The Court suggested that the manner in
which the discretion is exercised would depend on the experience and expertise of the
witness, the number of similar ridge characteristics, whether there are any dissimilar
characteristics, and the size and quality of the crime scene print.264
The validity of fingerprint evidence has not been subjected to serious or sustained
challenge in England and Wales and it seems doubtful that this position will change if the
Daubert-like approach to admissibility proposed by the Law Commission is enacted.265
The Commission’s draft legislation identifies a number of reasons why expert testimony
might not be “sufficiently reliable,” among which are that the opinion is based on a
hypothesis that has not been subjected to sufficient scrutiny, and that the opinion is based
on an unjustifiable assumption.266 Latent fingerprint evidence might be challenged on
either of these grounds. However, the Law Commission envisages that the reliability test
need not be applied where the party objecting to admissibility is unable to satisfy the trial
judge that the evidence might not be reliable.267 It cited the remote possibility that two
persons will have the same fingerprints as one example of circumstances in which it might
not be necessary to apply the reliability test.268 Were the courts to look to the
Commission’s report for guidance, if the draft legislation is enacted, it seems unlikely that
any challenge to the validity of the claims that fingerprints are unique, and that individuals
can be positively identified will be entertained.
As things stand, fingerprint examiners are routinely allowed to assert that a
defendant is the unique source of a latent fingerprint found at a crime scene and the courts
appear to readily accept such testimony.269 There is no requirement that the jury be warned
about any dangers or limitations.270

262
LAW COMM’N, supra note 24, at 181-82, 195-96; see also Edmond & Roberts, supra note 32, at 368
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The inquiry in Scotland following HM Advocate v. Shirley McKie (1999) (acquitting McKie of perjury after
she stated fingerprints collected at a crime scene were not attributable to her), along with several other national
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THE FINGERPRINT INQUIRY REPORT 600, § 34.21 (2011).
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DNA Evidence

Although it has not benefitted from the unencumbered route into criminal
proceedings that fingerprint evidence enjoyed, the science of DNA analysis has been
broadly accepted. In Gordon, for example, the Court of Appeal stated that it had no doubts
over the validity and value of DNA evidence in general, suggesting that “unlike
fingerprinting, a DNA profiling match is not unique.”271 The challenge that the Court
considered was not to the validity of DNA analysis generally, rather to the manner in
which the expert had arrived at the match probability.272 Anticipating the effect that
probabilities running into many millions to one may have on juries, the Court accepted
that the jury in the particular case may not have convicted had it had the benefit of expert
evidence concerning the effect on the match probability of variation produced by differing
equipment and the tolerances that are applied in the subjective process of comparison.273
Although such issues remain salient, they have not received close attention in any
subsequent appellate proceeding.274
While it appears to be presumed that the jury has the capacity to evaluate the
(partially subjective) analysis that results in a random match probability, in Adams, the
Court of Appeal deprecated defense use of Bayesian analysis to evaluate the probability
that the defendant left the genetic material at the crime scene on which DNA analysis had
been conducted.275 The Court doubted whether the jury should be led into the realms of
theory and complexity that the presentation of a Bayesian approach to evidence would
entail.276
The most significant recent challenge in the United Kingdom has been to the
admissibility of LCN DNA analysis, a relatively new technique that enables DNA alleles
found in very small samples of genetic material to be amplified in order to obtain a DNA
profile that can be used for forensic analysis.277 Doubts were expressed over the reliability
of LCN DNA analysis in R. v. Hoey,278 a first instance decision in Northern Ireland.279 The
problem is that the quantities of DNA available for analysis are so small that the process
used to amplify the samples is susceptible to statistically random (i.e., stochastic) effects,
which give rise to a risk of both false positive and false negative results. More recently,
however, the Court of Appeal has admitted the testimony of biologists, about the
significance of LCN DNA results, in circumstances where the analyst was unable to attach
a mathematical expression in the form of a RMP or likelihood ratio.280
In Reed & Reed,281 the Court of Appeal held that evidence of LCN DNA analysis
on samples of genetic material that were not susceptible to stochastic effects were
271

R. v. Gordon, [1995] 1 Crim. App. 290 at 290, 294 (Eng.).
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Id. at 296.
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Id. at 295-96.
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In R. v. Hookway, [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1989, [15]-[20], [33] (Eng.), the Court of Appeal rejected a
submission that disagreement between experts over the appropriate statistical model for generating a random
match probability in relation to LCN DNA warranted exclusion of the evidence. Such disagreement ought to be
addressed in an appropriate direction to the tribunal of fact. Id. at [33].
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admissible and suggested that even where there was a risk of them occurring the expert
evidence may still be admissible.282 In Broughton,283 the Court was more emphatic,
declaring:
In our judgment, the science of [LCN DNA] is sufficiently well
established to pass the ordinary tests of reliability and relevance and it
would be wrong wholly to deprive the justice system of the benefits to
be gained from the new techniques and advances which it embodies, in
cases where there is clear evidence … that the profiles are sufficiently
reliable.284
Generally, evidence that was susceptible to random statistical effects would be admissible
where repeat testing (even a low number of repeat tests) produced consistent results.285 In
cases where the profiles generated were “wholly and obviously unreliable,” it was
envisaged that the prosecution would not seek to rely on them, and if it did, then the trial
judge ought to exclude the evidence if he or she considered them unreliable.286 In cases in
which the probative value of the profiles was more debatable, the evidence may properly
be adduced and its weight established by ‘adversarial forensic techniques.’287 The Court of
Appeal appears to have great faith in the capacity of pre-trial management hearings, which
impose various reporting duties on experts, on prosecutorial restraint, and the ability of
advocates to reveal in cross-examination any shortcomings in methodology used and
opinions expressed by expert witnesses to address the uncertainties surrounding such
nascent forensic techniques.288 Where the empirical basis for opinions proffered by an
expert has been inadequate, the court has resorted to the “experience of the expert” as a
means of bridging the scientific gap.289 In Reed & Reed, although the Court acknowledged
that with respect to the mechanisms through which DNA may be transferred from one
object or place to another, there was little research and much more was needed, an expert
could still enumerate the possible means of transfer of small quantities of DNA.290 The
admissibility of this form of expert evidence was renewed in Weller.291 The appellant
submitted that if a proper review of the scientific literature concerning transfer of DNA
were to be undertaken, it would show that the state of scientific knowledge to be such that
no evaluative judgment on the possible means of transfer could be made.292 This
submission was rejected by the Court of Appeal, which was satisfied that an expert’s
practical experience could provide ‘a sufficiently reliable scientific basis for a forensic
science officer to give evidence of the evaluation of the possibilities of transfer’ in the
circumstances of the particular case.293
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Bite Marks

Bite mark evidence has not attracted the degree of judicial scrutiny in England
and Wales that it has in other jurisdictions.294 It seems that odontologists have been
permitted to proffer a range of opinion on the significance of similarities found in the bite
mark impressions left on the skin of a victim of crime (or an object found at the scene of a
crime) and dental impressions taken from a defendant.295 In some cases, this appears to
have been restricted to evidence that an impression left on a victim corresponds with an
impression of a defendant’s teeth.296 In others, it has been claimed on the basis of
similarities in such impressions, that the defendant was the source of the bite marks.297 It
would be in keeping with the approach in respect of other forms of forensic science and
medical evidence for experts to be given significant latitude in the terms used to state the
significance of their findings where the basis for the evaluation is their own experience.298
4.

Incriminating Images and Voice Recordings

Incriminating expert opinions concerning identification from voice recordings
and images are routinely admitted in criminal proceedings in England and Wales. In
common with other forms of forensic comparison evidence, the reliability of the
techniques that form the basis of such opinion is not subject to any form of rigorous
scrutiny for the purposes of determining admissibility.
a.

Image Comparison Evidence (So-Called ‘Facial Mapping’)

A range of individuals with expertise and/or experience in anatomy, medical art,
photography, information technology and military intelligence (and so on) have been
allowed to interpret images and express opinions about the identity of persons of interest
appearing in them. In addition, police and other investigators are entitled to express
opinions about identity from repeated exposure to images. There is, in contrast to
Australia (and Canada), no need for prior familiarity (with the suspect/POI) or something
beyond what a jury might be able to do through its own examination of the images and the
accused during the course of a trial.
Since the 1980s, courts have been admitting identification evidence derived from
photographs—initially of soccer riots and robberies—by investigators and more recently
digitally-recorded images and videos, analyzed by a range of investigators and
consultants.299 Since the early 1990s, English courts have allowed police officers and other
witnesses—formally qualified as expert witnesses and frequently described as “facial
mappers”—to express incriminating opinion evidence, even in circumstances where the
CCTV evidence and the witnesses’ interpretation was the only evidence against the
294
See, e.g., R. v. Bourimech, [2002] EWCA (Crim) 2089, [13] (Eng.); R. v. Singleton, [1995] 1 Crim. App. 431
at 434 (Eng.); R. v. Egan, [1992] 95 Crim. App. 278 at 280 (Wales).
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See R. v. Egan, [1992] 95 Crim. App. 278 at 280 (Wales); R. v. Bourimech, [2002] EWCA (Crim) 2089, [13]
(Eng.).
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In R. v. Bourimech, a forensic odontologist read a statement to the jury: “to the effect that there was no doubt that
the bite mark to the complainant's left shoulder corresponded in detail with the dental impressions taken from the
appellant.” [2002] EWCA (Crim) 2089, [13]. See also, e.g., R. v. Singleton, [1995] 1 Crim. App. 431 at 434 (Eng.)
(finding a match between a cast of the defendant's teeth and bite marks found on the victim, a forensic odontologist
claimed the marks identified the defendant as the assailant).
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See R. v. Liverpool City Council, [2007] EWHC (Admin) 1477, [46] (Eng.).

R. v. Hookway, [1999] Crim. L.R. 750 (A.C.); R. v. Clare and Peach, [1995] 2 Cr. App. R. 333 at 335-38; R.
v. Clarke, [1995] 2 Cr. App. R. 425 at 429-31; R. v. Stockwell, [1993] 97 Cr. App. R. 260 at 261-66. See Ruth
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accused.300 With the massive expansion in the number of images available from publicly
funded CCTV schemes, along with the proliferation of private security systems and
mobile recording devices, English courts have maintained their generally liberal approach
to the admission of images and opinions based on images.301 Two leading cases indicate
the receptiveness to image comparison evidence.
In Attorney-General’s Reference No 2 of 2002, the Court of Appeal confirmed
four circumstances in which photographic comparisons are acceptable.302 The two of
immediate interest are where the remote witness (often an investigator) spends time
viewing and analysing images “thereby acquiring special knowledge [as an ad hoc expert]
which the jury does not have” and “a suitably qualified expert with facial mapping skills
can give opinion evidence of identification based on a comparison between images.”303 In
both cases, the images should be available to the jury and the admissibility ‘subject to
appropriate directions in summing up’.304 Considering the admissibility of a “sufficiently
qualified expert” in R. v. Atkins, the Court of Appeal confirmed that his evidence was
admissible provided limitations were made clear to the jury.305 The Court explained that
there was no rule against positive identification (i.e. individualization), though the absence
of statistical information about the frequency or interrelatedness of facial features (i.e.,
some kind of database) ought to be disclosed.306 General methodological critiques and
frailties with techniques employed by the analyst were matters for weight at the trial.307
In the decades since it first appeared in courts, facial mapping in England has
largely abandoned any pretensions to mathematical precision and measurement (i.e.,
anthropometrics).308 Witnesses now tend to testify in terms of general morphology and
similarities. While courts do not proscribe individualization, the witnesses themselves tend
to prefer the use of scales that facilitate the provision of qualified opinions derived from
subjective impressions of the strength of the evidence (see Figure 3 and Table 1).309 Such
opinions are routinely admitted even though, as the Court in Atkins recognized, they do
“not have a scientific basis.”310
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See Hookway, [1999] Crim. L.R. 750.
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Gary Edmond, Just truth? Carefully applying history, philosophy and sociology of science to the forensic use
of CCTV images, 44 Studies in the History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences (2013) 80-91.
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BRITAIN (Oxford Univ. Press ed., 2004).
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Downey, [1995] 1 Cr. App. R. 547 at 556 (Eng.).
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Figure 3: Single image from the crime scene in R. v. Atkins (top left). One of the
accused (top right). Same images with grids reproduced below.311

Table 1: “Expert’s” assessment of the probative value of the image from Atkins in
terms of identity (taken from expert’s report).312

There has been some controversy around facial mapping evidence in England. In
this regard, the response to the opinions of one facial mapping witness (Harrow) are
suggestive.313 After many appearances, Harrow came to be seen as ‘an expert who over-

311
The left images in Figure 3 contain the single image retrieved from a security camera system after a home
invasion after enhancement. The image on the right is of one of the Atkins brothers. Photographs courtesy of Joe
Stone.
312
R. v. Atkins, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1876, [8] (this is an attempt to mimic a Bayesian approach to the
provision of evidence with no underlying research support).
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stepped the mark’ and whose reliability “appeared seriously questionable.”314 Rather than
consider Harrow’s mistakes as exposing or exemplifying a wider range of problems with
facial mapping evidence, the lack of a research base and absence of standardized
techniques, as Justice Mitting did in R. v. Gray, most courts have preferred to characterize
Harrow as a “bad apple”, thereby restricting Gray to its particular facts.315 Atkins
explicitly exemplifies this tendency.316
Much of the image comparison evidence, apart from opinions expressed by
investigating police officers, is supplied by (or outsourced to) independent consultants
(rather than state-employed forensic scientists).317 Experience with facial mapping
indicates how judges may be implicated in the creation and perpetuation of some forensic
“fields” and how those fields may possess little, if any, scientific credibility.318 Facial
mapping, per se, does not exist beyond its incarnation in law enforcement and
investigative communities.
b.

Voice Comparison Evidence

Although it is widely accepted that voice identification using only auditory
analysis is an unsatisfactory basis of speaker identification, in R. v. Robb the Court of
Appeal considered such analysis to be admissible evidence.319 The Court acknowledged
that the great weight of informed opinion, including world leaders in the field, was that
such techniques unless verified by acoustic analysis were an unreliable basis of speaker
identification.320 It also observed that respected forensic institutes had rejected the use of
auditory analysis without supplementation as a basis of voice identification.321 Further, the
Court noted that the expert in question was part of a very small minority of practitioners
who were prepared to testify solely on the basis of auditory analysis, that he had not tested
the accuracy of his findings and had published no material that would allow such testing to
be conducted.322 It concluded that his opinion had not been shown to be wrong and had
therefore been properly admitted at trial.323
In R. v. Chenia and R. v. Flynn, the Court of Criminal Appeals expressed the
need for caution when the witness purporting to identify a voice was an investigating
police officer whose interpretation might be contaminated by knowledge of the
investigation.324 Such cases now require careful warnings and where possible recordings
should be made available so the jury can undertake its own comparison.
It is notable that the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland, when called upon to
consider the admissibility of voice comparison evidence, declined to follow the casual
314
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approach adopted in Robb.325 In R. v. O’Doherty, it declared that in light of the state of
scientific knowledge at the time, no prosecution ought to proceed in Northern Ireland in
which the Crown proposed to rely predominantly on auditory analysis of voice
recordings.326
C.

Canada: Admissibility Standards, Jurisprudence, and Practice

Canada is a federal system, divided into ten provinces and three territories. The
federal government has exclusive jurisdiction over criminal law, but courts administration,
policing and some prisons are provided provincially. Federal and provincial evidence acts
establish some rules of admissibility, however common law is the leading source of
evidence law.327 Though originating in England, the common law of Canada has departed
from contemporary English law in some important respects. In particular, the Supreme
Court of Canada has adopted a principles-based approach to evidence, seeking to
articulate and apply a uniform set of values to guide trial judges when deciding the
admissibility of evidence.328 Principles such as necessity, reliability and the right to a fair
trial have been judicially defined and are balanced against one another at the time of the
admissibility decision.329 In adopting this approach, the Court has moved away from the
traditional rigid approach based on categories of admissibility. In many areas, this has led
to a more liberal (i.e., inclusive) admissibility standard, although it is sometimes suggested
that expert evidence has become more difficult to tender under the principles-based
approach.330
Since 1982, the Canadian constitution has incorporated a Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.331 The Charter has had an enormous impact on criminal procedure and
evidence, and particularly on investigative practices. Rights protected under the Charter
include a right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, a right to a fair and public
trial, and a right to legal counsel.332 Three decades of jurisprudence has given texture and
limits to these rights, and set out the manner in which courts must safeguard Charter rights
in their procedures. The focus on Charter protections has outweighed the articulation of
other evidentiary principles in relation to forensic science and medicine, and the vast
majority of defense challenges to the admissibility of forensic evidence are predicated on
an alleged Charter violation such as a warrantless search, illegal arrest or denial of
counsel. In light of this emphasis, Canadian trial practice on such issues as the reliability
of forensic evidence has at times become an afterthought to the procedural protections
afforded by the Charter. The seeming reluctance of trial counsel to challenge the reliability
of expert opinion evidence is particularly striking given recent decisions from the

325
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Supreme Court of Canada endorsing Daubert and its criteria, and a body of critical work
that has emerged from high profile wrongful convictions.333
The leading Canadian case on the admissibility of expert evidence is R. v.
Mohan.334 A unanimous Court moved away from the relevance and helpfulness standard
in place in English law, holding that:
Admission of expert evidence depends on the application of the following
criteria:
(a) relevance;
(b) necessity in assisting the trier of fact;
(c) the absence of any exclusionary rule; [and]
(d) a properly qualified expert.335
On behalf of the Court, Justice Sopinka explained that relevance is a broad inquiry,
encompassing logical as well as legal relevance, and requiring a trial judge to assess the
reliability of the putative evidence against its costs, including the risk of distortion or overvaluation.336 Necessity was described as a standard that is higher than the “helpfulness”
requirement set out in English precedent, but that should not be judged “by too strict a
standard.”337 However, novel scientific evidence (which seems to mean evidence that has
not previously been accepted in a court, but may extend to new applications of established
techniques) must be “essential” in the sense that a jury will be unable to come to the
correct decision without the evidence, in order to be admissible.338 The requirement that
another exclusionary rule must not apply is consistent with rules applied elsewhere in the
Commonwealth.339 The qualification requirement was described by Sopinka J as a need
for the expert to demonstrate “special or peculiar knowledge [acquired] through study or
experience.”340 While the qualification requirement was initially relatively lax, and
arguably remains so in some fields, the identification of wrongful convictions attributable
to poor quality expert evidence has led to some instances of a more rigorous assessment of
qualifications. Trial judges are increasingly being encouraged by appeal courts to identify
and enforce the boundaries of a witnesses’ expertise.341
Rules prohibiting an expert from testifying on the ultimate issue and requiring
that expert evidence go beyond matters that are common knowledge have become less
important over time, though they retain some formal status and are occasionally
333
See, e.g., STEPHEN T. GOUDGE, INQUIRY INTO PEDIATRIC FORENSIC PATHOLOGY IN ONTARIO: REPORT 514
(2008), available at
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JAMES DRISKELL 172-73 (2007), available at http://www.driskellinquiry.ca/pdf/final_report_jan2007.pdf; FRED
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invoked.342 Canadian judges have been reluctant to admit expert evidence on matters they
regard as being common knowledge, such as the inadequacies of human memory in
eyewitness identification.343 The Supreme Court of Canada suggested for a time that
expert evidence is admissible regardless of the extent to which the facts underlying the
opinion have been proven, but that the jury should be instructed to consider the extent of
proof in deciding what weight to give the evidence.344 More recent cases seem to have
backed away from this laissez-faire approach, holding instead that a lack of admissible
proof of underlying facts can undermine the admissibility of the opinion.345 The latter
approach is certainly more consistent with the cost/benefit analysis adopted by the Court
in Mohan.
During the last decade the Supreme Court has formally supplemented the Mohan
approach with a more explicit recognition of the need for evidence of reliability.346
Conspicuously influenced by Daubert, this standard is sometimes characterized as
“threshold reliability.”347 In J-LJ, DD and most recently Trochym, the Court referred
approvingly to Daubert and/or endorsed the reliability criteria.348 Subservient to Mohan,
Daubert-style criteria have not been strictly applied, especially to types of evidence that
have long been admitted or are not easily assessed in terms of validation and proficiency
testing.349
Despite the relatively large number of Supreme Court of Canada decisions on the
admissibility of expert evidence, much expert evidence (particularly evidence tendered by
the Crown) is admitted with, at best, a perfunctory admissibility enquiry.350 A study of the
courts of British Columbia by Cunliffe suggests that when admissibility is contested, trial
judges most often admit the expert testimony and leave reliability as an issue of weight to
be determined by the tribunal of fact. Expert evidence is rarely excluded on the basis of
unreliability, particularly when that evidence relates to what is considered as a routine
forensic procedure. Police officers and other investigative professionals are at times
qualified by trial judges as expert witnesses on the basis of relatively slight experience, or
to testify about the results of tests developed and performed in the context of a specific
case.351 At other times these opinions are admitted as non-expert opinion evidence.352
342
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These trends in trial courts suggest a lack of engagement with the
recommendations made by commissions of inquiry into wrongful convictions. Successive
commissioners have recommended closer trial scrutiny of investigative practices
associated with forensic science: most recently in the Goudge Inquiry into child homicide
cases.353 In many of these inquiries forensic science or medicine was identified as a source
of error that positively, and sometimes systematically, contributed to wrongful
convictions.354
The leading provider of forensic services is an arm of the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police (RCMP), and there is no independent forensic science institute like those
that currently exist in some parts of Australia (e.g., South Australia) and once existed in
England—before the demise of the Forensic Science Service (FSS). Only one published
judgment cites the NRC report (without engaging with it substance), and the number of
challenges to the reliability of forensic science and medicine evidence does not seem to
have increased since its publication. Legal aid funding is a particular concern, in this
regard. As is true in other jurisdictions, the amount of funding available to legally aided
defendants is inadequate and has been declining over time. This presents a considerable
barrier to contested trials of any sort, preventing robust analysis of Crown (or state
adduced) forensic science and medicine evidence.355 Defense experts are out of the
question in many cases.
In the vast majority of criminal trials in Canada a trial judge, rather than a jury,
acts as the tribunal of fact.
1.

Latent Fingerprint Evidence

Canada came relatively late to latent fingerprint evidence, although the RCMP
began using latent fingerprint identification as an investigative technique in the early
twentieth century. The first two reported decisions on the admissibility of fingerprint
evidence were both decided in 1934, and in both cases the evidence was excluded.356 In R.
v. Wiswell, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal suggested that the knowledge and practices
underlying fingerprint identification had not been sufficiently proven to admit the
evidence.357 In R. v. De’Georgio & Servello, the Crown argued that a fingerprint
identification was a question of fact rather than of expert opinion.358 The judge treated the
officer’s evidence as potential expert testimony, and excluded it on the basis that the
officer had given no account of how he reached his conclusion.359
The first reported case in which fingerprint evidence was admitted was R. v.
Buckingham & Vickers.360 Justice Robertson distinguished the earlier cases, finding that
the police officers who testified to a match on this occasion had given ”a very complete
352
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and adequate explanation as to why they came to the conclusion that these fingerprints are
the same as those of the accused.”361 There was no other evidence linking the accused to
the crime in this case, and the accused was ultimately acquitted by the jury.362 Pelletier. v.
Le Roi was the first Court of Appeal decision to confirm the admissibility of latent
fingerprint evidence.363 The Quebec court affirmed the reliability and universal
admissibility of fingerprint evidence, effectively approving this evidence for use in
criminal trials thereafter.364 By 1988, the Supreme Court of Canada felt sufficiently
confident in latent fingerprint comparison to describe the technique as ‘an invaluable tool
of criminal investigation . . . because it is virtually infallible.’365
There appears to be no reported case in which fingerprint evidence has been
excluded since Pelletier. v. Le Roi affirmed admission in 1952.366 From time to time,
judges acknowledge that experts must exercise judgment in declaring a match,367 or
provide a critical assessment of the inferences that may or may not be drawn from the
presence of matched fingerprints at a crime scene.368 In other cases, judges declare that
fingerprinting is so widely accepted that it can be admitted with little or no screening. 369
Canada has no investigative or evidentiary requirements of a minimum number
of similar points to declare a match.370 Experts tend nonetheless to testify to the number of
similar features identified, at times using visual aids to demonstrate them to the tribunal of
fact. Experts usually testify to a ”match” between the accused’s fingerprints and those
found at a scene. The advent of Mohan, with its emphasis on case-by-case determinations
of the admissibility of expert evidence, does not seem to have affected fingerprint
evidence.371 Effectively, this and the other familiar forms of forensic evidence considered
in this article seem to have been grandfathered out of the Mohan-Daubert framework.372
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DNA Evidence

The leading Canadian case on the admissibility of DNA evidence is R. v.
Terceira.373 In that case, the Court confirmed that the Mohan test applies to DNA
evidence, and defined a “match” as a “failure to exclude a suspect’s DNA.”374 The
Terceira court regarded reliability as the touchstone of admissibility for a novel technique
(as RFLP analysis was in 1991).375 Evidence on the statistical probability of a random
match was also accepted, although the Court held that the admissibility of this evidence
should be considered on a case-by-case basis.376 While probability evidence was often
ruled inadmissible in the 1990s, evidence of a match was invariably admitted from the
first cases. Probability estimates are now routinely admitted.
Early Canadian case law on the admissibility of DNA relied heavily on U.S.
judges’ conclusions regarding the reliability of DNA matching and the appropriateness of
forensic techniques adopted in crime investigation laboratories.377 As new techniques were
introduced (e.g. PCR and mtDNA), this reliance on U.S. precedent has persisted.
Questions about the applicability of probability-based statistics to indigenous populations
and ethnic minorities have been recurrent.378 In one Alberta case, a defense expert who
testified about the shortcomings of the statistical evidence given by prosecution witnesses,
partly in reliance on the first NRC report,379 was found to have given irrelevant and
unreliable evidence by a judge who ultimately relied on the Crown expert’s evidence that
a match had been found.380 However, in the first decision on the admissibility of
mitochondrial DNA evidence, the Supreme Court of British Columbia ordered that
proficiency tests be disclosed to the accused, and carefully considered evidence regarding
both proficiency and validity testing.381 In keeping with earlier decisions, Henderson J
concluded that the risk of contamination occurring in a particular case is a matter for the
jury which should not preclude admission of the evidence.382
The openness towards DNA evidence that has been shown by Canadian courts is
not restricted to human DNA. Forensic scientists have been permitted to testify that a
comparison of the phylogenetic profile of HIV made it highly likely that an accused
infected 11 victims with HIV.383 Phylogenetic comparisons were also admitted in an effort
to establish that HIV contaminated blood was used in a coagulant product administered to
hemophiliacs in the mid 1980s, although the application of the technique in that case was
ultimately found unreliable by the trial judge.384 In another case, cat hairs found on a
jacket similar to one the accused had been known to wear were alleged to match the DNA
373
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of the victim’s cat.385 In response to defense criticisms of the number and homogeneity of
cats included in the ad hoc sample of local cat DNA assembled for this case, the forensic
scientist testified, “We used a lot of loci instead of a lot of cats.”386 The evidence was
admitted, and its admissibility was upheld on appeal.387
There seem to be no Canadian cases in which DNA evidence was wholly
excluded from trial.
3.

Bite Marks

In Canada, bite mark evidence has been associated with exculpation in high
profile cases. Two important examples are R. v. Unger,388 in which a forensic odontologist
testified that bite marks on the victim were not made by the accused; and R. v. Reynolds,
where a forensic pathologist opined that wounds were made by scissors leading to murder
charges being laid against the victim’s mother.389 Unger is now considered to have been
wrongly convicted, and Reynolds is also widely regarded as innocent of the charges that
were laid against her.390 In Reynolds, a forensic odontologist concluded that the puncture
wounds were made by a dog.391 Forensic odontology seems to be one of relatively few
fields in which defense experts are occasionally called in Canada.
A review of cases in which bite mark evidence is admitted suggests that lawyers
and judges allow bite mark specialists wide latitude when testifying. For instance, courts
have permitted bite mark witnesses to testify about the force required to leave a particular
mark;392 about the psychological state experienced by a person when biting;393 and about
whether an injury to a victim’s head was caused by a boot.394 In some of these cases, the
court suggested that little weight should be given to the opinion—nonetheless, the
testimony was permitted.
A rare example of a more critical assessment of bite mark evidence is R. v.
Taillefer; R. v. Duguay.395 In this case, the expert testified that a bite mark was consistent
“beyond reasonable doubt” with the accused’s bite pattern.396 The expert had previously
given an opinion that the same mark was caused by a different suspect.397 The Supreme
Court of Canada upheld the accused’s appeal from conviction on the basis of nondisclosure of the earlier opinion.398 While discussing the relevance of the inconsistent
opinion to the expert’s credibility, the Court did not comment on the reliability arguments
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raised by the accused.399 The Court did not suggest that the patent reliability concerns in
this case mandated exclusion of the evidence.400
4.

Incriminating Images and Voice Recordings
a.

Opinions about Images

Expert testimony about images is rarely offered in Canada for two reasons. First,
in R. v. Nikolovski, the Supreme Court of Canada held that a tribunal of fact may reach its
own conclusion about identification by comparing images of a person of interest with the
accused person, even in cases where no other evidence links the accused with the crime.401
Trial judges are exhorted to emphasize the care required to reach such a verdict, but the
Mohan criteria will not condition the admissibility of footage or photographic evidence for
this purpose. Secondly, Canadian courts routinely permit a witness who knows the
accused to testify that he or she can identify the accused as the person depicted in video or
photographic images.402 Often, the witness called by the Crown for this purpose is a police
or probationary officer, or prison guard. Nonetheless, and perhaps reassuringly, the case
law includes several examples of those accused being acquitted in circumstances where
images and supplementary identification evidence are the only evidence presented to
establish identity.403 However, while judges frequently rehearse the general dangers of
identification evidence, they never disclose any familiarity with technical literature on the
topic, nor offer an analysis of the special issues associated with image identification
beyond occasional references to image quality.404
We have identified only three reported decisions in which expert testimony was
admitted to assist the court to interpret video imagery.405 In R. v. Brown, the defense led
expert evidence from an anthropologist (relying on facial morphology, photoanthropometry and video superimposition) to support its claim that the accused were not
the individuals shown in a video linked to the charged murder.406 The trial judge allowed
the evidence over the Crown’s objections, finding that it was likely respectable within its
field and that any frailties in the expert’s methodologies could be fully canvassed in crossexamination.407 In R. v. Eakin, the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench admitted expert
evidence proffered by the Crown to show that the movements captured on a video were
consistent with the accused punching the alleged victim, and inconsistent with the
399
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accused’s version of events.408 In R. v. Aitken the British Columbia Court of Appeal
upheld admission of the analysis of video by a podiatrist (so-called gait analysis) to help
identify the accused.409
b.

Opinions about Voices (and Sounds)

Voice identification evidence is routinely admitted in Canada, almost always via
lay witnesses.410 Courts allow police officers to testify to voice identifications that match
intercepted communications based on a few words spoken by an accused person at the
time of arrest.411 This evidence is considered directly admissible as a question of fact, and
is expressly not subject to the rules regulating opinion and expert evidence.412
Accordingly, arguments about the reliability of voice identification go to weight rather
than admissibility.413
The tribunal of fact is encouraged to consider several aspects of a purported
identification before acting on it.414 The factors set out in the case law regarding jury
instructions are effectively indicia of reliability. Because lay identification evidence is
directly admissible, the vast majority of challenges to the admissibility of voice
identification evidence are made on the basis of alleged Charter violations, without raising
reliability.415 The Canadian receptivity towards lay voice identification does not seem to
have been disturbed by two high profile wrongful convictions that relied upon lay voice
identification evidence.416
Given that lay voice identification is so readily accepted, expert evidence about
voice identification is very rarely called. One of the first Canadian cases in which an
expert was admitted was R. v. Medvedew.417 The trial judge allowed a trained police
officer to testify on the basis of spectrographic analysis that two voices were “the
same.”418 Instructions encouraged the jury to provide “a respectful audience,”, but also to
consider the possibility of error.419 Unusually, a defense expert was also called in this
case.420 The defense expert was highly critical of the methods used by the Crown
expert.421 The defense also argued that the Crown expert should have tendered the
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spectrogram results for the jury’s consideration.422 The trial judge left all of this evidence
to the jury, and a majority of the Manitoba Court of Appeal found that he was right to
admit the evidence and that there was no error in the instructions provided to the jury.423 A
strong dissent was issued, referring to inadequacies in the Crown case and explaining the
controversies then raging about voice identification evidence in the United States.424
Justice O’Sullivan held that the trial judge should not have qualified the Crown expert
without first being satisfied that the technique was scientifically valid.425 While O’Sullivan
JA’s dissent has occasionally been favorably mentioned in subsequent cases, it has never
formally been adopted by an appeal-level court.
A second dimension to “expert” testimony about voice identification is the use of
translators to identify a speaker. At times, courts have been willing to extend the field of
expertise (translation) in which a translator is qualified to include expertise in identifying
individual voices speaking in the translator’s language.426 However, even in this context,
the question of expertise rarely arises because of the readiness with which lay
identifications are admitted.
D.

Australia: Admissibility Standards, Jurisprudence, and Practice

Australia is also a federal system. The six states and two territories are
responsible for the vast majority of criminal laws and prosecutions. There are basically
two systems of evidence law operating among the various state, territory and federal
jurisdictions.427 The older, common law system was originally drawn from England and
continues to resemble contemporary English practice. The more recent addition is the
uniform evidence law (UEL), introduced in 1995 following the coordinated enactment of a
series of largely standardized evidence statutes.428 The common law continues to apply in
South Australia, Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory.429 The
Commonwealth (i.e., federal courts), the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales,
Tasmania and Victoria apply the UEL.430 This slowly expanding second group comprises
the most populous states where the majority of commercial and criminal litigation occurs.
In general, Australian judges in both systems have developed liberal (or inclusive)
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proceedings unless on appeal from certain State courts, most federal and state tribunals, and until 1998 did not
apply to Indigenous land claims under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 5-6 (Austl.).
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approaches to incriminating expert opinion evidence and there is considerable
convergence between the two systems.431
At common law, as in England and Canada, those with expertise are normally
allowed to express opinions, provided the opinions are sufficiently relevant to the facts in
issue.432 The witness must have undergone training (and received appropriate
qualifications or certification) or hold experience, and the opinion should be derived from
a recognized “body of knowledge” (or “field’”) or experience.433 The opinion should also
be of assistance to the tribunal of fact.434 Rules preventing expert witnesses from
expressing opinions on the ultimate issue or trespassing on matters considered to be within
common knowledge—because of their invasion of the prerogatives of the jury—have in
effect become moribund. Although, Australian common law judges (and their UEL
counterparts) remain reluctant to admit the testimony of experimental psychologists on
matters pertaining to human sensory experience and memory (e.g., on eyewitness
identification).435
There is, in addition, a supplementary consideration: the basis rule (which
persists under the UEL).436 In its more technical guise, the basis rule requires that the facts
on which an expert opinion is based must be identified, and in its strictest form, supported
by admissible evidence.437 This approach has been described by the full Federal Court as
“a counsel of perfection” and, in consequence, tempered.438 Another strand, requires the
expert witness to explain the process or technique through which his or her opinion is
derived—the so-called basis of the technique and opinion.439 Provided the witness can
articulate some kind of process, even if it involves speculative and untested techniques,
that will ordinarily satisfy this version of the rule. In practice, both strands tend to be either
ignored or treated perfunctorily in criminal proceedings.440
Under the UEL, there is an exception to the proscriptive opinion rule (s 76) for
opinions substantially based on “specialized knowledge” derived from the witness’s
‘training, study or experience’ (s 79).441 Section 79 states:
If a person has specialized knowledge based on the person’s training,
study or experience, the opinion rule does not apply to evidence of an

431
Victoria, however, may be slightly more exclusionary than the other UEL jurisdictions. Compare Evidence
Act 1995 (Cth) s 76 (Austl.), with Evidence Act 2008 (Vict.) s 76 (Austl.).
432

The common law maintains sufficient relevance, rather than logical relevance associated with the Evidence
Act. Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 55, 56 (Austl.).

433

R. v. Bonython [1984] 38 SASR 45, 46-47 (Austl.).

434

Clark v. Ryan [1960] 103 CLR 486, 491 (Austl.); Bonython, 38 SASR at 47.
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See, e.g., R. v. Smith, [1987] VR 907, [14]-[17] (Austl.); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 79(2), 80. Judges are
also reluctant to admit evidence about truth telling, as with polygraphs.
436

LAW REFORM COMM’N, REPORT NO. 26 (INTERIM) EVIDENCE, para. 750 (1985).

437

Makita (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Sprowles [2001] 52 NSWLR 705, [85] (Court of Appeal) (Austl.); Dasreef Pty.
Ltd. v. Hawchar [2011] 277 A.L.R. 611, [91]-[92] (Austl.).
438

Sydneywide Distrib. Pty. Ltd. v. Red Bull Austl. Pty. Ltd. [2002] FCAFC 157, [7] (Austl.). See also Dasreef
[2011] HCA at [25]; Alphapharm Pty. Ltd. v. H Lundbeck [2008] FCA 559, [758]-[59] (Austl.).
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Usually the derivation is linked to Davie v. Magistrates of Edinburgh, [1953] S.C. 34 (Scot.).
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See, e.g., R. v. Jung [2006] NSWSC 658 (Austl.).
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Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 76(1) (Austl.): “Evidence of an opinion is not admissible to prove the existence of
a fact about the existence of which the opinion was expressed.”
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opinion of that person that is wholly or substantially based on the
knowledge.442
Judges in UEL jurisdictions have not taken the opportunity to read the need for
”reliability” into “specialized knowledge” or to substantially revise their common law
practice.443 Somewhat paradoxically, the leading case in NSW explicitly rejected the need
to consider “an extraneous idea such as ‘reliability.”444
In consequence, UEL practice tends to resemble the common law, as lawyers and
judges focus attention upon the qualifications of the witness and whether there is a “field”
of “specialized knowledge”.445 There are relatively few criminal decisions where
incriminating expert opinion evidence is examined in detail or where the precise terms of
s79 are applied rigorously to incriminating expert opinions.446 Consequently, most
incriminating opinion evidence is simply admitted and its weight left to the tribunal of
fact. Under the UEL, the ultimate issue and common knowledge rules have been formally
tempered, if not quite abandoned (s80).447
In addition, drawing upon and contorting authority from New Zealand and the
Australian High Court—in relation to the preparation of transcripts of voice recordings—
several Australian jurisdictions have developed the concept of the ad hoc expert.448 These
witnesses, usually investigators, though sometimes translators or formally qualified
individuals, have been allowed to express their incriminating opinions on the basis of
exposure to (or analysis of) some kind of evidence: usually repeated exposure to voice
recordings or incriminating images. Originally developed to facilitate the admission of
transcripts as an aid for the tribunal of fact when they were required to listen to the content
of voice recordings of inferior quality, in recent years the use of ad hoc experts has
dramatically expanded as Australian courts have allowed a variety of witnesses to express
incriminating opinions about identity drawn from the rapid increase in the availability of
images and voice recordings.
Allowing ad hoc experts to express opinions sits awkwardly with the common
law because often the witnesses do not have appropriate qualifications and, to the extent
that there is a relevant body of knowledge or experience, these particular individuals are
not part of, or familiar with, it. Recourse to ad hoc experts also contravenes the explicit
442

The influence of the original Federal Rules of Evidence should be obvious. Compare Fed. R. Evid. 702, with
Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79(1) (Austl.).

443
See, e.g., Velevski v. The Queen (2002) 187 ALR 233, [82] (Austl.); HG v. The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414,
438-39 (Austl.).
444
Notwithstanding the statutory interest in ‘specialised knowledge’ under the UEL, common law jurisdictions
are slightly more likely to exclude expert evidence where the evidence is unreliable. R. v. Tang (2006) 161 A
Crim R 377, 378 (Austl.).
445

There is an explicit exception for opinions from indigenous persons on traditional laws and customs (s 78A),
and s 79 was recently extended to make clear that opinions are not inadmissible merely because they concern the
impact of sexual assault on the behavior of children: Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79(2)(a) and s 79(2)(b). Evidence
Act 1995 (Cth) s 78A (Austl.); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 79 (Austl.).
446
There are very few civil trials before juries in Australia. In consequence, trial judges do not need to be as
exclusionary in their civil justice practice. The participation of wealthy parties, frequently corporations, means
that in many civil cases the parties dedicate considerable amounts of time and resources to developing and
challenging expert opinion evidence. This is far less likely to occur in the very asymmetrical criminal contest,
especially as the state has an effective monopoly on many sources of expertise and, in most trials, the resources
available to the defense.
447

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 80 (Austl.): “Evidence of an opinion is not inadmissible only because it is about:
(a) a fact in issue or an ultimate issue; or (b) a matter of common knowledge.”

448

G. Edmond and M. San Roque, Quasi-Justice: Ad Hoc Expertise and Identification Evidence, 33 CRIM. L.J. 8,
11-14 (2009). Ad hoc experts have also featured in proceedings in England and Wales, although the use has been
questioned recently in R. v. Flynn [2008] 2 Cr. App. R. 20, 266, 271 (Austl.).
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terms of the UEL for, s76 imposes an exclusionary rule that appears to cover the field.449
Those purporting to express opinions on the basis of their interpretation of images or
voices invariably possess no “specialized knowledge” or “training and experience” in
voice or image comparison and analysis.
Only rarely do Australian judges use discretionary—and in UEL jurisdictions,
their mandatory and discretionary—exclusions.450 Australian judges seem to be reluctant
to exclude potentially probative expert opinion evidence even where it is likely to be
unfairly prejudicial—that is, unreliable and the jury likely to misuse or overvalue it.
Rather than require the state to support the probative value of incriminating expert opinion
with evidence of reliability or proficiency, common law and UEL judges tend to admit
speculative opinions—such as those of ad hoc expert witnesses—because a jury might
find unreliable or speculative opinions persuasive (i.e., ”accept” them).451 Questions about
the value of evidence are conventionally left for the jury to determine (as matters for
weight).
In addition, Australian judges maintain faith in the ability of warnings, directions
and cautionary instructions to overcome problems with expert opinion evidence. The
ability to comment, usually in quite general terms, about expert evidence and its dangers
often facilitates the admission of evidence that might appear unreliable, speculative or
controversial.
It is reasonably common for judges to hold a voir dire, following challenges to
the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. NSW has also experimented with expert
witnesses giving evidence concurrently in such preliminary proceedings.452 Preliminary
hearings rarely lead to the exclusion of incriminating expert opinion evidence adduced by
the state. Though, judges may sometimes direct a witness to avoid the use of certain terms
and expressions and encourage “splitting”. None of the admissibility and regulatory
interventions (e.g., the imposition of preferred expressions) is based on empirical research
concerning underlying techniques, the value of trial practices or jury comprehension.
In practice, there is often little difference between the way common law and UEL
courts approach the admissibility of expert opinion evidence. Notwithstanding
developments in the U.S. and Canada, Australian courts have preferred their common law
heuristics (i.e., “field” and qualifications or experience) and been reluctant to consider, let
alone incorporate, “reliability” as an admissibility criterion for incriminating expert
opinion evidence.453 Judges in both common law and UEL jurisdictions exhibit a tendency
to admit incriminating opinion evidence and leave questions about validity and reliability
to the trial and the tribunal of fact. This liberal approach to admissibility and effective
disinterest in reliability places both the risk of unreliability and the need to persuade the
tribunal of fact of the weakness of unreliable opinions on the accused—all in the context
of the accusatorial trial. Australian judges invest considerable confidence in defense
449

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 76 (Austl.).

450

At common law, Christie, and under the UEL, s 137: “In a criminal proceeding, the court must refuse to admit
evidence adduced by the prosecutor if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the
defendant.” See also UEL 135 and 136; R. v. Christie [1914] AC 545 (Eng.); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s 137
(Austl.).
451

See, e.g., R. v. Shamouil [2006] 66 NSWLR 228, [49] (Austl.); R. v. Carusi (1997) NSW LEXIS 1, 40
(Austl.); R. v. XY [2013] NSWCCA 121 (Austl.). Though compare R. v. Dupas [2012] VSCA 328 (Austl.).

452
See Gary Edmond, Merton and the Hot Tub: Scientific Conventions and Expert Evidence in Australian Civil
Procedure, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159 (2009).
453

“Reliability” is discussed, incidentally, in several cases. See, e.g., Velevski v. The Queen (2002) 187 ALR
233, [82] (Aust.); HG v. The Queen (1999) 197 CLR 414, [82] (Austl.); Osland v. The Queen (1998) 197 CLR
316, 374 (Austl.); R. v. Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45, 47 (Austl.).
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lawyers and cross-examination, rebuttal experts, directions and warnings,454 and the
common sense of juries to identify and overcome weaknesses and limitations in expert
opinion evidence—especially incriminating expert opinions.455
Australian judges and law reformers have been pre-occupied with the elimination
of partisan bias and improving institutional efficiencies, particularly in civil litigation.
Recourse to formal codes of conduct (for experts), along with the desire to extend the use
of single experts, joint experts and concurrent evidence (so-called “hot tubs”) from civil
litigation to the criminal sphere, reinforce the primary interest in institutional efficiencies
and longstanding concerns about expert partisanship rather than the validity and reliability
of incriminating expert opinion evidence and the accuracy and fairness of criminal
verdicts.456 Except in the immediate aftermath of miscarriages of justice and wrongful
convictions, and in response to a few specific types of evidence (e.g., bite marks),
Australian judges have been largely disinterested in reliability and have devoted little
attention to critical developments in the U.S. (or Canada).457 Australian judges are yet to
cite or engage with the NRC report, though their complacency, and indifference to
empirical research and reliability, may be disturbed should the recommendations of the
Law Commission of England and Wales, about the need for a formal reliability threshold
in criminal proceedings, be embraced by English parliamentarians or judges.458
1.

Latent Fingerprint Evidence

Latent fingerprint evidence is presumptively admissible in all Australian
jurisdictions. The long history of admission, dating back to formal consideration by the
High Court in Parker. v. The King (1912), has provided a largely uncontested
admissibility pathway that has not been substantially revisited during the course of the
century, notwithstanding technological refinements, changes in reporting practice and the
introduction of the UEL.459

454

The most a judge might say is: ‘”Expert evidence is admitted to provide you with … information and opinion
which is within the witness’s expertise, but which is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of the
average lay person. The expert evidence is before you as part of all the evidence to assist you with … [set out the
particular aspect(s) … ]. You should bear in mind that if, having given the matter careful consideration, you do
not accept the evidence of the [expert/experts], you do not have to act upon it. [Indeed, you do not have to accept
even the unchallenged evidence of an expert].” These are taken from Criminal Trial Courts Benchbook (NSW).
JUDICIAL COMM’N OF N.S.W., CRIMINAL TRIAL COURTS BENCHBOOK (2012), available at
http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/index.html.
455

The decision, by the defense, to obtain rebuttal expertise, often assuages any judicial concerns about
incriminating opinion evidence.

456
Gary Edmond, Impartiality, Efficiency or Reliability? A Critical Response to Expert Evidence Law and
Procedure in Australia, 42 AUST. J. OF FORENSIC SCIENCES 83 (2010).
457

There are a few incidental references to Frye and Daubert. On Daubert, see HG v. The Queen (1999) 197
CLR 414, 418 (Austl.); Osland (1998) 197 CLR at 375 (Austl.); Murdoch v. The Queen (2007) 167 A. Crim. R.
329, 354 (Austl.); R. v. Tang (2006) 161 A Crim R 377, 410-11 (Austl.); R. v. Karger [2001] SASR 1 (Austl.);
R. v. McIntyre [2001] NSWSC 311, [14-15] (Austl.); R. v. Gallagher [2001] NSWSC 462, [35] (Austl.); R. v.
Pantoja [1996] NSWSC 57, [17] (Austl.); R. v. Tillott [1995] NSWSC 83, [106], [111] (Austl.). On Frye, see R.
v. Parenzee [2007] SASC 143, [63]-[64] (Austl.); R. v. Bjordal (2005) 93 SASR 237, 252 (Austl.); Mallard v.
The Queen (2003) 28 WAR 1, [271]-[97] (Austl.); R. v. Jarrett (1994) 62 SASR 443, 447 (Austl.); R. v. Rose
(1993) 69 A Crim R 1, [15] (Austl.); R. v. Brown [1990] TASSC 28, [25]-[26] (Austl.); Lewis v. The Queen
(1987) 88 FLR 104, 121-22 (Austl.).
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Australian judges have looked primarily to England for law reform. Many, though not all, of the civil justice
reforms were drawn from LORD WOOLF, ACCESS TO JUSTICE (1996) and consequent changes to the English rules
of civil procedure (CPR).
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(1912) 14 CLR 681, 681 (Austl.). See, e.g., Moreshead v. Police [1999] SASC 162, [8] (Austl.); R. v. SMR
[2002] NSWCCA 258, [96] (Austl.). Like many longstanding forensic sciences, these have been effectively
‘grandfathered’.
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There are no formal restrictions imposed on what a latent fingerprint examiner
might say, by way of identification. The expression of opinions, derived from the
comparison of prints, is largely determined by latent fingerprint examiners (with
sensitivity to other jurisdictions, originally the UK, though increasingly Daubert and
NRC-inspired responses from the U.S.) rather than anything the court or independent
research might demand. No minimum number of points is required, although numbers of
points of similarity are frequently referred to in testimony and used to support the
declaration of a “match” and the attribution of significance. To the extent that they offer
positive testimony, latent fingerprint examiners ordinarily individualize.460 That is, they
declare a match between a latent fingerprint and a print on file as a positive identification
to the exclusion of all other individuals.461 There is no need for a latent fingerprint
examiner to bring photographs or workings to court (to show the tribunal of fact),
although most would probably be willing to do so. Where examiners do rely on exhibits
the jury may be formally exhorted not to engage in its own assessment of the prints.462
There are relatively few challenges, and surprisingly few considered decisions on
the admissibility and basis for identification evidence derived from latent fingerprint
comparison. Positive identifications derived from latent fingerprints are very rarely
contested and it is exceptional to have an expert appear for the defense. Cross-examination
is usually superficial or non-existent and almost never addresses methodological issues
and interpretations, as opposed to possible contamination or obvious mistakes. Judicial
instructions do not tend to warn about the dangers of relying upon a latent fingerprint
match as positive identification—other than in the general terms that even highly skilled
experts might make mistakes.463
The few cases where fingerprint (and palm and footprint) evidence has been
excluded (or appeals succeeded) involved fingerprint examiners failing to disclose
substantial weaknesses in opinions or clearly moving beyond their legally-recognized
competence. In Hillstead v. The Queen (2005), for example, the examiner purported to
link a bloody fingerprint with the accused’s presence at the precise moment of death.464
This witness, however, had no information about the rate at which blood dries, or the
temperature and humidity in the room, or whether the blood associated with the accused’s
latent fingerprint was from a pool or a thin smear.465 According to the Court, the witness
could only testify about the existence of a match and its significance in relation to
identification. To say more was to transgress the boundaries of the witness’s expertise.466
Problems with latent fingerprint evidence are understood and presented as
individual failings (due to inexperience or hubris—going beyond the proper scope of the
“field”, as in the previous example) rather than problems with the underlying methodology
and/or the totalizing manner in which results are expressed.

460
DNA and fingerprint experts are sometimes called to explain that no fingerprint or DNA sample was
recovered.
461
R. v. SMR [2002] NSWCCA 258, [86]-[91] (Austl.) (discussing Parker. v. The King, (1912) 14 CLR 681, 681
and Moreshead v. Police [1999] SASC 162).
462
Bennett v. Police [2005] SASC 167, [7] (Austl.). Originally jurors were shown images to consider, but more
recent cases suggest that it is experts who should undertake comparisons: R. v. Lawless [1974] VR 398 (Austl.).
463
There is no heading in the Criminal Trial Courts Benchbook advising on judicial instructions for fingerprint
evidence. JUDICIAL COMM’N OF N.S.W., CRIMINAL TRIAL COURTS BENCHBOOK (2012), available at
http://www.judcom.nsw.gov.au/publications/benchbks/criminal/index.html.
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DNA Evidence

DNA evidence is interesting because trial judges and appellate courts were
reasonably cautious in their uptake. Notwithstanding the traditionally liberal approach of
the common law, several courts initially excluded, or upheld the exclusion of, DNA
evidence: because the prejudicial effect was considered to outweigh the probative value;
because of problems with the technology (e.g., whether faints bands were artifacts) and
the danger that the jury might undertake their own comparison; because of questions
associated with population statistics and the size of databases; and, because the jury might
be confused or overwhelmed.467 From the mid-1990s, around the time of the second NRC
report (US), Australian courts largely accepted that DNA techniques were admissible (and
reliable). Subsequently, challenges were almost always left to the trial and for weight.
Since that time the major issues have been the introduction of new techniques and
commercial kits (e.g., PCR and Profiler Plus), the soundness of databases and their
applicability to indigenous populations, and the appropriate way to express results.
In R. v. Jarrett, the South Australian Supreme Court upheld the admissibility of
PCR techniques even before the reporting issue was effectively settled by the second NRC
report in 1996.468 For Mulligan J, resolving disagreement between mainstream scientists
was a matter for the jury.469 In R. v. Humphrey, Bleby J dismissed an admissibility
challenge to the database and distinguished the discretionary exclusions in R. v. Green and
R. v. Pantoja.470 The same Court also dismissed the challenge to the adoption of the
Profiler Plus system, after an unusually lengthy voir dire in R. v. Karger.471 More recently,
in R. v. Murdoch, the Northern Territory Court of Criminal Appeal (NTCCA) expressed
ambivalence about incriminating evidence, and expert disagreement, associated with
results obtained through LCN techniques, though without deeming the incriminating
opinions inadmissible.472
Other challenges have appeared in response to the population statistics applied to
Australian Aborigines and some unexpected results from criminal databases, possibly due
to recidivists changing names (i.e., using aliases).473 Judges, particularly in NSW, continue
to wrestle with the expression of results derived from population statistics. Originally, this
emerged in relation to paternity indices (as opposed to percentages) and more recently in
the way random match probabilities should be presented at trial.474 The main issues
occupying the appellate courts tend to be the expression of probabilities associated with
DNA matches475 and whether DNA evidence alone can sustain a conviction.476
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See R. v. Pantoja [1996] NSWSC 57, [85] (Austl.); R. v. Jarrett (1994) 62 SASR 443, 455-56 (discussing R.
v. Tran (1990) 50 A Crim R 233 (Austl.)); R. v. Lucas [1992] 2 VR 109 (Austl.); R. v. Green (unreported,
NSWCCA, 26 Mar. 1993) (Austl.).
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Aytugrul v. The Queen (2010) 205 A Crim R 157, 174-76 (Austl.), aff’d, [2012] HCA 15 (Austl.). See also
Andrew Ligertwood, Can DNA Evidence Alone Convict an Accused? 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 487 (2011).
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See Jeremy Gans, A Tale of Two High Court Forensic Cases, 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 515, 527-28 (2011).
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In trials, the possibility of innocent transfer and the interpretation of results (e.g.,
electropherograms) are not infrequently explored in cross-examination. There have been a
few successful appeals: where experts disagreed over interpretations of a mixed sample
(R. v. Juric); where secondary transfer was not excluded by the prosecution (R. v. Joyce);
and, where prosecution disclosure was incomplete (Hillier. v. R). Although, these cases
should be considered exceptional.477 Several high profile mistakes with DNA evidence,
particularly in Victoria, have stimulated public and private inquiries, but these seem to
have done little to temper overall confidence in DNA evidence.478
Today there are very few constraints on the admission and presentation of DNA
evidence. Short of obvious contamination or clearly inappropriate forms of expression,
DNA evidence is admissible and routinely admitted. Most of the institutions undertaking
DNA analysis (for the prosecution) tend to report in probabilistic terms—purporting to be
conservative, the probabilities almost never exceed 1 in 10 billion in written documents (at
least). That is, greater than the number of persons currently believed to be living on earth.
Where incriminating DNA evidence is not available the prosecutor often calls a forensic
biologist to provide reasons for the failure to obtain any positive (i.e., incriminating)
results—so-called “negative evidence.”479
3.

Bite Marks

The admissibility of the opinion evidence of dentists, orthodontists and
odontologists on bite mark comparison and identification is complicated by a series of
controversial convictions, particularly the role of English and Australian odontologists in
the notorious wrongful conviction of Lindy Chamberlain for the murder of her daughter,
Azaria (“the dingo baby”).480 Because of this negative experience, since the mid-1980s
Australian judges have taken an uncharacteristically skeptical approach to incriminating
bite mark evidence and several common law judges have demonstrated a willingness to
exclude it.481
It is probably no coincidence that bite mark evidence is still considered by some
judges and commentators as controversial. In R. v. Lewis, perhaps the leading Australian
bite mark decision, the Court of Appeal of the Northern Territory considered the
reliability, rather than just the field and qualifications (which were actually recognized, as
satisfied, in the earlier R. v. Carroll (1985) appeal).482 Interestingly, in considering the
admissibility of incriminating bite mark evidence, the Court suggested that the Crown had
a duty to explicate through evidence, “in ordinary language”, the expert’s “discipline and
methods necessary to put them in a position to make some sort of evaluation of the
opinions he expresses”—a form of the basis rule.483 Where the expert evidence is of a

477
See R. v. Juric (2002) 129 A Crim R 408, [15]; R. v. Joyce (2002) 173 FLR 322, [324]; Hillier. v. Rex [2008]
ACTCA 3.
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“comparatively novel kind, the duty resting on the Crown is even higher: it should
demonstrate its scientific reliability.”484
Lewis—like the early DNA appeals—is now decades old and sits awkwardly
with the very accommodating trend toward incriminating expert opinion evidence
currently in vogue under the UEL and the common law.485 Because the individuals
purporting to undertake bite mark analysis and comparisons possess tertiary qualifications,
it is likely that Australian judges will gradually admit this evidence, even if longstanding
skepticism manifests in restrictions upon the way interpretations are expressed (as in the
case of images, below).
4.

Incriminating Images and Voice Recordings
a.

Opinions about Images

A range of individuals with formal qualifications and/or through repeated
exposure are allowed to express opinions about the identity of persons of interest (POI) in
images associated with criminal activity (e.g. CCTV recordings) or to interpret what is
transpiring in them. Here we can observe how weak “body of knowledge or experience”
and “specialised knowledge” are in practice. Judges have tended to allow those with
formal qualifications in anatomy and physical anthropology or experience as forensic
photographers and intelligence analysts—rather than photo-interpretation—and those who
have acquired their “knowledge” or “experience” during the course of an investigation
(such as police officers) to express incriminating opinions—usually about the identity of
offenders (sometimes as ad hoc experts). The former group, with formal qualifications, are
sometimes described as “facial mappers” or “face and body mappers.”486 Most use
morphological (i.e., impressionistic assessments of form) rather than anthropometrical
(i.e., quantitative) techniques of comparison. Of the variety of witnesses qualified as
“expert” and allowed to express incriminating opinions, few have expertise in image
interpretation and specialization in face and/or body comparison. Few, if any have a
demonstrated ability to compare POI in conditions where the images are of low quality,
highly distorted, poorly lit, out of focus, and the POI often wear disguises or baggy
clothing and hats, and the images may be obtained years, and sometimes decades, apart.
Initially, these witnesses, including some with graduate qualifications, and senior
academic positions, were allowed to express positive opinions about the identity of
persons of interest (e.g., “one and the same”). However, more recently, they have been
required to refrain from making positive identifications (i.e. individualizations) and to
restrict their testimony to evidence of similarities and, in theory, differences.487 Though, it
is now common for Australian facial mappers to testify in terms of “high similarity” or
“high level of anatomical similarity.” Several have adopted the scale relied upon by many
English witnesses (see R. v. Atkins and Table 1, above).488
Image comparison witnesses are routinely sent only two sets of images—one set
of the person of interest and one reference set of the suspect (based on a police forensic
procedure)—and are often told about the suspect and other features of the case. Such
484
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R. v. Tang (2006) 161 A Crim R 377 at 384; Murdoch v. The Queen (2007) 167 A Crim R 329, 346-47; R. v.
Tanner [2010] SADC 128, [5]-[8] (Austl.); R. v. A [2010] SADC 126, [7]-[12] (Austl.); R. v. Miller [2008]
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suggestive procedures, to the extent that they are considered problematic or revealed, are
treated as issues for cross-examination and weight (rather than admissibility or
exclusion—on grounds of unfair prejudice).
Investigating police, with some familiarity of suspects—such as that obtained
through the course of an investigation or prior arrest—are not allowed to express opinions
based on the interpretation of incriminating images.489 In contrast to England and Canada,
this evidence is treated as inadmissible because of its deemed irrelevance—incapable of
rationally assisting with the assessment of facts in issue, because the jury can make the
same comparison—rather than because of reliability issues.490 Police and other
investigators are, however, allowed to express opinions, including positive opinions about
identity, where they have some perceived advantage over the jury caused by changes in
the accused’s appearance or because the tribunal of fact will not have an opportunity to
observe the defendant in motion (i.e., gait evidence).491 These exceptions, to the general
rule against positive identification, might be based on features as vague as the way a
person holds their head, the tendency to swing an arm while walking, or due to a modified
hairstyle or weight gain.492
Recently, the Court of Criminal Appeal in NSW, has excluded the opinion
evidence of an anatomist concerning similarities in body shapes between images of a
disguised armed robber and a person accused of the robbery.493 In the absence of
information about his method of photo-interpretation and without credible information
about the prevalence of body shapes, the witnesses’ similarity evidence was considered
inadmissible.494 The decision seems to have rendered “body mapping” evidence
inadmissible (at least where the offender is well disguised) though without restricting the
provision of facial comparison evidence relying upon analogous techniques.495
b.

Opinions about Voices (and Sounds)

Expert opinion evidence about the identity of voices (and sounds) is generally
admissible and admitted.496 Voice identification evidence is even less regulated than the
interpretation of images, and frequently (especially under the UEL) is not even treated as
evidence of opinion.497 As in Canada, the identification of a voice is often classified as
direct evidence, or evidence of fact rather than interpretation (i.e., opinion). At common
law, and under the UEL, language scholars and linguists are allowed to proffer
incriminating opinions about identity.498 Sometimes these opinions may refer to voices
489
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speaking in languages with which the listener is not familiar, and even where—as in most
cases—their actual expertise is not in the realm of voice comparison.499 Similarly,
interpreters and translators and even investigating police officers without voice
comparison training or experience, are allowed to express incriminating opinions, all as ad
hoc experts, on the basis of their exposure to voices during translations, surveillance or
interactions with the accused on arrest or during a search.500
All of these witnesses are allowed to make positive identifications (i.e.,
individualize) in circumstances where they are not familiar with the voices and even
where the voices they are comparing speak in different languages (e.g., Mandarin and
English) and their exposure, or the length and quality of samples, is limited.501 In many
cases, the witness is told by investigators, prior to their analysis, to whom the voice is
believed to belong.502
As with image analysis, it is not clear that there is a mature field of forensic voice
comparison capable of consistently producing reliable evidence about identity.503 The
need for a “field” or “specialized knowledge” tends to be either ignored or trivialized.
Faced with the potential exclusion of incriminating opinions judges often refer to the,
apparently unpalatable, alternatives of requiring the jury to listen to recordings that are
often very long, of low quality and (arguably of) marginal relevance, and sometimes in
foreign languages or, more radically, excluding the evidence. Significantly, juries are
routinely encouraged to undertake their own voice comparisons, even where they have
already heard the opinion evidence and the voices are speaking in different languages
(e.g., English and the Nigerian language of Igbo).504

II.

ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Having supplied a survey of admissibility practices in four jurisdictions, this part
draws on similarities and differences between these jurisdictions, as well as our collective
research experience, to identify key themes in the admissibility of forensic identification
sciences. Observing that admissibility practice tends to be similar across jurisdictions, we
first anticipate and counter the proposition that widespread admissibility of forensic
identification sciences reflects that the techniques are basically reliable. It is simply not
possible to know the reliability of many common techniques because they have never been
properly studied. In some instances, techniques that continue to be routinely admitted have
499
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been demonstrated to be incapable of reliable individualization. This leaves us with the
surprising conclusion that admissibility standards seem not to make much difference to the
rigor with which courts scrutinize expert evidence. We canvass several possible
explanations for the broad trend towards admitting expert opinion evidence without a
demanding assessment of reliability, and consider some of the implications of this
impulse. This part also considers some important differences among and between
jurisdictions, and the possible sources of these differences.
A.

Basic Conclusion: Admissibility Standards Do Not Seem to Make
Much Difference

Our basic conclusion—which may surprise many readers, particularly lawyers,
and disappoint those contemplating law reform—is that formal admissibility standards do
not seem to make much difference. Formal admissibility standards, particularly those
incorporating reliability, are not enforced in ways that regulate the reception of expert
opinion evidence that is of unknown reliability. On the basis of the preceding examples,
there does not appear to be a coherent, let alone principled, approach to the admission of
incriminating expert opinion evidence in any of these jurisdictions and admissibility
standards do not seem to clearly correlate with admissibility practice.
Table 2 (below) provides a summary of our basic findings. Given considerable
variation in rules, the similarities in response should be considered revealing, especially
where the reliability and appropriate way to express the results of most of these techniques
continues to generate controversy.

Jurisdiction
(and
admissibility
standard)

DNA
comparison

Latent fingerprint
comparison

Bite mark
comparison

Image comparison

Voice comparison

US
(reliability)

Admissible
(probabilistic)

Admissible
(individualization)

Admissible
(individualization)

Admissible
(individualization)

Admissible
(generally not
spectrographs)

Canada
(reliability)

Admissible
(probabilistic)

Admissible
(individualization)

Admissible
(individualization)

Admissible (nonexpert opinion &
individualization
where familiar)

Admissible
(individualization)

England (no
reliability)

Admissible
(probabilistic)

Admissible
(individualization)

Admissible
(individualization)

Admissible
(individualization)

Admissible
(individualization)

Australia (no
reliability)

Admissible
(probabilistic)

Admissible
(individualization)

Admissible
(individualization –
some caution)

Admissible
(similarities only;
no ‘body mapping’)

Admissible
(individualization)

Table 2: Summary of admissibility practice with respect to jurisdiction and type of
evidence

Regardless of the admissibility standard, whether “assistance to the jury”,
“specialized knowledge”, recognized “expertise” or “experience” (more below), “field” or
the need for “reliability”, all of the jurisdictions considered in this article admit most
forensic science and medical techniques proffered by the state. They “qualify” individuals,
sometimes highly trained scientists from adjacent domains, as experts. Individuals without
relevant expertise or investigators whose only experience was obtained in an unsystematic
manner during the course of a criminal investigation (or series of investigations) are also
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frequently found by the courts to possess “expertise” that allows them to testify. While
there are some variations in what these “experts” are permitted (or might prefer) to say,
typically any qualifications imposed by courts bear no relation to what empirical research
can support (or what the experts themselves might otherwise say: see infra Section
II.C.).505 Sometimes the absence of underlying research is used to impose restrictions
(such as limiting those performing image comparison in Australia to descriptions of
similarities) as something of an admissibility compromise, although that is not always the
case (e.g. voice comparison in Australia). Moreover, most jurisdictions enable legally
qualified experts to express opinions that exceed what available research could credibly
support. “Legally qualified” or recognized experts are not necessarily experts in the sense
that they are masters of their domain or can even do what they claim.
Contrary to the expectations of some, the introduction of new admissibility
standards purportedly indexed to reliability in the U.S. and Canada has not radically
disrupted historical settlements around admissibility practices and the expression of
opinions.506 Rather, the response to techniques and opinions, including new techniques,
seems to be guided as much by an inclusionary ethos as a consistent interest in validity,
reliability, error rates or proficiency.507 Inverting procedural propriety, admissibility
standards seem to be indexed to the proffered techniques with a general commitment to
admission rather than a genuine interest in reliability (or even relevance).508 Significantly,
DNA evidence was exposed to aggressive challenges, (and higher admissibility
standards), because: there was a great deal of published research and specialized
knowledge in the possession of non-forensic scientists (i.e., mainstream scientific
researchers); the defense eventually obtained access to highly qualified research scientists
who were critical of existing practice; there was a good deal of controversy (and criticism
from) beyond the courts; and, DNA profiling had many potentially valuable criminal
justice uses so it was widely seen as important (by investigative communities, as well as
politicians and judges) to “get it right.” Even so, it took a public controversy characterized
as the “DNA wars”, two formal (extra-legal) inquiries, several years and hundreds of
millions of dollars, to stabilize the technology and interpretations derived from population
statistics.509 At best, the courts played an indirect and inconsistent role in the refinement of
DNA techniques and evidence.510 Significantly, the responses to DNA evidence are not
representative of responses to other types of forensic science and forensic medicine
evidence.
Interestingly, recent challenges to the forensic sciences—primarily in the United
States—emerged in the aftermath of Daubert and largely in the shadow of the controversy

505
Interestingly, expert witnesses are often willing to say more than courts will allow. It is the courts, rather than
experimental evidence, that often shape the way experts express opinions. If experts had done the necessary
research, courts would have much more limited grounds for overriding the bases for opinions. Intervention
usually reflects ignorance and judicial concern, even if it does not lead to exclusion.
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associated with DNA evidence and its stabilization.511 Challenges to the forensic sciences
seem to have been an unintended (and largely unforeseen) consequence of Daubert—itself
a response to perceived problems with expert evidence in civil proceedings—informed by
the DNA wars, ongoing skirmishes around a range of forensic techniques (e.g.,
handwriting, voiceprints, latent fingerprints, bullet lead, ballistics and tool marks) and
more recently and directly, authoritative intervention by the National Academy of
Sciences (through the NRC) and high profile Innocence Projects.512
This is all revealing. It illustrates how admissibility jurisprudence and practice
are potentially open to exogenous influences. Admissibility standards stipulating the need
for reliable expert opinion evidence, though largely dormant in the criminal justice
system, eventually stimulated sufficient dissonance to encourage scholarly criticism that
led to NAS intervention. Admissibility standards are always available as a resource with
the potential to be mobilized to challenge and exclude expert opinion evidence that is
insufficiently reliable. Unfortunately, there seems to be limited interest in questioning
technical abilities when it comes to the legal assessment of most of the comparison
sciences. Not insignificantly, the operation of admissibility regimes predicated upon
reliability seem to be confounded by earlier liberal admissibility practices that make
reversals (i.e., exclusion) institutionally unsettling in criminal justice systems concerned
with rectitude of decision, finality and managing their social legitimacy in societies
increasingly anxious about crime and the costs of criminal justice.513
B.

Reliability?

Before proceeding to consider a variety of issues and implications flowing from
our basic conclusion (and research experience), we want to discount one possible
response. It might be argued that admissibility practice is similar across these four
jurisdictions because the various forensic science techniques are basically reliable. We
believe this response to be untenable. Returning to the NRC report (and unanswered
criticisms directed toward many forensic science and medicine techniques), it is our
contention that, with the exception of most of the DNA techniques, among our sample
there is limited research supporting many of the claims routinely advanced by forensic
scientists in courts. In many domains the value of techniques is simply unknown. Rather
than demonstrable evidence of reliability—such as validity studies that would inform our
understanding of ability and accuracy—many of these and other techniques (e.g.,
comparison or analysis or foot, shoe and ear prints, hair and fibers, documents, ballistics,
explosives, tool marks, blood spatter, stab wounds, soils and so on) are considered to be
effective because they are used in investigations and prosecutions and have assisted in the
production of “guilt.” That is, forensic sciences (and forensic scientists) are often judged
against their role in securing convictions. In some forensic science “fields”, legal
decisions to admit the evidence, the ability to withstand cross-examination, and
contributions to guilty verdicts, represent the primary forms of “proof” of reliability—
511

Though, some challenges, such as those to handwriting, pre-date DNA evidence. See D. Michael Risinger,
Symposium: Daubert, Innocence, and the Future of Forensic Science: Goodbye to All That, or A Fool's Errand,
By One of the Fools: How I Stopped Worrying About Court Responses to Handwriting Identification (and
"Forensic Science" in General) and Learned to Love Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 TULSA
L. REV. 447, 454 (2007); D. Michael Risinger & Michael J. Saks, Science and Nonscience in the Court: Daubert
Meets Handwriting Identification Expertise, 82 IOWA L. REV. 21 (1996); D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of
Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting Identification "Expertise", 137 U. PA.
L. REV. 731, 772-73 (1989); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 498, at 58.
512

See generally BRANDON GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO
WRONG (2011); BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION & OTHER DISPATCHES
FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (1st ed., 2000).
513

It is our contention that accuracy ought to trump finality.

92

UNIVERSITY OF DENVER CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3

sometimes characterized as “testing.” In the absence of evidence of ability, derived from
case-like conditions where correct answers are known—thereby excluding trials and guilty
verdicts—legal responses do not provide appropriate grounds for epistemic confidence.
Premature legal recognition of insufficiently reliable techniques and opinions may
discourage research, contribute to the emergence and persistence of inferior techniques,
and simultaneously threaten some of the primarily objectives of the accusatorial trial (see
infra Section II.C.). In many cases unreliable forensic science techniques and misleading
interpretations will have contributed to pleas and/or guilty verdicts. Inattention to
capabilities and actual reliability means that evidence may have been misleading and
processes unfair. The expert evidence may have been mistaken and in some proportion of
cases independent opportunities to expose erroneous assumptions or leads, false
confessions, or misleading evidence (such as erroneous eyewitness identifications) were
lost.514
Inattention to the reliability of forensic science and medicine means that
prosecution cases may appear stronger than they actually are (or were). Such impressions
have the potential to mislead prosecutors, defense lawyers (at trial, and when advising on
pleas), juries and judges as well as forensic scientists. The upshot is that legal practice is
not a credible platform on which to ground claims about efficacy. The courtroom cannot
replace validity, reliability and proficiency studies. Forensic science techniques can only
be evaluated through empirical study separate from actual investigations and
prosecutions.515
There is limited evidence to support the reliability of many forensic science
techniques (the examples we have chosen are broadly representative), and in consequence,
there is a need to explain admissibility in terms other than the actual research base and
technical abilities. We accept that DNA profiling evidence represents something of an
exception, but have included it as an influential recent development that casts much
needed light on many established forensic science institutions, techniques and
assumptions.516 It is significant that many of the most aggressive challenges have been
made against DNA evidence. Whether other forms of forensic science and medicine can
(or even should) emulate DNA is contentious, though ultimately doubtful.517
With respect to many forensic science and medicine techniques (and expert
opinions drawn from the social sciences and humanities), mimicking practices associated
with DNA will be inappropriate.518 This should not, however, divert attention from
empirical study, notably validity and valuation studies—even if the results will rarely be
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as compelling as those associated with DNA profiling and population statistics.519
Responses to DNA evidence, along with conspicuous differences between the responses to
DNA evidence and many other areas of forensic science, illuminate inconsistencies (and
unsustainable consistencies) in legal practice as well as the epistemic frailty of techniques
(and opinions) that are not derived from scientific research and not routinely used by (nonforensic) scientists. Conclusions based on these techniques are routinely expressed in
confident terms—where the accused is not merely implicated, but actually identified, often
to the exclusion of all other persons in the world (or who have ever lived).520 Legal
responses betray serious limitations in law-science relations, including a remarkably
accommodating response to forensic science and medicine evidence and authority, and are
suggestive of the difficulties courts have encountered and will experience even more
acutely as they endeavor to renegotiate longstanding admissibility settlements.521
C.

Explanations for the Basic Conclusion

The basic conclusion that admissibility standards seem to make little difference
in the admission of many types of forensic science, coupled with our rejection of the
proposition that this reflects essential reliability, raises difficult questions about why it has
proven difficult to focus legal attention on assessing reliability. In this section, we provide
a number of linked explanations for this difficulty. Suggesting that courts have tended to
use experience as a proxy for expertise, and that they have been generally uninterested in
scientific literatures leads us to the possibility that judges and lawyers have substituted a
legally-negotiated concept of reliability (which might be labeled forensic reliability) for
the empirical concept of reliability that we might have expected to see. A seeming lack of
interest in empirical studies of courts’ practices has compounded this tendency. When
inescapable problems do arise, as when wrongful convictions are produced by poorquality forensic science and medicine evidence, courts tend to blame those problems on
individual experts and thereby sidestep engaging with the possibility that legal processes
might create systematic vulnerabilities to unreliable and speculative forms of expert
opinion evidence. We suggest that the legal concept of forensic reliability is predicated on
confidence in the capacity of trial safeguards, such as cross-examination, to reveal
shortcomings in expert evidence, and that this trust in trial safeguards is accompanied by a
faith in the capacity of triers of fact to understand expert testimony and combine it
rationally with other evidence. In short, it may be that lack of attention to empirical
research allows judges to remain unpersuaded that careful attention to reliability adds
anything of substance to available trial safeguards. Given the disruptive potential of
adopting a more critical stance towards routine forensic comparison evidence, and the
often-stated desire to avoid intruding too far upon the role of the tribunal of fact, this
ambivalence may help to explain judicial reluctance to engage deeply with reliability.
1.

Demarcating Science from Non-Science, and ‘Testing’ and
‘Experience’

Boundary work around what constitutes science, as opposed to some technical
realm of expertise derived primarily from experience frequently tempers the application of
reliability standards. Judges often read down the need for reliability to accommodate the
practices of a field or group of practitioners rather than attend to what might be required to
519
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ONCA 575 (Can.).
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demonstrate that a technique is valid and accurate, or the practitioners genuinely
proficient.522
There is much that could be said about philosophical and sociological work on
science/non-science boundaries.523 In the context of the forensic sciences, however, the
primary issue is not whether some technique or skill is characterized as scientific (or nonscientific) or technical, but rather whether the individual can do what they claim and how
we know this. In relation to the vast majority of techniques and practices, gauging
proficiency requires some kind of empirical assessment. Too often forensic scientists and
others involved in providing technical and scientific opinions in relation to investigations
and prosecutions evaluate their performance against past legal recognition, convictions,
and appeals to experience, as epistemic justifications. Such metrics are inappropriate.
When it comes to techniques and practices that are used reasonably regularly, and
especially those used routinely, there should be extensive testing of both the techniques
and practitioners in realistic case conditions, where the correct result is known. This is the
only way to obtain credible information about capabilities and limitations whether
classified as scientific, technical or experiential.524
“Experience” is often used to recognize ”expertise” and facilitate the admission
of opinion evidence in the absence of experimental studies. While ‘experience’ is included
as a basis for opinion in several jurisdictions—both common law (e.g., England, Canada
and Australia) and “statutory” (e.g., FRE 702 and UEL s79)—courts rarely consider the
particular experience in detail and very rarely take notice of how the experience was
obtained, the nature of the experience and whether it is systematic and rigorous. One of
the problems with recourse to “experience”, that includes its role in techniques in regular
or even routine use, is that we do not know if the technique works nor how accurate it is,
nor if the expert performs better than a juror (or judge) or jury.
An individual’s experience does not provide a basis to ground the admission of
techniques and opinions that can be readily assessed but have not been. There is good
reason to believe that people’s experiences manifest very differently and equip them in
quite divergent ways. Moreover, and this reflects the procedural difficulties associated
with opinions predicated upon (or primarily upon) “experience”, it can be very difficult to
effectively challenge the testimony of persons who purport to base their opinions on
experience. Opinions based on experience are frequently ipse dixit (i.e., bare assertion)
even if they are not presented or understood in this way.525 Where the witness is an ad hoc
expert or, as in the case of Canadian image witnesses, proffers non-expert opinion
evidence on the basis of quite limited familiarity with the accused, there are even fewer
reasons to believe that the opinion offered by the witness is reliable. Moreover, such
witnesses are not usually familiar with relevant literatures, appropriate processes or
common mistakes, nor methodological limitations that might erode the probative (if not
necessarily the persuasive) value of their opinions. Such opinions are difficult to challenge
and lay people—both jurors and judges—are likely to assume that techniques in long or
widespread use have been properly studied and shown to be reliable. Where experience is
relied upon as the basis for admission (and credibility), the accused needs to persuade the
judge and tribunal of fact about limitations, but must also overcome the implicit
522
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endorsement, even imprimatur, conferred by admission (and prior use). “Experience”, in
the absence of testing, tends to prevent appropriate scrutiny and weighing. In fact, when
confronted with methodological and reliability challenges, it is common for courts and
persons recognized (in court) as experts to place great weight on experience and historical
use.526
2.

The Absence of Scientific Literatures and Knowledge

One interesting feature of the focus on experience rather than testing is the
infrequency with which courts are presented with relevant and recent research—let alone
synoptic literature reviews pertinent to the issues before the court—from professional
scholarly communities and researchers.527 Rather, lawyers and judges often rehearse and
imagine a range of issues that may, or may not, bear upon some of the main issues and
problems with forensic science techniques and the expression of results as opinions—
often from their own experience. These are sometimes expressed, though usually clumsily
and only partially, in admissibility challenges and directions and warnings.528
In relatively few of the decisions are there references to relevant non-legal
literatures or authority.529 In most proceedings and, consequently reported decisions, the
parties and the “experts” do not tend to refer to relevant scientific studies or bring the
court’s attention to the existence of critical literatures and challenges to the value of
techniques or the manner in which evidence is expressed—even when these are known to
the state’s expert witness (and required by ethical obligations or formal codes of
conduct).530 As a result, lawyers, judges and juries are often oblivious to relevant
literatures, critical commentary, experimental research and alternative techniques that
might be directly relevant to the evidence and the issues confronting the court.
In most Anglo-Australian jurisdictions, judges are formally proscribed or
informally discouraged from undertaking their own research. In consequence, trial and
appellate judges are at the mercy of the parties and a system that does not adequately
support the defense, particularly in relation to expert evidence. Admissibility decisionmaking is vitally important, but prosecutors and defense lawyers have been unwilling or
incapable of improving admissibility practice. Notably, the NRC report has been cited in
about fifty U.S. decisions, though with limited engagement and little deference.
Notwithstanding its international implications, it has yet to be cited in a reported English
or Australian judgment and its implications for forensic science and legal practice have
not been taken seriously by courts.
It is not our intention to suggest that extant research and knowledge is necessarily
clear-cut, or would always be decisive, but rather to draw attention to legal-forensic
ignorance, omission and indifference. Current practices in all these jurisdictions—though
perhaps less so in a tiny proportion of U.S. cases, where some techniques are aggressively
526

See, e.g., R. v. Reed [2009] EWCA (Crim) 2698, 1 Crim. App. 23, [72]-[73] (Eng.); Murdoch v. The Queen
(2007) 167 A Crim R 329, 346-47 (Austl.); R. v. Harradine [2008] SADC 179, [33]-[37] (Austl.).
527
This may be reflected in the lack of references to scientific literatures in many judgments. See Gary Edmond
et al., Unsound Law: Issues With (‘Expert’) Voice Comparison Evidence 35 MELB. U. L. REV. 52, 54 (2011).
528
The exceptions would seem to be some amicus curiae briefs in the U.S. and where the defendant is very wellresourced. See generally, Brief of Amici Curiae Individuals Exonerated by Post-Conviction DNA Testing in
Support of Respondent at 28, Dist. Att’ys Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) (No.
08-6) (arguing that DNA evidence is conclusive as biological evidence).
529

Even DNA jurisprudence tends to rely on previous legal decisions. See generally, 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches
and Seizures § 288 (2012).

530

See, e.g., Expert Witnesses in Proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia, Practice Note CM 7 (2011);
Bryan Found & Gary Edmond, Reporting on the Comparison and Interpretation of Pattern Evidence:
Recommendations for Forensic Specialists, 44 AUSTL. J. FORENSIC SCI. 193, 193 (2012).
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challenged (often with assistance from legal scholars and scientists)—have developed in
ways that structurally exclude or discourage recourse to those who might actually know
more.531 Experience with DNA profiling would seem to be salutary in this regard.
3.

Forensic Reliability?

In the absence of attention to scientific literature, it might be argued that the way
judges have interpreted various rules and decisions has created a special legal (or forensic)
definition of reliability. Legal negotiations and settlements around what reliability means
has produced a somewhat incoherent meaning that has little relationship to what others,
particularly scientists might mean by reliability. For judges, ‘reliability’ is often defined
by: whether a person is formally qualified or (minimally) experienced; whether a
technique has been used for a long time; whether a technique has been accepted by a
court; whether a technique has been reviewed by another “expert” (i.e., peer review);
whether a technique has survived cross-examination; whether a technique has been upheld
on appeal; and, responsively, to the question of what the alternatives to admission of an
expert’s opinion might be.532 These, as well as more orthodox uses, have created a very
complicated, indeed incoherent set of resources that enable individual lawyers and judges
to construct a very wide range of meanings around reliability that may have little if
anything to say about the value of techniques, actual abilities and levels of accuracy.
To the extent that law, or legal institutions, develop their own models of
reliability that have very little, if anything to do with ideas of (validity and) reliability in
relevant scientific communities (concerned with epistemic considerations) or require
attention to underlying research, these would seem to be creating scope for future
challenges and dissonance and, in the criminal justice system, might be considered
undesirable and possibly pathological. We accept that legal institutions may need to
develop and articulate peculiar models of reliability designed for specific legal purposes,
but these should be principle-driven, coherent and indexed to evidence or ability and what
is known in exogenous knowledge communities.
The objectives of criminal justice systems, increasingly embodied in formal
admissibility standards, would seem to require that forensic science and medicine
evidence should be demonstrably reliable. That is, expert witnesses should be able to do
what they claim, have procedures that minimize risks and error, and have a clear idea of
limitations, sources and levels of error. They should also acknowledge evidentiary
constraints, controversy and respond to authoritative criticism.
4.

Legal Institutions Disinterested in Empirical Studies or Studying
Their Own Practices

Compounding the problems presented by legally negotiated reliability standards,
courts in all of these jurisdictions have been relatively inattentive to empirical studies of
their own practices. Inattention is particularly pronounced in England and Australia.533
Practicing judges have expressed little interest, and less practical action, in supporting
methodologically rigorous studies of courts, trials and institutional practice.
531
Such cases often involve attentive scholars, frequently through the production of jointly authored amicus
curiae briefs.
532
See, e.g., R. v. Bonython (1984) 38 SASR 45, 47 (Austl.). For example, judges seem reluctant to exclude
‘expert’ opinion where the jury might be left to undertake any analysis without assistance. See R. v. Tang (2006)
161 A Crim R 377, 381 (Austl.).
533
See generally DAVID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
FACTS (2008); J.D. Heydon, Developing the Common Law, in CONSTITUTING LAW: LEGAL ARGUMENT AND
SOCIAL VALUES 93 (2011). To be fair, little of this evidence is ever brought before judges and in many situations
it is not obvious whether judges should or could respond.
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The judicial disinterest in empirical studies is especially important because in
many areas of legal practice, including areas where courts routinely admit(ted) techniques
and derivative opinions, independent reviews of techniques and research have exposed
(and continue to expose) serious methodological shortcomings and misleading forms of
reporting opinions. Examples include: the use of voice prints (spectrographs), bullet lead
analysis, handwriting comparisons, early population statistics associated with DNA
matches, latent fingerprint evidence, and most recently the various techniques criticized in
the NRC report. In each of these areas, academic commentators had criticized the
techniques and lawyers and courts had, to varying degrees, ignored or marginalized these
critiques—preferring jurors to determine the issue at trial. In the main, however, the
criticisms of independent scholars have been consistently vindicated. This vindication has
come through institutional disclosures, the research emerging from Innocence Projects,
and scientific research and interventions (e.g., NRC report).534
Nevertheless, in many jurisdictions adjectival law reform tends to be predicated
upon perspectives from the top of the legal pyramid (appellate judges and senior
practitioners) and based on their unsystematic experience rather than empirical research or
commissioned studies.535 Given the performance of those outside the courts, and the
difficulties experienced by lawyers and judges in all of these jurisdictions, it makes sense
to think about developing institutional mechanisms, staunchly independent of the
institutionalized forensic sciences and the courts, and not populated by stakeholder groups,
to provide advice about forensic science and medical techniques that are (or become)
controversial regardless of their longevity or apparent value.536 Criminal courts should be
cautious adopters of emerging forensic science and medical technologies.537
Given the limited resources available to the defense, along with the past
performance of lawyers, judges and many expert witnesses, there is little sense in making
the defense responsible for demonstrating that forensic science and medical evidence is
unreliable, weak and/or developed in ways that tend to undermine any probative value it
might possess.538 That is, the accused should not bear the risk or responsibility of
persuading the tribunal of fact about problems with expert opinion—including the
unreliability and limitations with incriminating expert opinion evidence—particularly in
the context of an accusatorial trial.
5.

Problems Blamed on “Bad Apples”

While courts are particularly resistant to learning from academic research, it is
harder to ignore the wrongful convictions and miscarriages of justice that have been
associated with problems in forensic science evidence in each of the jurisdictions
discussed.539 Reports written about these miscarriages of justice often identify systemic
534

See generally GARRETT, supra note 512; NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 498, at 58-69.
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We do not suggest that empirical research would be unequivocal about what should be done, but that it should
be commission and considered.
536

See Gary Edmond, Advice for the Courts? Sufficiently Reliable Assistance with Forensic Science and
Medicine (Part 2), 16 INT’L J. OF EVIDENCE & PROOF 263 (2012).

537
In most jurisdictions, regardless of admissibility standards, judges tend to accommodate emerging, and
sometimes unproven, techniques and technologies. See R. v. Atkins, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1876, [27]-[31]
(Eng.).
538
Itiel E. Dror, David Charlton, & Ailsa Péron, Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to Making
Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 77 (2006). See also Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott,
The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291.
539
In the U.S., see, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science Testimony and
Wrongful Convictions 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 1-97 (2009). In the UK, see, e.g., R. v. Mark Dallagher [2002] EWCA
(Crim) 1903 (Eng.). In Canada, see GOUDGE, supra note 354; FORENSIC EVIDENCE REVIEW COMM., FINAL
REPORT (2004). In Australia, see, e.g., VINCENT, supra note 478; MORLING, supra note 480.
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failures within police investigations and the forensic sciences as well as failures of
institutional culture.540 Trial and appellate processes, and lawyers and judges, are less
often subject to criticism. However, miscarriages of justice, wrongful convictions and
associated inquiries, along with law reform proposals, rarely seem to produce long term or
fundamental changes in admissibility practice. Rather, individual wrongful convictions
tend to become associated with the poor behavior of particular experts (such as Harrow in
the English image cases) or institutions, producing a discourse in which the “problem” of
low quality expert evidence will be eliminated by the identification and exclusion of the
bad apple(s).541 On some occasions, scandal leads to censure and even the exclusion, at
least for a time, of particular techniques or practices, such as voice spectroscopy in the
U.S. and bite marks in Australia.542 Scandals tend to be localized to particular techniques,
practices and disciplines, and only rarely influence analogous practices and
methodological indifference in other domains.543
The practice of blaming individual experts for their errors seems to mask broader
practices that expose criminal investigation and prosecution processes to unreliable
forensic science evidence. Unfortunately, any “lessons” are rarely learned and very rarely
applied beyond a particular case or, as is more likely, an individual expert (or laboratory)
once discredited. Even doubts and regular criticisms are unlikely to prevent admission
until epistemic failure is confirmed. The case method and focus on individualized justice
tends to accentuate these problems and frustrate the scope of more principled practice or
reform.
6.

Mediating Admissibility Strictures Because of the Trial Safeguards

The practice of relying on legally-negotiated reliability is predicated on judicial
confidence in trial safeguards. Judges in all jurisdictions endeavor to ground their
admissibility practice in relevant adjectival rules and jurisprudential traditions.544
Concerns about the admission of “shaky”—that is weak or potentially unreliable
opinions—tend to be mediated by the availability of trial safeguards and other protections.
Implicitly, the protection provided by cross-examination, rebuttal experts, and instructions
and cautionary warnings reduce or eliminate the risks to the accused from unreliable and
speculative forms of expert opinion evidence. That is, the ability to cross-examine the
expert, to obtain a contradictory or critical expert opinion, and for the judge to give
directions and cautionary warnings, all serve to temper the rigorous application of
exclusionary rules whether derived from the common law or otherwise (e.g. FRE 702 and
UEL s79).545
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See also, GOUDGE, supra note 354; VINCENT, supra note 478.
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Consider also Dr. Black in the English IRA cases, or Joy Kuhl in Chamberlain v. The Queen (No. 2),
Transcript of Record at Testimony of Joy Kuhl (1984) 153 CLR 521 (Austl.), 1984 WL 441785. See Clive
Walker and K. Starmer, (eds), MISCARRIAGES OF JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF JUSTICE IN ERROR (1999). Consider
also the responses to the performance of police crime laboratories in St Paul, Minnesota (2013), and Houston,
Texas (2003).
542

See, e.g., Ohio v. Williams, 446 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ohio 1983) (discussing jurisdictional differences regarding
admissibility of voice spectroscopy evidence); Mark Page, Jane Taylor & Matt Blenkin, Reality bites—A tenyear retrospective analysis of bitemark casework in Australia, 216 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 82 (2012).
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See, e.g., GOUDGE, supra note 354, at 25 (focusing on individual and forensic pediatric pathology, but with
relatively little influence beyond).
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See, e.g., JOHN D. JACKSON & SARAH J. SUMMERS, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE:
BEYOND THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS 27 (2012).
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FED. R. EVID. 702; Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) s79 (Austl.).
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A fairly typical expression of this commitment can be found in the Daubert
decision.546 On behalf of the majority, Justice Blackmun wrote, “Vigorous crossexamination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of
proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible
evidence.”547 In the civil sphere, and notwithstanding the ‘relevance and reliability’ regime
he was inaugurating, Justice Blackmun explained that ‘shaky’ evidence was potentially
admissible because it could be substantially addressed through traditional trial
safeguards.548 We question this as a principled response to incriminating expert opinion
evidence in criminal proceedings. We also note that emerging research questions the
effectiveness of trial safeguards both individually and in combination.549
In addition to the limited impact of formal admissibility standards, judicial
discretions to exclude forms of evidence that might create unfairness, because of their
potential to mislead the jury or because they are practically difficult to explain to lay
decision makers—such as those embodied in the probative value/unfair prejudice
discretion (e.g. FRE 403 and UEL s137)—are rarely used to exclude evidence that is not
demonstrably reliable.550 Once expert evidence is deemed to have satisfied formal
admissibility rules—especially in jurisdictions with a reliability threshold—discretions are
very rarely used to exclude. It seems that judges rarely consider the probative value of
incriminating expert opinion evidence, preferring to leave such issues for the tribunal of
fact (and “weight”). In some jurisdictions, a range of supplementary considerations have
emerged to facilitate admission, such as compromises around the strength of expression
(so-called “splitting”), or liberally admitting incriminating opinion where the defense has
access to a “rebuttal” expert.551
The value and effectiveness of trial safeguards is uncertain. Cross-examination
can have a devastating impact on an expert witnesses’ testimony, and a rebuttal witness
might change the way in which a decision maker understands expert evidence and even
the case. On occasion, the trial judge might even identify the major limitations of an
expert’s opinions and convey them to a jury through cautionary warnings.552 Generally,
546

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993).
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Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. Daubert, it should be remembered, was a civil case dealing with the admissibility of
epidemiological studies and meta-analyses. See CARL F. CRANOR, TOXIC TORTS: SCIENCE, LAW AND THE POSSIBILITY
OF JUSTICE (2006).
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549

Gary Edmond & Mehera San Roque, The Cool Crucible: Forensic Science and the Frailty of the Criminal
Trial, 24 CURRENT ISSUES IN CRIM. JUST. 51, 62 (2012); EMMA CUNLIFFE, MURDER, MEDICINE AND
MOTHERHOOD 196 (2011); Keith A. Findley, Innocents at risk: Adversary imbalance, forensic science and the
search for truth, (2003) 38 Seton Hall L.Rev 893.
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FED. R. EVID. 403; Evidence Act 1995, s137 (Austl.); e.g., R. v. Jung [2006] NSWSC 658, [68]-[86] (Austl.).
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See, e.g., Jung [2006] NSWSC at [76]-[86] (Austl.). On the ‘equality of arms’ more generally, see JOHN D.
JACKSON & SARAH J. SUMMERS, INTERNATIONALISATION OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE: BEYOND THE COMMON LAW
AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS 83-85, 133-35 (2012).
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Note that this does not mean they will be understood. The ability to give directions and instructions with the
authority of the court often mediates the admission of expert evidence, particularly in England, Wales and
Australia. This response is interesting given that the research on judicial instructions, directions and cautionary
warnings has repeatedly questioned their influence and therefore value. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra
note 505, at 58. In addition, a review of directions in Australia in response to voice identification evidence found
that the content of instructions did not provide any scientifically-derived information and presented them in a
way that made them practically difficult, perhaps impossible, to apply them. Rather than inform juries about the
magnitude of risks of error, instructions tend to be remarkably general, often merely pointing to potential
difficulties (e.g. the length of exposure was short, or the quality of the recording was poor) or these is no
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revealing very high levels of error associated with the interpretation of voices and images, statements by learned
societies imploring members not to use particular methods for forensic purposes, and the emergence of more
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however, trial safeguards tend to be weak—much weaker than credible safeguards ought
to be—and inconsistent in their operation. Their existence and presumptive claims as to
their effectiveness are often used as grounds for admitting incriminating expert opinions
that are neither demonstrably reliable nor effectively challenged. The many limitations
associated with incriminating expert opinions are not usually canvassed or explained to
juries. Juries are rarely provided with much detail and almost never with the assistance of
relevant empirical studies, even where they exist.553 Often, appellate courts treat the poor
performance of lawyers, specifically in response to incriminating expert opinion evidence,
as strategic decisions in the conduct of the defense.
In relation to these trial safeguards we might note that traditions, especially in
England, Canada and some parts of Australia, of prosecutorial restraint seem to have little
conspicuous impact on the handling of expert evidence.554 In theory, the prosecuting
attorney should aim to prosecute in a manner that is robust, but also principled and fair.
Concerns with rectitude and fairness should extend to the use and reliance placed on
incriminating expert opinion evidence that is unreliable or of unknown probative value. In
addition, the prosecutor has a responsibility to direct attention to the actual value of expert
evidence and concede and convey limitations with that evidence.555 Where a technique is
weak or untested, the state might be obliged to abstain from relying upon it even if the
courts are willing to admit it.556
The ideal, rather than the reality, of trial safeguards, tends to be used to support
admission and reliance upon speculative and unreliable forms of expert opinion evidence
in all common law jurisdictions. Ironically, the limits of trial safeguards and prosecutorial
restraint, individually and in combination, reinforce the need to be more aggressive about
admissibility and to exclude evidence developed through techniques that are not
demonstrably reliable.
7.# Confidence#in#Juries#and#Judges#(and#Their#Ability#to#
Understand Complex Technical Evidence and Rationally Combine
It with Other Evidence in an Accusatorial Setting)
Ultimately, the issue of admission determines whether the tribunal of fact—lay,
whether jury or judge—will get to hear the testimony of a person formally recognized by
the court (and the state) as expert enough to express opinions in criminal proceedings.
Most judges express confidence in the ability of fact-finders to assess expert evidence
regardless of whether it is adequately contested or explained and regardless of whether it
is demonstrably reliable. Nevertheless, the jury’s performance depends upon their
understanding of the meaning of the decision to prosecute (e.g., that the accused is likely
to be guilty), the way the trial is conducted, particularly representations by the prosecution
and the adequacy of the defense, the way different types of evidence are combined, as well
as general cognitive capabilities.

technical methods by highly skilled linguists, statisticians and engineers all tend to be disregarded—whether
deliberately or inadvertently. See id. at 60-69.
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See Gary Edmond, Kristy Martire & Mehera San Roque, ‘Mere Guesswork’: Cross Lingual Voice
Comparisons and the Jury, 33 SYDNEY L. REV. 395, 421 (2011).
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Michael Saks, Scientific Evidence and the Ethical Obligations of Attorneys, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 421, 430-31
(2001). See also Myrna S. Raeder, See No Evil: Wrongful Convictions and the Prosecutorial Ethics of Offering
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The appropriate response might be to require research or the reform of investigative practices. See NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 505, at 63-66.
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Despite the expectation placed on the tribunal of fact, our criminal justice
systems are not well designed to facilitate jury (or judicial) comprehension of expert
evidence. It is far from obvious that juries perform well with expert opinion evidence or
with the integration of different forms of expert and non-expert evidence. There is little
evidence that judges perform much better.557 Where there are serious methodological
and/or statistical limitations or problems, or where there is no credible “research base”, it
is reasonably unlikely that this will be drawn to the attention of juries or explained in a
manner that might lead them to appreciate how serious concerns voiced by the NRC, for
example, actually are. We do know that juries do not perform well with statistical and
probabilistic information (or with likelihood ratios) and this is the way that many types of
forensic science are now being expressed—sometimes in the absence of underlying
research (see Table 1).558 In addition, there are good reasons to believe that judges and
jurors struggle to disaggregate components of the case. Once they have heard evidence,
even if it is not particularly probative, they may have serious difficulties discounting it.
There is little evidence that judges or juries are capable of ignoring evidence, regardless of
its admissibility.559
We do not say that juries are incapable of understanding complex evidence—
although this requires further attention—but rather that our current institutional
arrangements are not particularly well suited to jury comprehension. It may be that
procedures could be dramatically improved, but even improvement might not be adequate
for lay persons (including judges) to credibly cope with the tremendous variety of expert
opinion evidence, and evidence that is especially complex (or technical), unreliable or of
unknown reliability.560 The limits of the tribunal, once again, reinforce the importance of
admissibility decision-making and the reliability of incriminating expert opinion evidence.
And yet, admissibility gate-keeping is dependent upon legally-trained judges who, for a
variety of professional, ideological and pragmatic reasons, tend to maintain confidence in
the state and its criminal justice institutions.
D.

Implications of the Basic Conclusion

The implications of a lack of judicial attention to reliability are troubling. Most
obviously, it is disconcerting that trial practice does not seem to have been altered by a
major formal shift in admissibility standards. Courts and prosecutors have not yet engaged
with the possibility that past convictions were based on unreliable evidence, or with the
responsibility to review past practice that this realization entails. Adherence to forensic (or
legal) reliability in lieu of empirical reliability allows courts to cleave to a precedent-based
557
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approach, whereby opinions or techniques that have been admitted before the adoption of
reliability standards continue to be admitted. This tendency persists at times even when
there has been controversy about a technique or the evidence was originally admitted with
caveats. Courts devote selective attention to empirical reliability where demonstrable
reliability exists, while seemingly retaining a basic operating assumption that most
evidence should be admissible. Worryingly, courts seem to reserve particular skepticism
for experts called by criminal defendants. Overall, there is a serious lack of clarity around
the expression of results, particularly when it is appropriate to individualize. The
prevailing focus on experience rather than expertise discourages forensic scientists from
testing the reliability of their work or becoming familiar with scientific literature and
reasoning.
1.

The Historical Legacy

One of the more confronting implications from revelations about the quality of
forensic science and medical evidence, in conjunction with the emerging limits of legal
practice, particularly the failure to consistently identify very real epistemic frailties during
trials and appeals, is that many past convictions were probably mistaken, and very many
criminal proceedings admitted incriminating expert opinions that were either wrong,
grossly exaggerated or otherwise misleading. Very many criminal trials were, in
consequence, substantially unfair.561 Similarly, many guilty pleas were undoubtedly
accepted from innocent persons—presumably over-represented by minority groups, the
poor and the poorly educated—pragmatically responding to accusations predicated upon
or bolstered by mistaken or misleading expert opinions. Unreliable and speculative expert
opinions were often contaminated by exposure to prejudicial information but appeared as
independent corroboration, even when the other evidence was mistaken—such as
mistaken eyewitness identifications and confessions obtained under duress.
Where types of evidence, or individuals or laboratories are shown to produce
mistakes, these should not be treated as isolated errors. Rather, there should be reviews (or
audits) of other cases to determine whether poor practices are more widespread. In the
wake of the NRC report, there would seem to be a need to review convictions
substantially and systematically dependent on incriminating techniques and “expert”
opinions that are not demonstrably reliable.562
2.

Once Admitted, It’s Here to Stay

Once a type of opinion or technique is admitted, typically it remains admissible
unless some controversy emerges or evidence suggests that techniques and practices are
completely unacceptable. Interestingly, there tends to be limited review of previous
evidence, even once a technique is refined or shown to be limited. Moreover, where
evidence is initially admitted with reservations or constraints, or because of the particular
features of the case or the analysis, these restrictions are not always considered or applied
in subsequent decisions. Initial limitations, as in the case of bite marks in the U.S.
(following Marx) or the need for considerable familiarity to ground non-expert opinion in
Canadian image cases (after Leaney), were elided or watered-down in subsequent practice.
Often the decision to admit a kind of technique or opinion in one jurisdiction
provides support for similar practice in other jurisdictions. Legal practice in foreign
561
Even where the totality of the evidence might support guilt, admitting speculative opinions—often
contaminated by knowledge of other prejudicial information—as independent support for conviction is
inconsistent with a fair or rational process.
562
This would apply to cases involving over-zealous prosecutors, incompetent defense attorneys, and judges who
presided over cases.
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jurisdictions, though not necessarily determinative, often seems to temper the way in
which local rules of admissibility are constructed and may shift attention from
demonstrable evidence of reliability (or actually enforcing admissibility standards).
Perversely, in terms of criminal justice principles, it seems much more difficult to
have a forensic science or medical technique deemed inappropriate or inadmissible than
admissible—regardless of the research support or risks of error.
3.

Selective Attention to Reliability

This article documents that judges in the U.S., England and Wales, Canada and
Australia have not required forensic scientists to establish, with empirical evidence, that
their techniques are reliable, including techniques that have been relied upon for decades.
Interestingly, the only technique that seems to have been exposed to quite demanding
technical review, DNA profiling, was also the only technique where the defense obtained
access to technical insights of undoubted authority at a preliminary stage, and is the only
one of our techniques capable of satisfying a credible reliability standard given the way
interpretations are currently expressed. Judges, in conjunction with the resource
constraints on lawyers, have limited the scope and effectiveness of challenges to other
(i.e., the non-DNA) forensic science techniques.
It is no coincidence that judges in England, Wales and Australia often refer to
reliability, and sometimes validity and occasionally even refer to the copious amount of
legal and non-legal published literatures, with respect to DNA. They tend to be less
attentive to reliability, and it is of less value as a rhetorical resource, where a forensic
science technique is not demonstrably reliable (and/or is controversial). Perhaps the
primary exception is in the aftermath of high profile miscarriages of justice where
(un)reliability is often an important rhetorical resource.563
4. Evidence of Defendants (and Plaintiffs)
Judges seem to believe that admitting as much evidence as possible is basically
consistent with the primary goal of rectitude of decision (i.e., accuracy or “truth”).564
There is certainly a conspicuous trend in that direction in the Canadian jurisprudence.565
Revealingly, the commitment to the admission of the state’s expert evidence –
approaching “free proof” – is not necessarily extended to expert opinion evidence adduced
by plaintiffs in civil proceedings with juries (i.e., in the U.S.).566 Nevertheless, judges in
all common law jurisdictions have admitted and continue to admit the various forensic
science techniques we have considered notwithstanding remarkably divergent levels of
experimental support and quite different formal admissibility standards. Criminal trial
563
This occurred in response to the exoneration of the Birmingham Six, Guildford Four as well as the Splatt and
Chamberlain Royal Commissions and the Canadian inquiries cited previously. These all led to proposals for
change, but not ultimately to reliability-based research and admissibility practices.
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‘Free proof’ entails eliminating rules of admission to enable a more naturalistic (and implicitly rational)
approach to the assessment of all relevant evidence. See JOHN D. JACKSON & SARAH J. SUMMERS, THE
INTERNATIONALISATION OF CRIMINAL EVIDENCE: BEYOND THE COMMON LAW AND CIVIL LAW TRADITIONS
(2012). Our essay is, at least implicitly, an argument against free proof—at least in its more non-reflexive guises.
Not only are many of the formal rules and principles inconsistent with such a liberal response to incriminating
expert evidence, but free proof and its proponents tend to overlook, or underestimate, the weakness of trial
safeguards and the willingness of modern juries to convict. The admission of speculative incriminating opinions,
expressed by individuals presented as experts, may be difficult to overcome, even where their opinions are
contaminated, methodologically frail and mistaken. This has certainly been the case in many of the notorious
wrongful convictions and miscarriage of justice cases in recent decades.
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principles and values, like the application of admissibility rules, seem to be subservient to
admission rather than the other way around.
In theory and practice the adversarial criminal trial is intended to produce
accurate outcomes fairly.567 Quite deliberately, modern criminal trial processes and rules
are asymmetrical. Though primarily concerned with correct outcomes, the system is
intended to operate in a manner that embodies the presumption of innocence and prevents
a certain kind of error—namely, the conviction of the innocent. It is the state, in
consequence, that is obliged to prove guilt to the exclusion of all reasonable doubt. With a
few exceptions, there are relatively few expectations placed upon those accused of
criminality. In addition, trials should be substantially fair - both in the way they are
conducted and in the kinds of evidence produced and relied upon. This last point includes
the ability to meaningfully respond to incriminating evidence.
All four of our jurisdictions feature a one-size-fits-all approach to expert opinion
evidence. In theory, the same standard applies to evidence adduced by the state and the
accused in criminal proceedings as well as to evidence adduced by plaintiffs and
defendants in civil proceedings.568 Nevertheless, our findings affirm that judges are
particularly receptive to incriminating expert opinion evidence. These findings are
nuanced by empirical research on criminal trials and appeals, as well as judicial responses
to the expert opinion evidence adduced by plaintiffs in civil proceedings.569 In contrast to
the receptive, even laissez faire response to the state’s proffers in criminal proceedings,
the expert opinion evidence adduced by criminal defendants and plaintiffs tends to be
more thoroughly scrutinized and held to more demanding standards.
These differential practices are difficult to square with legal principle. In
principle, if there is to be disparity in the system, the most onerous standard should apply
to incriminating expert opinions. The most accommodating standard should be applied to
expert opinion evidence adduced by the accused.570 Alternatively, all evidence should be
held to precisely the same standard. Actual practice, in contrast, seems to invert legal
principle.
It might be thought that the presumption of innocence, the requirement that the
state prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and the desire to only convict the guilty might
justify the adoption of a more liberal admissibility threshold in respect of expert opinion
evidence adduced by the accused.571 The accused should, if there is any flexibility in
admissibility standards, be given (greater) scope to introduce expert evidence that may
raise a reasonable doubt or establish innocence.572 In practice, the state’s incriminating
expert evidence is likely to secure easy passage, but when expert opinion is tendered by
the accused it is more likely to undergo scrutiny and exclusion. In part, this is a result of
the differential access to resources and information. Prosecutors tend to have superior
567
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Regardless of the value of finality, this should be accommodated at any stage of proceedings or incarceration.
There will, of course, often be questions about what new techniques and evidence actually establishes.
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resources and much better access to forensic scientists and consultants. They also tend to
be more specialized and coordinated than many public (and private) defenders and so are
in a better position to develop strategies, share information and successfully contest expert
opinion evidence adduced by the defense. Expert evidence adduced by the defense, it
should be acknowledged, is sometimes of questionable value or speculative and often
presented by (forensically inexperienced) academic researchers rather than forensic
science practitioners. However, given the preceding discussion of admissibility practice in
response to many forensic science techniques that are currently relied upon by the state,
allowing the accused to adduce expert opinion that might not be demonstrably reliable (or
quite as demanding as any credible standard imposed upon the state) would not seem to be
inconsistent with principle or the generally accommodating responses to incriminating
expert opinion.573
5.

Expression of Results

Inattention to what the NRC Report characterized as the ‘knowledge base’
underpinning many forensic science techniques has meant that the issue of how results
should be expressed is often unclear—though not always explored (or conceded).574 The
lack of validation or proficiency testing means that in many areas forensic scientists
speculate on the significance of results (often apparent “matches” or “similarities”). This
may lead to attempts to express results cautiously, though in the absence of genuine
insight about methodological and procedural issues, and information about distributions,
imagined cautioned may be too cautious or—more troubling for the accusatorial trial—not
cautious enough. Increasingly, lawyers and trial judges negotiate the way results may be
expressed in courts, but this negotiation often follows from the lack of experimental
research supporting a technique. Negotiations, forming part of an admissibility
compromise, are not in any obvious sense indexed to empirical evidence. While they
might, as in the case of some recent qualifications to latent fingerprint evidence in the U.S.
and images in Australia, be better than unregulated assertions, they may nevertheless have
no tangible empirical foundations or discernible effects. Recent research suggests that
attempts by lawyers and judges to manage and perhaps mitigate the worst impacts of
expert opinions through tempering expression may make little, if any, difference to the
way incriminating opinions are actually understood—by the tribunal of fact.575
Differences in interpretations, conspicuous in the way DNA profiling and other
techniques (see Table 2) are reported, are also revealing given the lack of research support
for non-DNA comparison and pattern-matching techniques. DNA profiling, in contrast,
has undergone extensive testing and lengthy discussions by well-resourced specialist
groups that practically resolved a range of ongoing difficulties (and uncertainties).576 Few
other forensic science techniques have anything like the level of research support,
multidisciplinary consensus, or highly trained experts in non-forensic domains using
similar techniques and methods. When we compare the manner in which opinions are
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expressed, however, the non-DNA comparison (or identification) sciences are likely to be
linked to positive identifications (so-called individualizations). This is the strongest form
of expression: converting (apparent) similarities or “matches” into certain conclusions
about identity or source. In some instances this may be because investigators and
technicians are, or were historically (i.e., pre-DNA evidence), unaware of the complex
issues associated with identification and individualization, particularly around similarities,
the distribution of features in relevant populations, as well as a range of procedural biases
that might influence interpretive and comparative practices.
There is no coherent rationale for the manner in which different types of evidence
and opinions are expressed in reports and testimony. Rather, forms of expression are
historically contingent, reflecting: the age of techniques and the length of admissibilty
(with older techniques generally leading to higher levels of confidence or certitude); the
amount of supporting research (the more research the more cautious, and empiricallypredicated, expressions tend to be); the nature and extent of challenges; the degree of
mobilization (and controversy) beyond the courts; the involvement of (non-forensic)
scientists; and, the impact of notorious cases (e.g., bite mark cases in Australia or
problems with voice spectrographs in the United States).
Older and empirically tenuous techniques frequently use the strongest forms of
expression—e.g. a “match” as positive evidence of identity.577 Most of these expressions
were developed, or shaped, through ongoing interactions between courts and investigative
communities. Perhaps inadvertently, and unwittingly, courts have actively participated in
the production and legitimation of “expertise” and even “fields” through their
admissibility practices.578 Generally, admission (understood, and represented, as a proxy
for reliability) has tended to stall interest in research. Somewhat perversely, verdicts,
pleas, admissions, and the opinions of the experts themselves, rather than independent
research have all been used to ground and support many of the claims associated with
techniques not based on analysis of DNA. In some cases experience acquired during the
course of an investigation by a police officer or a forensic scientist is considered adequate
to ground admissibility, especially where the alternative is to allow the jury to examine
“evidence” unaided or to exclude potential evidence. For a variety of reasons, not the least
of which is the potential for embarrassment to criminal justice institutions, few
prosecutors, judges or forensic scientists have much interest in destabilizing earlier
admissibility settlements.
6.

Implications for Forensic Science Practices

Legal (i.e., judicial) recognition of “fields” or “expertise” confers social and
evidentiary legitimacy in circumstances where there may be few epistemic bases for that
status. Courts should be looking for independent—that is, non-legal—evidence of ability.
In the criminal sphere courts should be slow to confer their imprimatur (which may imply
reliability), especially in jurisdictions requiring ”reliability.” The alternative is an
undesirable tautology where legal recognition substitutes, almost always prematurely, for
reliability.
As things stand, it is simply unknown whether many of the experts permitted to
testify in courts can actually do what they claim, let alone how accurate they are. This is a
deplorable state of affairs for all jurisdictions regardless of the admissibility standard.
Courts have been instrumental in recognizing “experts” and “fields” and providing
577
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alternative pathways (such as treating the evidence as non-expert lay opinion or treating
recognition evidence as fact thereby circumventing opinion rules) that facilitate the
admission and reliance on practices and opinions that are not necessarily accepted beyond
forensic contexts. Many of those appearing in courts as expert (and non-expert) witnesses
are not familiar with standard research methods or the kinds of studies that might
illuminate the validity and reliability of their techniques. In consequence, many of those
giving forensic science evidence are oblivious to, or inadequately trained to credibly deal
with, some of the most pressing questions around validation and reliability and the ways in
which to express opinions in reports and before lay persons.579
E.

Differences Within and Among Jurisdictions

Our study documents the remarkable similarities in admissibility practices across
the four jurisdictions (and their many states and territories). In this section we consider
some of the differences in our sample. Notwithstanding overarching similarities, there are
variations in the way some courts within and across jurisdictions manage different kinds
of forensic science evidence and in some of the basic structures and resources that
influence jurisdictional practices.
The interpretation of images and bite marks, for purposes of identification, are
probably the most varied in our sample. Perhaps the variation stems from the influence of
the Smith decision on Australian case law and the relative distribution of cameras.580 In the
U.S., England and Wales, and Canada, police with limited exposure to the accused—
including “familiarity” acquired during the course of an investigation—are allowed to
offer positive identification evidence through watching images of an alleged crime. In
Australia, in Smith, the High Court largely prevented police identifications.581 This has led
to greater recourse to the opinions of ‘experts’ and non-investigative familiars.582 England
and Australia both seem to have more expert witnesses testifying in relation to facial,
body, gait and clothing comparisons derived from images than Canada and the United
States. This may be a consequence of more cameras, but would seem to be more closely
linked to their accommodating jurisprudence. In the United States, expert witnesses
commenting on images have largely relied upon photogrammetry. They are sometimes
called upon by the defense in post-conviction reviews.583 Allowing police to testify, as
‘familiars’ rather than “experts,” may help to circumvent reliability standards for expert
opinions in Canada. In Canada, in the place of expert witnesses, police officers, prison
guards and parole officers tend to express their opinions about identity. The early case of
Leaney provided access to the courts where there is sufficient “familiarity” (or
recognition) and since that time there has been little need for more expensive and less
predictable “experts.”584 The use of prison guards and parole officers in recent years
probably reflects a desire to have individuals who appear independent of the investigation
testify. Unavoidably, their participation reveals that the accused has prior convictions,
often having served time in prison. This may be seen as acceptable in a jurisdiction relying
heavily upon its judges for fact-finding. Notwithstanding these differences, all
579
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jurisdictions enable some kind of ‘expert’ or criminal justice employee to proffer their
incriminating opinions about the identity of persons of interest in images.
These differences are interesting because they imply that the various jurisdictions
have different approaches to relevance—a logical concept—as well as the manner in
which they treat fact versus opinion evidence at least in relation to images. The same
concerns are not applied, or not applied consistently, in other areas, even though there
would seem to be few conceptual reasons to distinguish the interpretation of images from
the interpretations of sounds, by way of example, at a conceptual level. Moreover,
relevance is rarely used to exclude expert evidence, even where the abilities of forensic
scientists are uncertain and their opinions might be unreliable and, hence, incapable of
rationally influencing the assessment of facts in issue.
Differences in response to bite marks are more difficult to explain. In part, they
seem to be linked to underlying problems with techniques and interpretations as well as
ongoing controversy associated with notorious miscarriages of justice and critical
academic commentary. Although in Canada, dental evidence has been used to suggest
problems with the state’s allegations. Variation in responses to incriminating images and
bite marks, along with the general responses to the other techniques, reinforce the
unprincipled nature of admissibility jurisprudence and practice.
While there are differences in the responses to voice comparisons (and
spectroscopy), bite marks, LCN DNA techniques and who gets to interpret incriminating
images, practical differences, tend to be on the margins or relatively minor. In most cases,
such opinion evidence is admissible (in some form), though occasionally subject to
qualification or comment or restriction on precisely who is entitled to express the opinion.
Even formally discredited techniques, such as some kinds of bite mark interpretations and
voice spectroscopy, might be admitted subject to witnesses qualifying their opinions and,
in England, Wales, Canada and Australia, judicial warning. Admissibility practice seems
to have no direct correspondence with the value of evidence, admissibility standards
(especially formally stipulating reliability), or the efficacy of safeguards such as crossexamination or directions and warnings.

III.

CONCLUSION

Our comparative study and analysis identifies serious problems with the
provision, reception and assessment of many forms of forensic science and medical
evidence used routinely to investigate and convict citizens in all adversarial jurisdictions.
Our study suggests that admissibility standards have not contributed to the exclusion (or
informed systematic evaluation) of unreliable and speculative forms of incriminating
opinion evidence in courts. Indeed, admissibility standards seem to have little discernible
impact on the quality of forensic science and forensic medicine evidence. This applies to
jurisdictions with common law and statutory standards, and includes jurisdictions that
expressly stipulate the need for reliability.
In consequence, too much incriminating opinion evidence, based on techniques
of unknown value and expressed in terms whose influence on lay persons is simply
unknown, is routinely admitted in criminal proceedings. Our findings affirm that
admissibility is important, and probably more important than conventionally believed,
because adversarial proceedings, especially the quotidian trial (and here we might add plea
bargains), are not well suited to identifying and conveying the complexities and
limitations of expert opinions or providing a forum conducive to meaningful exploration
and evaluation.
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In order to improve performances, and to align more closely with espoused goals
of accuracy and fairness (or truth and justice) and increasingly efficiency our lawyers and
judges must be willing to exclude expert opinion evidence that is not demonstrably
reliable. Legal institutions and personnel would seem to need to develop means of
obtaining more mainstream and methodologically–sensitive advice and evidence. Without
wanting to promote wholesale technocratic reforms, or to be understood to imply that
accommodating exogenous knowledge and empirical studies would be straightforward,
legal institutions must nevertheless begin to revise the ways in which they identify, admit
and assess scientific, medical and other expert opinions. In the face of emerging criticism
and evidence of wrongful convictions, continuing reliance upon unreliable and speculative
opinions and blind faith in the value of trial safeguards will erode the social legitimacy of
criminal justice institutions.585
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